Socialist Organiser

The weekly of the fused Workers Socialist League, July 1981 to April 1984

Polish generals three options'

Socialist Organiser no. 91, 1 July 1982 · scan pp. 4–5 · about 670 words

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tha offration nosition of the Warsaw May Day Solidarnosc demonstrates defiance •THE results of martial laur aro uncotiafontary Law are unsatistactory, especially in southern Poland... The commissions cannot cope with the factory workforces...

The latest issue of the Solidarnosc Trade Union Working Group newsletter carries a report of an interview with a senior Polish army officer. As well as describing the results of martial law - and Jaruzelski's contingency plans - the interview gave details of the preparations for martial law.

The first preparation for martial law was started in February-March 1981. These included training for the professionals in the army. The decision to introduce martial law was taken during the Solidarity Congress and, immediately, military training was begun on a tactical level.

An important element in the training and preparations was the use of the so-called operational groups who were to spy out the ground. Officers in charge of units were assigned a number of public premises in order to train their troops to seize them.

One month before the declaration of martial law, officers received sealed envelopes which they were given code word. On the An the nanta night 12-13 December, this particular officer got the code word and opened the envelope. It contained instructions as to what objects were to be taken by his unit. The training and information about martial law were a shock for the cadets in the army colleges. They did not want to go out on patrol, there were cases of psychological depression and suicide.

Criminals who had previously received long jail sentences, were incorporated into the ZOMO firmations. This particular officer trained them. They distinguished themselves by their exceptional lack of intelligence. They were given IQ tests and their average was about 70.

Apart from these facts, which the officer knew at first hand, he gave several other facts which he had been told but which were difficult to check.

*The actual date of martial law was known only to Jaruzelski and not more than five absolutely trusted generals. The Politbureau of the PUWP didn't know. This was the crucial precondition for the successful introduction of martial ports about the effectiveness of their activities. The results of martial law are unsatisfactory, especially in southern Poland.

In fact, one can speak of a partisan movement there. The commissars cannot cope with the economy, factory workforces, etc.

*There were revolts in the army after the introduction of martial law. As a consequence of refusing to obey orders, more than ten generals were shot. Many units were isolated..

*The army has problems with the ZOMO which must be watched so that they don't rob or rape. There have been cases of theft during searches.

• Officer The remaining information illustrates the state of awareness of the army's officer corps and is a testimony to their indoctrination.

*The need to introduce martial law in Poland was a conclusion during a talk between Jaruzelski and Kulikov. The discussion took place in January 1981. It was decided that martial law would be introposition of the Warsaw Pact was threatened. The precise date of martial law was not fixed.

*Martial law can be implemented on one of three possible ways:

1) As it is at present 2) The militarisation of the whole population; a drastic curtailment in personal movement (empty streets), starvation food allocations, everything rationed. This alternative is so constructed that it must lead to rioting and acts of desperation by the civilian population since under it life becomes impossible.

Tacties to deal with partisans and street fighting had been planned, possible civilian and military casualty levels have been estimated.

3) If that failed to restore order, military intervention and occupation.

Thus the official propaganda stresses the insoluble nature of the situation since it flows from a total dependence on the Soviet Union; it also stresses the humanitarian" characteristics currently pursued by Jaruzelski.

(First published in 'wokopach number 10. Warsaw, 1 March 1982' in Warsaw: DYKTA TURI NIE!

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Socialist Organiser no.91 July 1 1982 Page 5

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