Nurseries fight grows

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Wing shop-floor leadership. There is a lack of branch life becaust of the centralised union structure.

But Lee Jeans shows a "wind of change" . More and more women are unwilling to work for 'pin money' The Lee Jeans occupation was a great embarrassment to the union leadership, after many years of complaining about the lack of fight from women workers and how their hands are lied by this lack of militancs"

The show of strength by Lee Jeans exposed them for what they are. It showed how divorced the union bureaucracy is from the feelings of the shop 110or.

Many factories would be willing to occupy in defence of jobs if they had a leadership capable of fighting not just at trade union level but at a political level. This is crucial for all workers, noi just in clothing, but in all industries where Jobs are being lost.

A national conference should have been called for in defence of those workers, and the question of national planning for the clothing industry and workers' control of that industry as a priority under the next Labour Government should have been raised.

But of course that requires a political leadership, which must be fought for by the leaders of the Lee Jeans lactory and all the women and men in struggle for their jobs.

The NUTGW is a strong supporter of import controls. What do you think? EARLY MORNING phone calls from the Social Services Directorate to one of the campaigners and to all matrons ot nurseries lower Hamlets, forbidding entry and placing a 'ban' on all campaigning on behalf of nursery workers, have been greeted with amusement by supporters of the 'Save Tower Hamlets Nurseries' campaign.

Links had already been made anyway, and we are amazed at the arrogance of local government workers who - facing redundancies and cutbacks themselves -think that just one word from them will stop support being built for the two threatened nurseries in this East London borough.

Management, however, are under pressure. Letters written to Peter Shore MP, who has passed the buck in typical fashion, are landing thick and fast on their desks. They also have several telexes from the Shadwell nursery giving them one week to declare in writing what decisions have been made.

Failing any decent replies the Shadwell parents and staff will assume the nursery is down for closure and act accordingly Parents are now prepa ing to reply to managemen and protest about thi attempt to exclude the cam paigners. And the fight ha been strengthened by thi production of a bulletir Trade unions and Labou Parties have been circulated and a petition will be pu round on local estates an: markets.

The Council is placing any new childre and is running down t numbers in the threatene: nurseries - even trying : force some parents to iran: fer when they clearly dor want to.

They have gone to res lengths - phoning parent: = work, finding out the: work hours and how the arrange their travel to it : with the nursery hours.

Despite the paren: retusal to move, they k=: on asking.

List

But lobbies anu Fi: meetings are planned 10:: autumn with Trades Coursponsorship, and are being made with hes visitors to make a 4* list that nurseries can c* order to thwart the Cour: manoeuvres.

Contact: c/o 36 Bradmere House, Jamaica Street. London El.

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•The French CP and the Mitterrand gove CRISSIN MENTA-RISIENTE together in garcrumen from 1010 in 10l FOR THE first time in nearly 40 years Communist Party members sit in the government of a major advanced capitalist country.

When François Mitterrand appointed four members of the French CP to his government in June, it might have appeared that the advocates of the 'parliamentary road to socialism' had at last got some of the power they needed to carry that strategy out. To judge by the reactions of the American government, the Communist Party ministers pose real threat to the stability of capitalist rule in Europe.

The reality is very different. The CP ministers occupy four relatively junior ministries (transport, health, public services and administrative reform, and vocational training). They enter the government at a time when the CP is at its weakest electorally since 1945.

The victory of the left in the Presidential and legislative elections in May and June marked a shift within the left from the CP to the Socialist Party. In the first round of the Presidential elections, the CP General Secretary Marchais slumped to 15% of the vote, while Mitterrand's vote soared to 26% .

Dropped

In the elections to the National Assembly, the CP dropped from 86 seats to 44, while the Socialists went from 107 to 273.

The CP even lost 4 of its 9 seats in its stronghold of Seine St. Denis -in the 'red belt' around Paris - to the SP.

Yet despite this setback for the Communist Party and the fact that Mitterrand had a majority in the Assembly without CP votes, the CP was invited to send ministers into the government.

