Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

Whv Russia invaded

Socialist Organiser no. 16, February 1980 · scan pp. 8–9 · about 1,095 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 8

Usury

Native Afghan capital tended to be employed in usury. Industry has scarcely developed at all, despite big injections of foreign aid. The state was heavily involved in what industry there was. This meant that neither a modern bourgeoisie nor a modern proletariat developed in Afghanistan. _In the 1920s an attempt by the King, Amanullah, who held a complete monopoly of power, to copy the work of modernisation and reform from above which Kemal Attaturk had done in Turkey, brought tribal revolts and the powerful opposition of the priests. Defeated, he fled to exile in 1929.

In this society women were chattels, denied education, sold as brides, completely tepressed.

From the mid-1950s on, Afghanistan became more and more a client state of the USSR, getting two thirds of all foreign aid from its northern neighbour. The entire officer corps of the armed forces was trained in the USSR and armed by it, The armed forces were the main force holding the state together, and were the major group to have solid links with the modern world.

Groups developed in the army with commitments to developing and modernising the country, and initially many of them looked to the USSR as a model to copy, considering their own future role in a transformed Afghanistan to be like that of the privileged bureaucratic caste which rules in the USSR.

In 1973 the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup, and former prime minister and member of the royal family Mohammed Daoud was installed in power.

But despite promises to modernise the country Daoud achieved little because he had strong ties to the ruling class and its vested interests. He broke with the organisers of the coup and downgraded them.

The result was a second coup in April 1978, which toppled Daud. In fact it was led by those who had made the 1973 coup, working in collaboration with the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), a sort of 'Communist Party' (though inside Afghanistan it always denied it was a CP) allied to Moscow. Many of the leading officers were members of the PDP, and it assumed the leadership of the new regime.

To understand what followed it is essential to grasp two things. This was a coup of the army, with little support other than the army. And, through the PDP's underground work in the army (allied to the influence of the Soviet Union on the officers) the Army itself had become the main base of support for the PDP. It had no other big base of support in Afghan society.

The PDP itself had been split for years into two components, named after their publications Parcham (Flag) and Khalq (Masses).

Parcham was more a direct tool of the USSR. It joined the Daud government from 1973 to 1975. and in IRA A RABI that capacity persecuted Khalq, which was less subservient to the USSR. Unwillingly reunited before the April 1978 coup, the two factions fell apart within three months, and Parcham leaders were jailed or exiled.

The consequence of these facts was that the regime had a terribly narrow base for its reforming efforts, and that the purging of the Army and the PDP (which began in April 1978, with a purge against non-PDP supporters in the officer corps, and then escalated as the bloody faction fight between Khalq and Parcham erupted) progressively disrupted the base that the regime did have, demoralising the army.

The Khalq/army regime proclaimed drastic land reform designed to help millions of peasants and the estimated 700,000 landless people. It abolished debts to usurers. It began to create educational possibilities for women, and attacked practices such as the bridal price system.

AFGHANISTAN Hormuz 101A3 •OMANE Instead of these decrees rallying the people to the regime, they allowed an alliance of Muslim priests, landlords and royalists to rally much of the population against the regime.

The reforms themselves threatened the interests of all the traditional ruling groups, specially the landlords. Many of the priests are landlords, too. These reactionaries were able to win the support of masses ofe People whose interests should have led them to support the regime, by raising the cry "Defence of IsAmy Thime de dared hself lam" to be Islamic (and its enemies to be "unIslamic"'), it could not compete with the social influence of the masses of priests.

Priests

This outcome flower from ne fact that the regim lackd a sufficient base of ocial support to compete with the vast network of priests, and could only act through decrees and through the army. Before it had time to win sufficient support for thereforms, civil war developed on a serious scale, and the polarisation of the country went more and more against the 'infidel' government.

Similar things happened during the bourgeois revolutions in France and Belgium and, in a more complicated situation, in Spain): reactionvaries and priests led masses of peasants under the banner of 'Church and King' against the Jacobin revolutionaries and the town population.

One other consequence of the character of the base the regime did have was that it responded as a military power to the very first Muslim tribal revolts. Right from the beginning, and before the revolt became threatening, it strafed and bombed and napalmed villages from the air — which is not how a revolutionary regime goes about winning the people. By the end of 1979 the vicious. war of attrition had driven about 400,000 refugees across the border into Pakistan - most of them noncombatants.

From the summer of 1978 the Muslim revolt spread, and by mid-1979 it had a firm grip in a big part of Afghanistan. The rebels got outside help from the beginning, with money and arms from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. They were allowed to arm and train and maintain bases in Pakistan. The Chinese, alarmed at the pro-Russian regime in Afghanistan, sent guns and soldiers to train the Muslim rebels. No doubt the CIA was also involved, though not to the degree the Russians claimed.

Russia had long been involved in Afghanistat adwe have seen. Russian visers' ', military and civilian, became more numerous throughout 1978-9. A treaty tying the USSR and Afghanistan was signed in Decem ber 1978.

Dozens of Russians were slaughtered, some in the fighting, but also civilians. As the regime tore itself apart with factionalism and fratricidal slaughter, and suffered in the war of attrition with the rebels, the Russians became more and more involved, substituting themselves more and more for the flagging and tottering PDP/Army regime. The take

Scan page 9

build-up

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 16

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →