[6% in 1979 to over 25%. ably the…]

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6% in 1979 to over 25%. ably the second force in Though its leaders profess Spanish politics. In fact the a formal adherence to only other significant forces bourgeois democracy, they in Parliament are the rightare very quiet about their wing nationalists of commitment and their Catalunya (Jordi Pujol's campaign has been based Convergencia i Union) and on extreme right-wing of Euskadi (the Basque rhetoric, largely about the Nationalist Party). Both of "integrity of the Spanish them increased their nation', , law and order, and representation in the the traditional values of the present parliament largely family. because they took part the It is hard to argue that declining UCD vote. Only the AP is as yet any more of their defence of the righte a seriously organised politi- of the oppressed nations cal party than the UCD within Spain have mitiwas. But its rise is definit- gated the fundamentally ely a symptom of a growing very right-wing nature of The Centre was crushed polarisation in Spanish both these parties. It has politics. lead them to oppose the.

The AP is strongly assoc- centralism of both the Seats in the lower house, after the elections ofiated with a return to the national bourgeois parties politics of Francoism. and of the PSOE.

February 23 1981 - right wing officers invade Parliament. How long before a repeat? way from granting eve Last week was the winner in a remarkable The most obvious feature pas the unstoppable dvance of the Socialists. the PSOE's share of the stal vote was 48%; cominred with 31% in the 1979 Hactions.

Given that the turnout his time was 78%, comred with only 68% in 979, this means that this me, several million more paniards voted Socialist han 3 years ago.

Where did all these new otes come from? Many of bem were ex-abstentionko who in this election ensed a real possibility of hange in Spain.

Second, the PSOE gained stes from other left-wing arties, and in particular toma the Spanish bmmunist Party. Since 179, the CP, under the radership of Santiago arrillo, has passed trough split after split and arge after purge. These pheavals have lost the arty much of its old authoty in the eyes of sections I the working class. be CP's share of the vote ill from 11% in 1979 to ing than 4% in these factions, as its former apporters decided not to aste their vote. : in parliament, the ammunist representation Ill be reduced from 23 to a tere 5. By far the most ramatic drop was in saluna where the PSUC be Catalonian CP) lost 7 of March, 1979 Centre Democrats Communists 23 Socialists 121 October, 1982 as 5 its previous 8 members of parliament, - a clear result of the bitter split between the pro-Carrillo, Eurocommunist and the pro-Moscow factions of the old PSUC.

Carrillo has resigned as CP leader because of the party's bad results.

Collapse

Dramatic as it is, " the collapse of the CP's vote was not the determining factor in the election. That was the even more sensational collapse of the party which has ruled Spain since the first election after Franco's death, the Democratic Centre Union (UCD).

What was the majority political party of the Spanish ruling class has almost completely disappearred. In the 1977 election the UCD had 165 seats, in 1979 it had 167. Now it is reduced to 12.

But before going up in a puff of smoke the party had shattered into smithereens like a pane of glass. In the last months since Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo took over the premiership from Addfo Suarez, the UCD has said goodbye to five separate groups of defectors from the parliamentary party.

One of those was led by the man who led the UCD Popular Alliance C Basque Nationalists 7' Catalan Liberals 8 seats 7 Others therals Conte Danacras Besson seats Others 6 Carrillo - forced to resign to victory in the two previous elections, Addfo Suarez, a former leading Francoist bureaucrat. Suarez was forced to resign as premier in January 1981, apparently under pressure from the military.

His experiences seem to have made him into a genuine convert to bourgois democracy, and in these eleetions, leading his own splinter party, the Democratic Social Centre Party (CDS), he was the only one of the bourgeois leaders to defend with any conviction the limited reforms of the post-Franco period.

Separating himself from the rest of the bourgeois parties, he made clear his will to join a coalition government with the Socialist Party. And had the Socialists fared worge and Suarez's party better, that might have been possible. But as it turned out, Suarez' party obtained only two seats, though he himself was elected, which is more than can be said for his successor as Prime Minister, Calvo Sotelo.