It was not a major concession to the CP, as the Reagan government and the French right-wing parties argued. Rather, Mitterrand took a shrewd decision that he would be able to dictate terms to the CP and the CP would be less trouble inside the government than on the outside. In the run-up to the elections, the CP, which was attacking Mitterrand and the Socialists for "playing the right's game"

threatened general strike action if the SP came to power without agreement with the CP on their policies.

The CP has far less room for manoeuvre with their members in the government. The French rightwing paper 'Le Figaro"

was quite direct about it:

Naught 'The success of a socialist experiment in France is only possible to the extent that the Communist Party supports it more or less directly.

•Thrown back into opposition Georges Marchais' party would still have the means, even after its electoral setback, to reduce the socialists' ambitions to naught. Its implantation in the world of labour and its control of the CGT I the major union federation] are weapons which are effective in a different way to its Parliamentary strength"

The CP will have to take URP Workers demand 35 hour responsiblity for Mitterrand's policies without being able to change them.

The terms of CP participation in the government were humiliating. Since 1977, the CP has violently attacked the SP for not renegotiating the 'Common Programme" of the Union of the Left (between the CP, the SP and the Left Radicals) so as to include a more extensive programme of nationalisations. In the negotiations the CP had no choice but to accept the more limited proposals Mitterrand had campaigned on in the But in the field of foreign policy the CP had to concede still more. The agreement specified that France would "respect her alliances" and spoke of international negotiations to remove both the American Pershing missiles and the Russian SS-20s from Europe.

It also calls for 'the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs", that is, NAIU and the Warsaw Pact.

Afghanistan

The French CP, which in 1980 went out of its way to support the Russian invasion, has now signed an agreement calling for non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. As "Le Monde" put it, "The Americans should have seen this as considerable grounds for satisfaction."

The CP also accepted cooperation with the Socialists in local government, and, more importantly, in the factories - something the CP has always refused in the past. The SP obviously wants to limit the CP's freedom of manoeuvre in the unions when the Mitterrand government begins to push through anti-working class policies and the pressure from the CGT ranks builds up.

The CP prefers to face both ways. Charles Fiterman, the most senior of the CP ministers, says, to pacify the Socialists - and the capitalists - 'We are not delegates of the Communist Party. We respect the Constitution."

At the same time, Paul Laurent, a membes- says, CP's secretariat bays with one eye looking over his shoulder at the workers that expect the Mitterr.

and government to act in eek; Mitterand's not so sure their interests, 'trade unionists are totally independent in their actions and, if they feel they have to show a bit of impatience or a wish to go faster or to settle problems in their own way, well, I suppose that will go on just as befores."

For the time being, however, Mitterrand is clearly in control. The CP has made its peace with him. Mitterrand has in turn taken pains to assure the capitalists that he won't go too far and has the Communists under his control.

Whatever their private and not-so-private dislikes of their subordination to the Socialists, the CP are prepared to accept their subordination to the bourgeoisie and the political framework laid down by them -particularly De Gaulle's reactionary constitution. Fiterman declared, 'We deny to anyone the moral right to doubt our loyalty to France."

The more far-sighted French capitalists recognise that four Communist ministers are no threat to the stability of their rule.

The Reagan government, however, reacted very strongly against the (far appointment of the CP ministers, saying that ''the tone and content of our relations as allies will be affected by the Communists getting into the government.

George Bush, the American Vice-President and ex-CIA boss visited Mitterrand in Paris just as he was announcing his ministers, to make Reagan's views known to him.

Mitterrand did all he could to reassure Bush that his government would not do anything to jeopardise the links between France and the US. Mitterrand is rumoured to have told Bush that questions about national defence would be discussed in the Cabinet in the absence of the CP ministers. Although Cheysson, the Foreign Minister denied this, NATO Headquarters in Brussels stated that the French government had given satisfactory assurances that information vital to the defence of the West would be protected.

(Although France is not a member of NATO, France cooperates with NATO's defence plans).

The American response Giaulli is partly based on Cold War paranola about the intentions of Communist Parties. But Reagan and his allies are also worried about the overall effect of the Left's victory in France on the situation elsewhere Europe.

Now the French CP has ministers it is more difficult to continue to refuse the Italian CP any role in government.

The French CP has proved in the past that it is not the red ogre that Reagan and Bush believe.

In 1936, an acute sucial crisis brought to power the Popular Front government (led by the Socialist Leon Blum) on an upsurge of working class militancy. The CP had signed common programme and electoral pact with the Socialists and the bourgeois Radical Party.

The Popular Front consisted merely of antifascist and 'democratic' platitudes, but the working class took its election as a sign to take on the employers and fight for its own demands, with a wave of strikes and factory occu• pations.

The CP wholeheartedly supported the Popular Front alliance, in line with Stalin's need for "democratic anti-fascist" bourgeois allies for the USSR against Italy and Germany - at the cost of strangling independent working class action.

Blum offered the CP places in the government, but the CP refused.

Trotsky described their motives as follows:

"Most criminal and infamous in this situation is the conduct of the Communists: they have promised to give unswerying support to the Blum too revolutionary' - say the Cachins and the Thorezes (CP leaders) -'we might frighten our Radical colleagues to death. It is best for us to remain in the antechamber' Outward "In point of fact, the Communists wish to preserve an outward semblance of independence in order the better to subject the working masses to the Popular Front, i.e. to the discipline of capitalism"

The CP helped derail the strike wave - Thorez made the infamous statement It is necessary to know when to end a strike" - and were guided above all by their wish not to offend the French capitalist class, even the part of it opposed to the Popular Front.

Even the limited reforms Blum introduced were attacked on this basis -'the time was not ripe for an act of Marxist expropriation" , they commented as Blum tried to nationalise the Bank of France.

Having served its purpose of staving off militancy, the Popular Front government fell after only a year in office.

At the end of the war the CP did actually enter government. In 1944 the CP were given the Ministries of Health and Air in De Gaulle's Provisional Government in Algiers.

They remained in the government until 1947 when the Socialists showed them the door. It was in 1946 -presumably with Stalin's approval - that Thorez.

put forward for the first time the line of a peaceful road to socialism 'in the French style da uC thi att eci be thi str •pi :.

The CP's role is best described by the participants. Fernand Grenier, a CP minister in 1944-5 said in a recent interview, "De Gaulle no doubt chose me as he appreciated my national feelings and because he knew I wouldn't take advantage of my position to boost the positions supported by the CP"

Another CP minister, Marcel Paul, said, 'There was solidarity between ministers. It's true that there was no debate on changing society and modifying the country's structures. We had other things to do!' CHARLES ENTERMA MINISTRE PLE De Gaulle himself paid bute to the CP's 'nation feelings": "Of course, day afte y, the Communists prod ed their invective. Ye ey did not make an empt to start an insurr tonary movement. Ever Utter, while 1 governes ere wasn't a sing" ike" "As for Thorez, while he ed to push communism rward, on several occa ins he rendered a publ rvice.

"From the day of hu turn to France, he helped it an end to the 'Patrioti ilitias" that some of his

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The French Communist Party has achieved its main aim for the last 30-odd years - to get CP ministers in the government. Yet the CP faces an insoluble dilemma:to reaffirm its links with the Kremlin bureaucracy is to marginalise and discredit itself; to focus on its own bureaucracy in the CP municipalities, the unions etc., is to become a pale, secondrate version of the Socialist Party. Bruce Robinson reports. led to the CP leaving the coalition government '?? Haven't you seen a CP minister before? ment people wished to keep in a new state of clandestinity... he opposed attempts to encroach on the Committees of Liberation and acts of violence which overexcited units tried to commit.

''To those - many -workers, particularly the miners, who listened to his harangues, never stopped advising them to work as hard as possible and produce at any cost.

The CP was thrown out of government as relations between the USSR and the big capitalist powers began to worsen seriously in 1947. From then until now, the CP has been in opposition in France.

