Bad news for COHSE

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S London Spanswick - a right-winger elected to succeed him THE results have been published of the election for General Secretary of the Confederation of Health Service Employees (CoHSE).

David Williams, the right-wing Assistant General Secretary, was elected with a vote of over 27,500 - nearly 4 times as many JOHN HARRIS as his nearest rival, Malcolm MacMillan. The total CoHSE membership is approximately 230,000.

This was hardly a surprise result, given the situation of the Union in general, and the circumstances of the ballot in particular.

The un-numbered ballot papers - more than required for the number of members in each Branch -were entirely in the hands of the Branch Secretaries to distribute. This method is wide open to abuse, especially in the many Branches which are kept non-functioning by Branch Secretaries!

CoHSE has. a reputation of being a right-wing union, but during the mass industrial action in the NHS last year, several attempts were made by Branches ranging from Edinburgh to Guildford to achieve indefinite strike. These attempts were all broken under the weight of the bureaucracy of CoHSE and the TUC NHS Committee, headed by CoHSE's retiring General Secretary, Albert Spanswick.

Nevertheless, there was a groundswell of feeling against the tactics of this leadership, which eventually procured a sell-out settlement to the dispute.

The Broad Left, known as 'Group '81', sponsored Andrea Campbell for General Secretary. She stood on the Broad Left platform of democratising the Union to make it work for all the membership, and of support for the membership in the fight not only for pay, but for the Health Service itself.

Address Her election address spelled out the need for occupations and supporting strike action in the fight against the cuts.

Sister Campbell won 1,761 votes.

Unfortunately, another Group '81 supporter, Haddu Mohammed, stood against Andrea Campbell, as did also the Regional Full-time Secretary for Scotland, and the national Education officer, Malcolm MacMillan.

As runner-up to Williams, Macmilian polied 7,000 votes - far more than the other Left candidates. As a nationallyknown figure in the Union, he was seen as progressive in the sense of being outside the traditional closed clique of national bureaucrats.

The Union now faces the need for a fight against mass privatisation and the end of the Health Service as we know it, under a General Secretary more rightwing than Spanswick. It seems a bleak prospect.

But then none of our Union leaders predicted last year's massive pay struggle, which saw the awakening of NHS workers on .an unprecedented scale. Hopefully we will not forget the potential strength we realised last year - despite the efforts of our incoming General Secretary Angela Gregory Gregory CUTS

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rel off ap en La No an Lal Sta me me ish sta me figl the stri Soll mid Solı poli the we witl live Soley is deputy Labour Irty spokesperson on Northern eland. He has been quoted peatedly in the press as speakg out for a united Ireland (the ficial Labour Party policy). He 'pears to be cast from a differt mould from men like former bour Secretaries of State for orthern Ireland, Roy Mason d Merlyn Rees, not to speak of in Concannon, the present bour shadow Secretary of ate.

Labour's recent record on rthern Ireland is a crying indal for the labour moveint. It was the Labour governint and Roy Mason who aboled political status, and thus rted from the British governnt side the five 'years long ht about criminalisation in the Blocks which culminated in • death of ten men on hunger ike in 1981. onathan Hammond and John Mahony interviewed Clive ey for Socialist Organiser in I-February. In the earlier part ey expounds Labour Party icy and his own views. In latter part of the interview discuss some of the issues h him. lext week: part 2, and a commentary by Jonathan Hammond and John O'Mahony.

JH: Can you outline the Labour Party policy for us, as it stands now?

CS: The first thing Labour would do on gaining power would be to give a clear commitment to a united Ireland by consent.

way consent! f'irst of all, we prefer to govern by consent, obviously. But, secondly, and this is very important, the population of Ireland is five million. Of those five million, 1½ million live in Northern Ireland. Of that 1½ million, one million, to a greater or lesser extent, support the Unionist cause. And to try to force one million to join the other four million without their consent would be a recipe for disaster.

