Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

[East European countries. bourgeoisie in the 1940s. nosc's…]

Socialist Organiser no. 32, 10 January 1981 · scan p. 5 · about 1,161 words

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East European countries. bourgeoisie in the 1940s. nosc's leaders. councils.

Today the situation still hangs ers' struggles in Poland.

IN 1980, the ten year respite which the Polish workers had granted to Gierek in 1970 finally ran out.

The hopes of the early 1970s, the rising living standards, the idea that the bureaucracy could reform itself gradually and lead the country out of its economic impasse by reliance on foreign loans and investments — all proved to be nothing more than a chimera for the vast majorityn of the Polish working class and peasantry.

How out of touch with the growing anger of the working class the Polish leaders actually were can be gauged by their ill-considered and ill-timed attempt to raise the price of foodstuffs throughout the country in the first days of July.

Price rises had been severely curtailed in the aftermath of the 1970-71, and the subsequent explosions of Ursus and Radom in 1976. But the 1980 price rises — the exercise of the unfettered 'leading role of the Communist Party' in the economic life of the country - were essential for the bureaucracy to begin making even more brutal inroads into the already poor living standards of the Polish workers, in a desperate attempt to meet its repayments to its foreign creditors.

The stormclouds of economic collapse were becoming ominous. But the bureaucrats had overestimated their ability to browbeat and deceive the workers. Strikes erupted.

in the balance. months of workembryonic political demands could be seen, as workers demanded not only wage increases but also family allowances equal to those received by the militia. The first signs of panic became visible in the reg ime's response, coupling negotiations with the threat of military intervention.

Finally, deputy premier Jagielski patched together a deal and a return to work was agreed.

The elation of the regime was undisguised. It thought the worst of the storm had passed.

Despite its massive security and intelligence network, the bureaucracy's lack of contact with the mass strikes... begins with a pure economic, or at all evens, a partial tradeunion conflict. and runs through all the stages to the political demonstration...

'But the movement on the whole does not proceed from the economic to the political struggle, nor even the reverse. Every great political mass action, after it has attained its political highest point, breaks up into a mass of economic strikes... Between the two there is the most complete reciprocal action '.

Within a month the bureaucracy would be facing not isolated strikes here and there, but a fight for its very survival.

The strike at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk on August 14th was the signal for hundreds of thousands of workers to down tools. Docks, engineering plants, textile factories, steel workers, the smallest factories and the most gigantic, stirred with an anger never seen before in modern Polish history. And they organised their nixn domorratirallv-elected strike committees.

On the Baltic sea-board, over 500 factories came together through elected representatives to form a MKS., Inter-Factory Strike Committee, an example to be followed up and down the country, from the Baltic the mines of Silesia, the south.

The strike wave in Silesia was the final blow which sent the bureaucracy reeling to the negotiating table to meet the workers' demands, which included everything from wage rises to the release of political prisoners, and other political demands which challenged the suffocating repression imposed by the Polish 'Communist' Party for the last thirty years.

If the movement from then on did not take the shape of a direct and head-on confrontation with the bureaucracy. it was only because the alarm bells , now sounding in the USSR and its satellite states signalled caution to the ears of the Polish workers. The last card of the Polish bureaucracy, in case of total impasse and the paralysis of its own means of repression and violence, would be the Russian army.

The fear of invasion led to the continuation of the political struggle not through the further development of workers' councils which would clash directly with the bureaucracy, but through new unions which, it was hoped, could bargain with it.

Free unions was the most bitterly fought of the workers' demands, the bureaucrats realising that it would mean the creation of a national organisation which, however much it claimed to be non-political, would be a permanent organised challenge to their legitimacy and their exercise of monopolistic control over society.

The intransigence of the workers forced the bureaucracy to make a temporary concession, hoping that with a gradual return to 'normality, placing innumerable obstacles in the way of the new union and also using the moderating influence of the Catholic Church on the union's top eadership, it could eventJally tame, and then crush, his new challenge.

Nevertheless, the new 3rd, was an overwhelming success, and official union membership estimates reached six million. The union's activities were spreading into the countryside.

In mid and late October, Poland was isolated by its neighbours as East Germany and Czechoslovakia closed their borders. (The borders with the USSR are permanently shut, the Moscow bureaucrats not trusting their population to travel even to a 'fraternal socialist country'). Warnings of excesses and dangers poured in from Honecker and Husak. And on October 24 the Warsaw District Court wrote into the statutes a clause about the 'leading role of the Party' The Solidarnose leaders had already stated that nothing more would be allowed than a reference to this shibboleth in the annex to the statutes. A national delegates' conference called a strike alert for 12 November.

Shuttlecock diplomacy between Warsaw and Moscow and a communique on the 'complete identity of views' between the Polish and Russian leaders, warnings and threats and even concessions to Solidarnosc about allowing it access to the media, could not sway the union to call off the proposed strike. Finally the Supreme Court in Warsaw overruled the lower court decision, and approved the union statutes as they stood.

Arrest

The third confrontation, and the most serious to date, was over the arrest of a union printer and a civil servant working in the Prosecutor General's office after the leaking of confidential material dealing with how the secret police should harass political militants.

This last confrontation showed that the regime's attempt to split the union activists from the political opposition and from the struggle for democratic rights were totally unsuccessful. The response was a demand to drastically cut the budget of the secret police and a call for the release of the arrested men and four other political prisoners.

Solidarnosc called an official strike alert on November 27th in Warsaw, but strikes and occupations had already • started several days earlier, including at the giant Huta Warszawa steelworks outside the capital. It was only by raising the bloody spectre of military intervention that Walesa, who had flown in from Gdansk, was able to persuade the workers to go back to work.

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