There is one very important difference between the CP's governmental policies in 1936 and in 1944-7 and its present policy. Before the CP's policy was entirely determined by the needs of the foreign policy of the Soviet Stalinist bureaucracy. Today that is not the case.

Though less ideologically 'Eurocommunist' than the Italian CP or the majority of the Spanish CP, the 'French CP's policies - and particularly ILS relations with the Socialists - are determined as much by considerations of its own ¡national interests as by ¡orders from Moscow.

The Soviet bureaucracy did not want a victory of the left in the Presidential Elections. Until the extent of Mitterrand's victory was clear, they were supporting Giscard d'Estaing on the grounds that Mitterrand would be less independent of the USA than Giscard and his nationalist Gaullist allies. Moscow is also at least lukewarm towards the French CP entering the government - none of Marchais' demands for CP ministers were ever published in the Russian press.

Pressure

At best, the advantages for Moscow lie in the pressure the CP could bring to bear on Mitterrand on foreign policy. But Mitterrand has already made it clear to the American government that the Socialists will not take any notice of the CP's views on France's alliances or on defence.

From Moscow's ENFIN QUOI n VOUS N'AVEZ JAMAI VU UN MiNiSTRE COMMUNISTE??

KASON

Trotskyists led Renault strike point, the dangers are also clear. In accepting the ministries, the CP had to give up those of its foreign policy positions that were most closely identified with Moscow (on disarmament and Afghanistan).

After 1978, when the Union of the Left with the Socialists and Left Radicals collapsed, the CP turned back towards an alliance with Moscow. The Soviet bureaucracy clearly fear that the entry of the CP into the government means a move back towards 'Eurocommunism' and fear that this might mean 8 (April-May 1947) which revival of a flagging 'Eurocommunism' in other European CPs.

The Italian CP, which has particularly bad relations with Moscow and which has in recent years developed relations with the French Socialists, was quick to greet the shift in French CP policy reflected in the agreement signed with the SP. The Italian CP stated 'We are happy with the positions taken today which will facilitate relations between our two parties."

This can only have strengthened Moscow's reservations at the French CP's participation in government, and the Soviet bureaucracy's feelings that, as "Le Monde" put it, "a better solution would be... support without participation' allowing the reconciliation of contradictory demands: maintaining doctrinal purity and keeping an eye on a government still suspected by Moscow of being tainted with atlanticism.

Failure

The terms on which the CP has entered Mitterrand's government marks the latest - and possibly the most far-reaching -episode in the failure of its strategy and in the political crisis that it has faced over the last 10 years.

With the exception of two short periods between 1939-41 and after 1947, the French CP's strategy since 1935 has focussed on achieving governmental power in alliance with other left parties and 'progress19. PI ive' sections evisie.

The form this has taken has altered depending on the realities of French politics. In the 30's it emphasised winning as much of the bourgeoisie as possible for a 'patriotic' government. In the 50's it took the form of asking to be admitted to centre-left coalition governments.

in the 70's it took the form of the "Union of the Left" with the Socialists and the Left Radicals.

The constant factors are that the CP is not strong enough to come to power alone and carry out its 'Parliamentary road' and also that the CP wants to reassure as wide a section of the bourgeoisie as possible that it will be careful to respect their rights.

The roots of the 'Union of the Left' strategy lie in the CP's attempts in the mid60s to get the Socialists and their allies to agree to a joint programme and to work together electorally. In 1965 the CP supported Mitterrand's candidacy for President.

But it was the events of 1968-9 that provided the real spur for both the CP and the Socialists. After the general strike of May-June 1968, the left was resoundingly defeated In the ensuing general election.

But the groups to the left of the CP and SP had massively increased their strength.

The CP drew the conclusion that they ruled a central governmenial strategy to counter the danger of being outflanked on the left. In December 1968 they drew up a manifesto focusing on three planks: the Union of the Left (on a programme of 'advanced democracy); nationalisation of the monopolies; and the leading role of the working class (expressed politically as the leading role of the CP!)