The UCD and CDS's share of the vote fell from 36% in 1979 to 10% this time. And undoubtedly about a third of those who voted UCD in 1979, sections of the middle class genuinely committed to democracy, voted for the PSOE in 1982.

But the rest of the former UCD voters this time voted for the so-called Popular Alliance, led by Manuel Fraga - champion of the Right Fraga, a long-time faithful servant of dictator Franco as Minister and Ambassador.

If one of the dramatic features of the election was the political collapse of the Centre and of the Communist Party, the other was the rise of the Popular Alliance (AP).

Its vote rose from a mere It was therefore very important that during the campaign, after a sharp discussion, the CEOE (the Spanish equivalent of the CBI in Britain) came out in favour of a vote for Fraga's geats in Congress, the neo-francoist AP is now unquestionTHE PSOE went through the election campaign armed with a single slogan: For Change. And there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Spanish people voted in last month's election for change, many of them for profound change.

In practice what changes can the election of a PSOE government be expected to produce in Spain?

One starting point from which to answer that question is to look at the party's election programme, though in the case of Spain today, as I shall argue later, there is even less reason than usual in Western democracies to expect any connection between what the government does and TENT PINE nob Indone Ind its programme.

But, for what it is worth, the PSOE's 47-page programmatic document, surely even more boring to read than the Labour Party's manifesto, is certainly a blueprint for change in nearly all areas of Spanish society.

Under a Socialist government, it says, there will be a programme of reforms of the legal and administrative systems, of the social security and unemployment benefit laws, of laws which impose sexual discrimination, of the state finances, of the energy distribution network and many other things.

Democratic freedoms and rights wil be strengthened. In foreign policy Spain will move towards non-alignment and hence freeze its integration in NATO pending a national referendum about membership.

The philosophy underlying the document, however, is not, even rhetorically, the pursuit of socialism - a term which is not mentioned in the manifesto except in the title of the party. It is a pure democratic capitalist philosophy • consisting of more freedom, more social equality, and, above all, the "modernisation' of Spain.

In all the 47 pages of changes suggested there is nothing which would not in abstract be supported by most of the democratic sections of the capitalist class the world over.

That is not to say thi from the standpoint of socialists and oppresse sections of the populatio many of the changes, they could. be effecter would not be very desi able. Spain is still a lon

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'For change' was the Socialists' single slogan could get on with introduc- markets, and as a consequing its many marginal re- ence inflation, already forms, none of which seem rapid by European standmuch of a threat to bourg- ards, started to accelerate. fore be expected to be there is no sign at all that accepted with little more the new government has a Scenario interrelated problems of The scenario of a stable ment, financial crises and era of gradual reforms is crashes, and a major run on about as far from Spanish the peseta. It certainly has reality as it is possible to no plan for any radical attThe ETA leaders can towards military coup. concentrated very nara on aner tne election - which the elements of the PSOE saw the collapse of a major in Tordcanbo Mad ie democratic freedoms. 'he trouble is that the DE proposes no really lie changes which would er the underlying econo: inequality in Spain. In iculture the PSOE promme proposes many inges - with the exceptof the basically needed • of a radical land reform ich would dispossess the ze landowners. n the rest of its economic inor it aurorenate a masa icy I suggess a wurt ransionists approach and re encouragement to the is to finance investnt; but it proposes noag which would reduce • capitalist basis of the anish economy. t is capitalism's desperthirst for profit which in ain, as everywhere else the capitalist world, is ay creating mass unemyment on a scale unwwn for decades.

C'he best the PSOE can risage is the creation of 1,000 jobs over four years about a third of the presi number of unemploy: It hopes to disguise ne of the rest of the blem by encouraging ing people to stay longer school and old workers etire earlier.

But again it will leave vate nronertv invinlate. nAMA CarnAATA unr, ept for a plan to nationle the national hich tenselectricity transmission eS. )n paper the PSOE's ernative economic policy very much less radical n that of the Mitterrand rernment in France en it was elected or that the Labour Party in tain today.

Reforms The British Labour govment of 1945-51, for ance, undertook jens which on the surface * infinitely more radical h anything the PSOE is i committed to.

I politics depended on ling more than written Frammes, it might be able to predict that in now faced a period of tical stability in which very mildly reformist ernment which has just electea by sucn popular majority eois power and could therethan formal resistance. be. In fact the PSOE enters office in the middle of a very acute and rapidly worsening economic crisis and amid a permanent short-term threat to any kind of political democracy posed by the powerful Francoist army.

There are several separate but interrelated sources of instability and potential crisis which the Gonzalez government will be forced to contend with.

At the top of the list is the economic situation. Leading Socialist spokespersons often point to the unacceptability of over two million unemployed. But they have a tendency to talk about it as if it were a static problem which could be gradually reduced by their programme of reducing the retirement age to 04, reaucing е working week to 40 hours (in Spain 15 ge d the school-leaving age, while ameliorating the conditions of those who reilau main inamninger hur spreading the right to benefit which (even in a grossly inadequate form) is received by less than 30 per cent of the unemployed at present.

GoaL Maraneand hamera en buch measures nave 10 hope of fully offsetting continual increase in unemployment which is resulting from the wave of bankruptcies of firms. These collapses are also having major repercussions in the financial sector.

Many banks have failed in Spain in the last five years. And the latest was only a week after the elections when the Banca Catalana, the largest commercial bank in Catalonia, went bust. At the same time a run on ine peseta began, its 21 -value began to fall on world

ESPANIO

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From its programme policy which can solve the rapidly growing unemployack on the rights of private property such as would be needed to begin to resolve these problems. So in the early period of the Socialist government they will in all probability get a lot worse.

The second acute immediate problem faced by the new government is the political terrorism practised by the Basque nationalists of ETA. The day after the collapse of the Banca Catalana, ETA assassinated the commander of the important Brunete Tank Regiment, whose leaders were heavily implicated in the coup plot of February 23 1981.

Such effective anti-military actions by ETA are not the cause of the existence of an ever-present tendency towards military coups in the Spanish army. The 1 11 basic cause of that is a large and deeply reactionary caste oi rrancoist muntary --___ 1f l CL -:14.officers feeling that over seven years they have been robbed of some of their presugt unu power ana manatiran MIAM nadl economic privileges in Spanish society.

But the coup mentality in the army is tactically aided if there seems to be an excuse for military action to "stabilse tne poutical •1. 11. -situation. And the actions of ETA have up to now been the most convenient ae то тво such pretext.

There was much talk during the election that Felipe Gonzalez might be willing to negotiate a truce with ETA. And while this has been intermittently denied by both sides, there are elements in the PSOE and in ETA who believe that a negotiated truce is desirable.

hardly have failed to notice that the electoral coalition which supported them, Herri Batasuna, in the Basque provinces failed, in spite of a vast expenditure on propaganda, to maintain its share of the poll compared with recent elections. If they have passed their peak of popular support, then perhaps it is the moment to negotiate.

The elements in ETA who, by contrast, would like to retum to the oic days of military government in Madrid are probably quite small. The fact that they exist, however, gives the organisation a politically very erratic character.

This problem is an example of a more general one - that of the power and privileges of the military in general.

Spain has the largest repressive apparatus (army and police) per head of its population of any in Westorn Furno The mast maiority of its 1500 serving generals are loyal to the memory of dictator Franco, who appointed them.

They are a permanent and daily threat to any reform or democratic advance in Spain. Their many plots of political takeovers in the last few years are open secrets. Yet they remain impossible to control.

Even those like Milans del Bosch, sentenced to 30 years in prison, are free tn rantinno ninttina frim their comfortable cells. Colonel Tejero, the man who invaded the parliament in 1981, was allowed to stand in the elections, though his candidacy received only 25,000 votes nationwide.

The PSOE talks vaguely of the need to 'modernise' the army and at length to convert it to a professional one, but they have absolutely no idea at all about what to do with the Francoist officers. Even their plan to reduce the jurisdiction of military courts to soldiers on duty, and similar obvlous reforms, may provoke the ire of the generals.

The PSOE leaders do not even conceive of the possibility of anything more basic like sacking the generals. In their programme they refer to the army as a wnoie as ine guaranwr ur the constitution, and call 10I survig lucasures ag ainst those officers who plot coups (the 'golpistas'). The touble for the PSOE and 10r bit peupit ur spaw to fan the mannla of Cnain ia that all the officers are 'golpistas' The PSOE leaders know this but realise also that there is no way of dealing with it within the confines of their cautious parnamentarism.

It is still probably true that the creat mainritu of Bica Majn the bourgeoisie of Spain, even in their present agony, have not yet come to believe that their problems can only be solved by a coup. And some of them even have hopes of the socialist government.

But the AP leaders' studied ambiguity about democracy must in general strengthen the tendency Bourgeois support for unconstitutional action would no doubt rise fast if the Socialist victory led to a renewed upsurge of class struggle in Spain. This, of course, will not be at the behest of the Gonzalez government leadership, which never tires of calling for moderation.

But the accentuation of the economic crisis is forcing growing numbers of workers every day into conflict, merely to defend their jobs.

In addition there is a strong possibility that, faced with economic reality, the Socialists will, like governments all over Europe, ahandon their mild expansionism in favour of Panions farin ПІТ ПАТТА fill-arale anetarity nAThaps even quicker than the Mitterrand government in France.

If ench a move 10 responded to by a new wave of workers' struggle, then the bourgeoisie might very quickly abandon constitutionality. They would have no reason to tolerate a Grainlint marromant whinh had lost its ability to control the working class.

The final term in the complex equation of Spanish politics is the church. There are clear signs that the church played less role in the elections than in the two previous polls. Fewer sermons were reported promising eternal damnation for voting Socialist -and this might have helped the PSOE's vote in some rural areas.

But Fraga's campaign programme which might be expected to alienate the Church - and especially on the PSOE's plans to legalise abortion, though this will be only when the life of the mother is in serious danger, when there is a serious possibility of the child being deformed, or when the pregnancy is the result of rape.

Since the election this pledge has been taken up by the Pope in his visit. His call to Spaniards to resist the Socialist government's plans to legalise abortion will be seized on by the far right, and perhononcodhutha 'mlniotoo' naps useu vy wue gulpisvas as a pretext for a seizure of namar whinh amnna nthor among ocie. things would protect Christian morality'.

A leaflet which fluttered arnand the etrosta of Snanish cities the night before the election said simply, 'If the Socialists are elected your savings in the bank will be in danger'; the next one could add something -La mood i-dandinida forced malancie and nuns being raped in the street.

The threat to Spain's limited democracy is now very severe, even if an immediate serious coup attempt looks rather unlikely. The Socialist leaders almost certainly have at least a little breathing space to prepare for a probable right wing attempt to destabilise the country and overthrow constitutional rule.

In the dramatic week 11 - --1. • - 1. ! a brave bank horses into inf general, and a call by the Pope to mobilise against the government in defence of reactionary superstitions - the prospective government displayed some disturbing signs that it had no intention of using its breathing space to politically arm and mobilise its vast numbers of potential supporters. On the contrary it seemed intent on lulling them into a profoundly false sense of security.

In particular the assassination of General Ramon was greeted by Felipe Gonzalez with flattery and conciliation towards the armed forces.

When, just over 50 years ago, Largo Caballero became Socialist Prime Minister of Spain, he was described (over-generously) as 'the Spanish Lenin' Last week Felipe Gonzalez looked more like a Spanish Allende:

Not only in Spain but also in other countries socialists, recognising the significance of the ousting of the Francoists from the Spanish government for the first time in 45 years, will be preparing • to defend unconditionally the new government against the immense threat which it faces from the right.

But they will also fight for genuinely radical moves against the repressive system in Spain. 'Slow but sure' is no motto for the coming struggles.

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Organiser no. 108 November 11 1982 Page 10 : 11.1982 Page 10

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Spanish Soc ialist Party