I don't think a united Irish government Fould be well equipped, particularly in akbe earty days, to cope with the problems thas would come from that.

Box obes cocsers unet sox Dear is a We wouia legislate in a way that mould lead people to the conclusion that • united Ireland was in their best aterests.

The sort of things I would like to see us consider, and I think we would consider, maid be measures like joint citizen-poke and stand in each other's elections, -ery close harmonisation, so that the Trionist won't feel trapped in a united fretand - so that he knows that if he bosses to he can travel on a British pessport or an Irish passport, he can vote in British elections, he can vote in Irish elections, and, I would hope, could stand in elections on both sides too.

I think we would be looking very quickly for a major effort to harmonise various matters on the economy, social factors, and political institutions north and south of the Border. I believe the Border has distorted the economies of both North and South alike. One of the things I would want to consider very urgently would be an all-Ireland Economic Development Council. I'd also like to look at some form of all-Ireland council, or a sort of British-Irish council - with elected representatives from the North and the South, and possibly from Britain.

We'd want to consider an all-Ireland police force, recruited - and 1 emphasise this - from both sides of the Border, trained in a common training school, with a common sense of identity.

I would say to people who are worried about an all-Ireland police force that unless you do consider things like that, then frankly you are not serious about a united Ireland. At the end of the day, there has to be a police force that can cross that border, and it's an important step forward.

There's a whole range of factors of that sort which we'd want to consider. JH: You seem to be leading towards the idea of a federation between Britain and Ireland, and a united Ireland within that federation.

CS: No. I don't think there is any chance of a federation between Britain and Ireland. If people wanted it, I wouldn't rule it out, but frankly I don't think it is realistic. What I do think would be more likely, although I would stress that I am not looking for this particularly, is a federal Ireland. That makes sense -whether on the existing borders or not, is another matter.

A federal Ireland would, I think, provide a recognition that the Unionists are a significant part of the population, and do have anxieties about certain social legislation, abortion rights, etc. You can deal with that in a federal system quite well. But frankly I don't think there is any chance of a federation between Britain and Ireland. I do think that with the Border out of the way, there could be a much closer, more healthy, relationship.

JO'M: Dick Spring, the Irish Labour Party leader, recently talked about seeking a solution within the broader framework of the EEC.

CS: I wouldn't rule it out. We've got to Roy Mason be very open and flexible in our approach. But having said that, again I wouldn't be optimistic.

My view is that the reason why we've always had a problem in Northern Ireland is because we have always dealt with it as though it is a problem of the people of Northern Ireland or Ireland.

But in fact it's a British problem as well.

If we believe that Northern Ireland is part ot the United Kingdom, OK, let's integrate it into the UK. But no government ever has. No government has ever treated it as part of the UK. We have always treated it differently, and therefore I think we have to make up our minds.

An EEC intervention - well, it might help, but at the end of the day we're still going to have to make that decision ourselves. If you have a family quarrel, it's no good inviting the neighbours in to sort it out.

JH: You talk about the need to get the consent of the Unionist population. But that's a two-way thing - because you also need to get the consent of the Republican population in Northern Ireland and in the Republic.

What is your view of the growth of Troops Out sentiment, not only in Northern Ireland, but in the Labour Party?

What is Labour's current view of Provisional Sinn Fein? Does Labour think they have a contribution to make to bringing about Irish unity? What about Frank Allaun's recent statement that the Labour Party should start recruiting in Northern Ireland? On the face of it, it would seem to be a sensible idea - in the light of the ideas you've just put forward? Do you support it?

CS: When we say consent, what we are talking about is a majority - whether Catholic or Protestant, just a majority -of those people coming out in favour of a united Ireland. Obviously I would prefer it to be more than 750,001, but that's a majority. So it's not as difficult a task as it looks on the face of it.

- You are dependent, obviously, on an Irish government wanting this outcome. At the end of the day it's got to be negotiated with them. But we are looking for a majority of the people in the North, measured by a poll or by institutions like a new Assembly, or whatever.

On the Labour Party organising in Northern Ireland - I feel it would be a mistake. I don't think it would work, and I think there is a hidden and very real danger in it that you'll end up with a Catholic trade union movement and a Protestant trade union movement. That would be disastrous.

My view is that nationalism, sadly, is a stronger force than class, and until we resolve the question of national identity we won't resolve the question of class politics. Therefore I think it is a non-starter. But if they are successful, OK, I'll relate to that party.

Provisional Sinn Fein? I dearly wish it will do the ballot box and drop the armalite. They can't do both at the same time sensibly or honestly. They might be moring in that direction, though not immediately. It's anybody's guess.

People who have not broken the law are people whom, at the end of the day, you can't refuse to talk to, and that's not a problem as I see it. I still say: drop the armalite.

JH: Do you see withdrawal of troops as an objective of Labour Party policy? CS: The aim should be troops back to barracks as soon as possible. That is actually happening, but slowly. We want to continue it as quickly as possible.

I'm not a Troops Out man, nor am I EN 'The Catholic population began to feel the ) for setting dates for British withdrawal. I see a policy of British withdrawal from Ireland as opposed to a policy for a united Ireland. It does not follow that if we withdraw our troops then you will have a united Ireland.

We all know that some unionists are prepared to fight for an independent Vorthern Ireland. I don't think it would vork, but I do know that plenty of them ire prepared to fight for it.

Therefore my view is that policies that ire designed simply to get Britain out lon't provide a solution. They simply get Britain out, which might be nice for us vut doesn't solve the problem. 'H: As you know, the first post-war Labur government set a precise time-table or withdrawal from India. You don't see hat as a realistic option for the next Lab. ur government and Northern Ireland? 'S: No, I don't think so. These areas are Iways very difficult. We look back on re India operation as a success. It was success for Britain, in that it got us ut. But it wasn't a success for the milons who died - and millions did die. nd it created the split Pakistan state hich led to yet more wars.

We have got to do this in a manner •hich does leave a united Ireland and ot just an Ireland divided in a different ay: We must do it with the minimum as of life. There is going to be some ss of life whatever we do, no ifs and uts about it. It's a violent situation, and le violence is going to stay for a while hatever we do.

D'M: How would you define Britain's otive for staying in? There used to be ilitary considerations up to the '40s OU Full weight of the British presence' and later, and economic considerations a long time ago. How would you define the motives now?

CS: I don't think I would ever have definied it as simply one thing or the other. I agree that the military considerations were major. I don't think they are any more. I think it is a mixture of economic, social, cultural and political, and in part military, things. I don't go into Irish nistory in depth: there's so much of it you can pursue it forever.

My job as a politician is to recognise that we have got a problem now and try to resolve it. You only need to look at the fact that the vast bulk of the Protestant community come from Scotland to realise that you have a very distinct cultural group there. You then have a distinct cultural group in the Anglo-Irish, and also the original Gaelic Irish. So it's very complex, and I'd hate to say it was purely economic or purely military. That would be to ignore an awful lot of complexities. I think the only similarities to Ireland are places like Cyprus and Israel/Palestine.

JH: But would the package of economic and social and political reforme you speak of really affect Catholic/Protestant polarisation for the better. Wouldn't it just scratch the surface?

CS: Initially they might not have all that much effect. Some of them would. But as we went on, we would have more and more effect.

Let me give you an example. If we were successful in harmonising pensions on both sides of the Border - which is not impossible - then I would be quite DreDared in adminica..

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William Street, Derry: British troops trying to bold everything together...' politics of Ireland until I came into this presence there when the troops were House in 1979. I always felt there should first brought in. Is that not correct? rights movement came along in the late JO'M: I doubt it — not at first. I could, 1960s I got very excited. I thought there for example, tell you in detail about was a good chance of real political and how the British army was allowed into economic progress by peaceful means. Catholic Free Derry, and the protective I think the destruction of that civil barricades (erected in August 1969) rights movement was a crucial step. A voluntarily taken down, in October 1969. lot of people have got a lot to answer for. It was actually organised by the RepubliThe main people are the Stormont gov- cans. Later the IRA split and things things the Loyalists and the Stormont absolutely necessary political logic in the happened is that the IRA, as it then was, offensive, in that the basic civil right that recognised that the initial popularity of the Catholics lacked was the right of self Then it swung in the opposite direction JU'M: Ine trovisionals emerged at the and, after he succeeded Merlyn Rees, end of 1969 as part of a reaction against JO'M: Would you defend Roy Mason's Mason adopted a policy that was essen- the fact that over the previous seven policy after the bringing down of the tially one of beating down the Catholics. years there had been an evolution topower-sharing executive by the Orange There is a lot of evidence of very wide- wards peaceful methods by the old IRA. general strike — withdrawal of political spread searches of thousands of Catholic They were involved in the civil rights status, a hard line 'security policy' for homes. It amounted to terrorisation. It agitation. They had no guns, or scarcely was basically a policy of holding the ring, any, during the pogroms of 1969. The' ES: I don't think I'd defend the records doing nothing, sweating it out — immed- IRA didn't in fact... of a number of previous Secretaries of iately after buckling under the pressure CS: I'm quite prepared to accept that State! It's very easy to sit back and criti- of the Orange strike. That's what hap- you know more about the IRA than I do: is that successive Labour governments CS: I understand that view. Can I say you that there was an effort to alienate and successive Labour Parties # how I see it? I wast involved in the the minority community tron the British ts from Dublin. So if you are a hardunionist, and you get your giro in the from Dublin, then you could tear it I blow it up, but my guess is that would cash it. hat I'm after is the vast majority of people prepared to enter into a uniteland.

Back in 1974 we have the very effecLoyalist strike. The Labour governI more or less capitulated to it. n the fact that Paisley and other -line Protestants might do the same 5 again if you introduced such a age, what guarantees do we have a new Labour government would not le same as its predecessor?

have to move. It is unrealistic to and otherwise. ›wever, having said that, I think this y requires a great deal of political mination and political skill. The is to do it in such a way that you r allow either of the main antagonist ps to bring down our proposals. You roing always for what is workable, в pushing people in a certain direcIt will be maybe two steps forward, be one step back now and then. But • got to be very clear progress in a lorward. ope we could deal with a crisis like , but my first aim would be to avoid E Bas Britain's whole e strategy was dous in 1974 by the Org inge general areeir true. y es. But we nood to remamhor that mo waro atill in a ICÇU W IOLICLUUOI VUAL NE NÇIO DUL LI A very early stage of grappling with the problem. We've done a lot more thinking about it. I would hope we've learned from that. I recognise that it would be extremely difficult. But with determination and skill I think we can do it. JH: There has been a lot of - justified -criticism of one of your fellow spokesthe crassness and insensitivity of his naranno nn Ianlaud Nau Nan- (-_ Perovus un trElia, Non COnCannOn, IOT visit to Bobby Sands on his death-bed. Concannon obviously represents a strong point of view in the Labour Party. CS: I wasn't involved in any discussions with Don about the visit, so therefore I don't know if the popular image is quite right. Ithink he would have a very different view of it. It ought to be recognised, in fairness, that he was asked to carry out that visit by the then leader of the Party. Whether it was right or wrong, sensitive or insensitive, I can't say.

Don is now committed to the policy that is being described, and that to my mind is good.

Roy Mason's policy the Catholic areas?

cise when in fact what happened, I think, pened. wasn't just the government, it was the Party as a whole - never really thought about Northern Ireland until it blew up in their face, and then the first thing we did was to try to hold everything together.