The presidential election of 1969 confirmed to both sides the usefulness of such ‚union' The Socialist candidate, Deferre, only got 5.1% of the votes. To the CP it appeared that they could use the ailing Socialists; to the Socialists, atter some wrangling, it appeared the only way to grow at all.

In 1972, the Common Programme was signed (along with the Left Radicals) and the Union of the Left came into existence.

Things did not go as the CP expected, however. Far from allowing the CP to dominate the left, the Union of the Left provided the means for the Socialist Party to re-establish itself as a major force both electorally and in terms of membership, and become more and more of a direct threat to the CP.

Since 1972 the CP has responded in two ways to this, but neither has prevented it from going from one crisis to another.

Sometimes the CP has gone out of its way to emphasise its moderation and democratic credentials, in order to win over floating middle-class voters whose support is necessary for the CP to gain electoral dominance in the left.

To do this, the CP needed to distance itself from its Stalinist past and its identification with Moscow. Hence its 'Eurocommunism' largely dropped in 1979-80 when the CP zigzagged to violent attacks on Mitterrand and the SP.

At other times the CP has emphasised its differences for alleged differences) with the Socialists - often in a violently sectarian manner.

In such periods the CP brings forward its claim -still believed by large numbers of workers - to be a 'revolutionary' party fundamentally different from the reformist Socialists. The CP has also at times appealed to the Gaullists - with whom it shares a fanatical nationalism - over the heads of the Socialists.

None of these ploys has prevented the SP from continuing to gain strength.

The CP was caught in a cleft stick. If it emphasised its differences with the SP, people who took the Union of the Left seriously would be attracted to the SP as the party of 'unity'. If the CP emphasised its links with the SP, it would become more and more subordinate to the SP and voters would go to the SP as the more dynamic, less 'dogmatic' and non-Stalinist party.

The CP has switched from one position to of the Left, 1972 anther with a speed that has thrown its own members BuLO COmES I and brought forward open in fundamental turn came i 1977-8 and led to the breal up of the Union of the Left Leading up to the Parl iamentary elections In March 1978 which the left was widely expected to win - the negotiations on Programme were „ marked by more and more noisy •soules betwetu the CP and SP, . particularly about nationalisation The CP broke off negotiations and publicly accused the SP of planning to do a deal with Giscard to form centre-left government. Although the SP's vOLt beat the CP's for the first Bathe sac and the be ance the CP managed to lost the election One result of this was a crisis inside the CP. Opposloosely organised and largely based among excellence a came into exotente the period running up to the CP's 23rd Congress in May 1979.

This antagonism to the Socialists was carried on from 1978 right up until the results of the first round of the presidential elections were announced. In 1979 80 the CP put on a left face and at the same time began to orient to the worst backwardness in the working class.

This included open use of racism, as Vitry-surSeine, where the CP mayor led a demonstration last rear which demolisher nostel for immigrant work ers. For years the CP has campaigned to reduce the number of immigrants in CP-controlled municipalities, and it also demands a total ban on immigration.

Humiliation

The CP's humiliation in the elections forced Marchais to do another 180° turn. To get into the Mitterrand government which would have been formed with or without CP participation — the CP had to make peace with the SP and accept their terms. This is leading to another crisis in the CP.

At the first Central Committee meeting after the elections, Marchais gave a series of excuses for the CP's performance.

late of the next Congres vas fixed for January 1982 already begun, however the Discussion in the Party had Eleven members in the Paris region have been expelled publishing "Rencontres for Communistthe recent politics : of the The internal crisis of the CP will continue for as long as the party lurches around in a desperate attempt revive ils w dull popularministers into the gheem The entry OT 40E CP ment, will nothing to reverse that. It SlaOLy marks a new stage in the CP's crisis.

If the government popula Sochists. if not, the to lhe votuisu unpopularity will rub oft on the CP - though in that case the CP might withrow its ministers and sta gain attacking Mitterrar from the left

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Socialist Organiser day 27 Au st. 19 81 Page Thurs PHOTO: JOHN HAYNES

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