How lack of leadership helped close Kinneil

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MRERS « FIGHT Gi MAD MONK RUMANC - JOB LOSSES Dave Milliken looks at why and how the fight against closure collapsed IN THE course of the eight weeks from November 2 to December 28 a 69% vote by the Scottish miners in favour of industrial action for their wage claim and against closures, was converted into a vote of 12-7 not to support Kinneil.

The implications for the Scottish mining industry are grave. No pits are safe, and the NCB has been given a green light to do their worst.

We can perhaps best understand the failure of the 'Save Kinneil' campaign if we compare the actions of the miners at Kinneil with the actions of the Scottish NUM executive land indeed of the national NUM leadership: Arthur Scargill was heard speaking about his speeding charge more than about Kinneil).

It had been known for some time that the NCB were going to announce the closure of Kinneil, with the disappearance of 320 jobs, but the timing, the Monday before Xmas did surprise many.

On hearing the news, NUM Kinneil branch met immediately and decided Yorkshire NUM militant Dave Douglass spoke to Socialist Organiser WHAT is your view of the Kinneil pit closure defeat and what are the implications for resisting further closures?

It was a disaster. It was a mistake for the Scottish NUM leadership to rely on unofficial action.

Scottish miners have always been constitutionally minded and in fact voted 80% for strike action in the ballot. The Executive had the authority to call action but someone passed the ball to the men.

Noone said the occupation of Kinneil was wrong when it began. The miners crossed the picket for two reasons. One was the pressure of the Xmas week pay packet, the other was the fact that the picket was unofficial.

I personally don't think this" should make any difference, but on this occasion the men were waiting for an official call.

The conference went the way it did because the officials recommended acceptance to the Executive who then recommended acceptance to the conference. That's what did it.

The effect on the Welsh miners can only be one of namArnGALınn LEGUTI ER to take whatever action was necessary to prevent the run-down, and specifically not to carry out recovery work, ie. removal of machinery etc.

That same day, the back shift were instructed to start recovery work, which they refused to do. The following two shifts. were given the same instructions and also refused. The strike was thus underway.

Pickets were organised and in the course of the next week all 19 Scottish pits were visited. Not all of have no doubt that Yorkshire is strong enough to hold. In my view last year's ballot was a tactical blunder; the two questions, about the pay offer and closures, should have been put, but with room for two separate answers.

If pit closures had been put separately, there would have been a massive vote to fight which would have taken the middle stump out of the press campaign about tying the two issues together.

What is the likely effect now on the National Coal Board's plans?

I don't see them launching an all out attack before a general election. But the employer has now got the thin end of the wedge and will press the advantage.

With steel and other industries running down the NCB can't go on for ever with 40m tons on the ground. There must be a lim it to that. The Board will be paying more to store the coal than mine it.

Then there is the privatisation threat. Their longtorm ninenanto muat he to BilLAND SUBSIDISE OUR TORY POLICIES EQUAL

has given us instructions

has Riv that if action is required, action must be taken to pull out the entire Scottish coalfield to support Kinneil or others threatened with closure" said George Bolton, Scottish vice-president, on November 21.

The official campaign conducted was only a propagandist one, aimed more at publicity to the 'general public' than to build the support within the Scottish and British workforce which was needed to take on the NCB and win.

On McGahey's first visit to Kinneil after the occupation he told them that the situation wasn't. looking promising. The groundwork for the unpromising position had been well and truly laid by the Executive's lack of effort to mobilise support amongst their members.

And then why did the Executive recommend that the conference vote against strike action?

There is probably a higher degree of loyalty by NUM members to their leadership than in any other union. Kinneil branch chair Jim McCallum's reaction when I asked him last week what he felt of the Executive's campaign was that "I'm not prepared to attack the NUM to a newspaper. If I'm criticising them, then it'll be at an NUM meeting."

It may well be that the support would " not have been there. We will never know. But there comes a point when leadership has to take the lead. The "we'll support any action you take' mentality is inadequate especially on jobs.

Job cuts and closures are difficult issues to fight; there have been few victories on this front (although perhaps the most spectacular was by the NUM two years ago) and little action is likely so long as leadership brings up the rear.

The collapse of the Kinneil fight torpedoed battles against closures in South Wales and Kent, and set the whole NUM back. If the NUM Scottish area executive had recommended strike action and had the recommendation, then that would have been worse for their bureaucratic credibility. But would it have been worse for the working class than the executive's collapse without a fight?

in the end it was another example of bureaucracy within the labour movement. The process is relentless. Militancy is sat upon by leaderships who make use of all the rhetoric at their disposal - until they announce that much as they would like to take action, the membership has let them down once again.

It took eight months in the case of the health workers and eight weeks for the miners.

The process will continue until this sort of 'leadership' is replaced by people prepared to take a stand and actually fight for the interests, of their members.

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