How the miners cracked the Tories
Socialist Organiser1984 1984-04-04Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 7 →
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ONE of the weaknesses of the 1972 strike was that, as is not uncommon in union struggles, the leadership was amazed at the success of a strike which more than any other was built and pushed forward from below.
The number of rank and file miners involved in fighting the strike in 1972 was unbelievable. Around 8,000 workers were said to be involved in picketing within the first week. By the end of the strike some 40,000 miners were said to have been involved in the flying pickets and the mass pickets.
Once faced with negotiations, the leadership reverted to type. One of the concessions the Wilberforce settlement imposed was a clause extending the agreement by four months. In future agreements with the NCB would terminate not in early winter but in february. So if there was a breakdown in negotiations the miners would be taking action in the spring, a far less suitable time.
In 1973 there was a downturn in struggle as Heath, aided by the union leaders recovered from the twin debacles for him of the miners' strike and the Pentonville dockers. With some strokes reminiscent of the nimble tread of the feet of Fred Astaire choreographed by Vic Feather,: Hugh Scanlon and Jack Jones, he made the switch with dexterity from free market economics to incomes policy.
Joe gormley was on hand to juggle the conference claim of the miners around until winter ended, and settle in March under Phase Il of the incomes policy for a swiftly conjured up £2.29.
The lefts had not pushed hard. 'You can't go over the top twice in two years was the orthodox widsom.
But for 1974 such a push began early. From the moment the July conference decided on a rejection of the wages policy and a demand for new minima of £35, £40 and £45 for surface, underground and face workers a frisson of fear ran through the establishment.
Heath had run out of options. There was talk of a general strike and a last stand. But like Will Paynter before him Joe Gormley was a noble savage whose moral courage and love of high living might pull the Tories' chestnuts out of the fire.
And when negotiations failed to progress satisfactorily and a Special Conference was called for October 1973 the Bolton Boozer was first to the podium. In a matter of moments, Joe's motion for a complete overtime ban encompassing even safety and maintenance work had been carried and Joe was in the bar annihilating his second pint of bitter. "'The ban," he informed -with increasing incoherence -the reporters who purchased his subsequent pints, "would ensure the miners would grind to a halt within a few weeks ... days . . . hours . . . minutes... seconds!"
All of this took just 90 minutes. The overtime ban lasted more than two months. The left fell into line behind Joe though they started from widely differing ends of the political spectrum there was at this time little difference between Joe Gormley and Lawrence Daly. * Daly was even more enthusiastic than Gormley about the ban. 'Coal production will not slowly grind to a halt" he lectured the Morning Star, "supplies will drop speedily"
By the end of November this seemed to be the general view on the left. rom Joe gormley's point of view it cut across any preparation for a strike.
In December his call at the executive for a strike ballot was defeated. Joe was seen as attempting to derail a successful tactic. Militants who argued that the time had come to move forward were seen as playing into his hands. The ban itself would do the job. Joe Gormley Lawrence Daly have seen a clear run to March and another small settlement.
But Heath decided to go for the miners. Like Thatcher today, he wasn't willing to rely on his collaborators in the trade union leadership.
He decided to put the frighteners on, hoping to isolate the NUM.
Just before Christmas he put the country on the three-day week. Despite government propaganda, there was three months' stocks at the crucial power stations in mid-January. Heath's move backfired and so did a vicious media campaign. A mood of anger swept the pits. Calls came from the lodges that the time had arrived.
At the Executive meeting on 24 January, a move for a ballot was won. The result was a massive 80% for a strike.
Given the lack of preparation this was amazing. The majority in 1972 had only been 58%. There was a feeling of hatred against Heath, a teeling that the harvest of the earlier victory had been denied the miners, a sense that now was the time to fully settle accounts.
But Heath and Gormley were still in there battling for Britain. On 7 February, Heath called a General Election rather than face things out. Gormley announced the next day that the strike should be called off until after the election. A wave of resolutions called for his resignation. The executive voted to fight on.
But the struggle was very different from 1972. Picketing was cut to a minimum. There was little involvement. In reality things were hanging on for the ballot box.
With a minority Labour government installed after the February 28 Election, the executive again didn't maximise its bargaining position. Faceworkers got the full £45 but underground workers got £3 and surface workers f4 less than the full claim and concessions were made on holidays. Most shameful was that the settlement was to be operative from March. 1974, not November 1973.
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