We tried to clamp down on violence. I remember the outrage at the time of the 1974 pub bombing. Now everybody is against the Prevention nf Terrorism Act. My own view on that has always been the same. But at the time that Act was passed, there was an awful lot of support for it in the labour movement.

I thought we would never crush the violence until we had dealt with the political problems. But some people have forgotten what they were saying at the time.

JO'M: Can I put to you a view of what Mason did? You have a situation where the government balances between the Protestants and the Catholics. The Labour government capitulated to the Or. ange general strike in May 1974. I think it simply let its strategy (power-sharing and a Council of Ireland) be wiped out. be a united Ireland. Then when the civil ernment, and then the paramilitaries on both sides of the divide over there:

Because, leaving aside the obvious government did, the other thing that the British troops could not be allowed to CS: Richt. conținue. So they started their policy of shooting at British forces. British forces totany unequippea to aeal win inar de La and situation, backed by both Labour and Tory ministers, then began to crack down where they thought the threat really came from, which was the Catholic population.

And then you get everything you have described - searches, people being arrested wrongly, etc., so that the Catholic population began to feel the full weight of the British presence, and that is what alienated them.

I don't blame them for being alienated in exactly the same way as the Prevention of Terrorism Act alienated them, because they all get lifted under it. We all know that. That's how it came about.

It's very difficult to reverse that process quickly. At the end of the day it is going to need to be reversed. But in the meantime we must just stick with the main objective of a united Ireland, because all of these things are symptoms of the problem. The problem is the Border.

JO'M: But WHY do you think the civil rights movement of the late '60s turned into the armed offensive led by the IRA? CS: I think the civil rights movement was a threat to the paramilitary grouns on both sides. Certainly it was a massive threat to the Stormont government and the Loyalists generally. There is no doubt in my mind that a whole lot of people who had a very fixed view of how they saw things developing, thinking they represented their particular group, set out to destroy the movement. JO'M: The IRA scarcely existed in 1969.

CS: Well, it existed all right, and it existed enough to do the damage by turning on the British troops. intr I wasn't deeply involved. But I put it to changed.

But can I put the point in a different way? It seems to me that there was an development from civil rights to the IRA determination.

The whole logic of the struggle for limtea objectves tea to a trotestant packlash, which in turn pushed the Catholics, in fear and terror, towards self-defence, and then boosted those who wanted to go on an armed offensive, after the IRA split.

That takes us back to what you said about waiting for a majority in the Northern state. The point is that it has been artificially carved out — very artificially. 35% of the population are opposed to the state's existence. Over the past 15 years, in fact from before the violent phase, when it was a question of Britain putting pressure to reform on the old Orange state, the central problem has been that the state was deliberately designed to give a permanent Protestant majority. It was not reformable. You say you want a new beginning. Yet you are committed to remaining within the narrow limitations of a state which has a built-in Protestant sectarian majority.

CS: These are very important points, and I recognise the logic of what you have just said. I'd go along with quite a bit of it. I'd have reservations about some of it. What I would stress to you is that the key to this is having the political skill and determination to go through with the political, social, economic and institutional changes regardless of opposition from the Unionist groups.

I don't mean rough-riding over them. I am saying that we would not accept that they had a veto - for example, on setting up an all-Ireland Economic Development Council, or an all-Ireland police force, and a whole host of other things of that nature.

If you do that, you are saying something you've never said before to the unionists: it's not just that we want to get things better in Northern Ireland. We are savine to vou that we don't want you in the UK any more, we want you in a united Ireland. That is a very different message going out to the Unionists than has gone out before.

I don't think you can assume that all unionists are hard-liners who will fight in the last ditch. Obviously there are lots of those. They keep making their presence felt. But there are also a lot of them saying things that would not have gaid even five years ago, let alone ten. Well, we can't go on as we are, can we?, for example. That's. a very significant change.

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idl PRY

I don't have any, because all govern- is when they come under pressure