Hot and cold on Falklands
Socialist Organiser1982 1982-04-29Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 2 →
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Thatcher's SEIZING the barren islet of South Georgia is one thing. A head-on battle with the Argentine forces in the Falklands is another.
For that reason even the wildest war-cries of the Tories are coupled with talk of negotiations and concessions. For that reason, too, they rely heavily on economic pressure.
The military threats and actions, apart from their direct effect, are designed to spur Britain's US and EEC allies into helping maintain that economic pressure.
The recent Royal Institute of International Affairs briefing on the Falklands points out:
"Its (the Galtieri junta's) greatest vulnerability ... lies in the external debt, now over $32 billion. This year alone over $7 billion has to ment for the last six years has pinned its whole economic strategy on attracting foreign capital... and it is this which renders it most vulnerable of all"
Economically as well as militarily, the Tories must aim to gamble on the brink. For if Argentina is pushed into defaulting on its debt, the results for the whole capitalist world economy could be drastic. Martin Thomas at the pressures possibilities for negotiations over the FalklandÅ› The Argentine assets now frozen in London are about a quarter of Argentina's total reserves. And Argentina's blocked exports to the EEC amount to 32% of its total.
The Tories' essential aim is to secure an impression of victory - to save their face. The rights or wishes of the Falklanders (let alone of the Argentine workers suffering under the brutal military dictatorship which British politicians of all stripes suddenly SO freely denounce) are strictly incidental.
Since the early 1970s Britain has plainly been trying to get rid of the Falklands.
In 1971 there was a communications agreement, tying the islands economically to Argentina.
"In the House of Commons in February 1977" the RIIA briefing reports, "the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland, made clear that the United Kingdom would not finance projects that the Shackleton Report of 1976 had identified as necessary for the economic development of the Falkland Islands. Nor would private investment be forthcoming unless there was a political settlement. Hence cooperation with Argentina was essential...
"After talks in December 1977, two working parties were set up (between Britain and Argentina), one to consider political issues, including sovereignty, the other to consider economic cooperation".
This was, of course, the Labour government dealing in: this way with the Argentine military regime which the same Labour leaders now brand as a "fascist dictatorship" to be fought at all costs!
Expect
The Tory government continued this policy. Tory minister Nicholas Ridley visited the Falklands in November 1980 and "tried to persuade the Islanders that it was unrealistic to expect the existing situation to continue indefinitely"
He stressed that cooperation with Argentina was vital, and urged the islanders to consider either a straight transfer of sovereignty or a transfer combined with a 'lease-back'.
However, the negotiations between Britain and Argentina never got anywhere: partly because the islanders had some political clout among nostalgic imperialists in Britain; partly for lack of sufficient urgency; and partly, no doubt, because of Britain's desire to secure some of the spoils of the oil and mineral resources of -the South Atlantic and Antarctica - revealed in the early 1970s - as part of the settlement.
Spoils
As the RIIA briefing points out, the dispute:
"would probably deter any oil company from embarking on any substantial investment in offshore mineral exploitation without firm assurance that its activity was acceptable not only to the Falkland Islands government but also to Argentina. Political risks apart, the logistics of an exercise that avoided Argentina would probably make it economically unattractive"
Economic interests drove towards a settlement - but not hard enough to overcome the political blockages process onto a different level. But the framework of the long years of negotiation remains.
Flotilla The RIIA briefing out that:
"Even if Britain were successtully to recapture the Falkland Islands, it would clearly not be able to hold them indefinitely .. a defeated Argentina would not be willing to negotiate a long-term agreement leaving the Islands in British hands"
For Britain to hold the Falklands by force, the RIIA estimates, it would have to install a force of helicopters, Britain's 50 biggest industrial companies do over 40% of their production abroad. Interest, profits, and dividend from abroad are a sizeable part of the income of the British capitalist class - £5,000 million in 1978 War The late 19th century scramble to divide the-world took the form of the seizure of colonies by the European powers. Yet that was only the form. Most fundamental was the world exploiting
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be either paid or rescheduled "The Argentine govern-
and the disputes over the Now the war has jerked the whole slow-moving