Making the CP safe for capitalism
Socialist Organiser1984 1984-06-28Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
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Neil Kinnock's performance during the miners' strike has brought home sharply to many activists the fact that the Labour Party needs to be turned upside down if it is to be a real working class party. But most would be startled to think that the Communist Party in Italy is to the right of Kinnock' Labour Party. Such is, however, the fact: the Italian CP (PCI favours coalitions with the Italian equivalent of the Tory Party. This article by Andre Frys (translated and abridged from the French socialist weekly Lutte Ouvriere) explains Berlinguer advocated coalition between the CP and Italian Tories Italian president Pertini beside Berlinguer's coffin BERLINGUER'S political career in the PCI really began in the month April 1944, when he was freed from prison and when the Badoglio government, which had succeeded Mussolini, put the political structures to follow fascism into place with the aid of the Anglo-American forces.
Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Stalinist PCI, had just arrived back in Italy and stamped on the PCI what gone down to history as 'Salerno turn'.
This "turn' removed any possible ambiguity about the role that the leaders of the PCI wanted to play in the postfascist order. There was no question at all of social revolution. The PCI declared itself ready, on the contrary, to collaborate in a government of national unity with "the participation of the great mass parties", "a government capable of organising a real serious war effort throughout the country" against the Germans.
Proclaiming that 'there is a place in the national front for all those who want to fight for the liberty of Italy", the PCI even abandoned any insistence on the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel - the 'fascist 'king' who had installed Mussolini in power — and the abolition of the monarchy.
In that month of April 1944, the PCI made its entry into the Badoglio government, giving its collaboration to the Italian bourgeoisie to reconstruct a state apparatus, to redress the economy and above all to block, by its influence on the masses, the road to any revolutionary possibilities.
It was in this party of government, this 'party of a new type' as Togliatti called it, with its positive and constructive activity', that Berlinguer began a brilliant career.
He became general secreItary of the Communist Youth then, as from 1948, a member of the leadership of the party.
The PCI had left the government in 1947. But it still continued on the path traced in 1944, becoming a party heavily involved in the administration of municipalities and trade unions, basically a profoundly reformist party despite its name 'communist'.
For many years, just like the French CP, the PCI was excluded from • all governmental coalitions. Not until the 1970s could its leadership once again envisage the possibility of participating in government, thanks to the PCI's steady electoral progress and the increasing discredit of the centre-left government coalitions.
It fell to Berlinguer, elected general secretary of the party in March 1972 as successor to some of the history.
Luigi Longo, to define a policy that would permit the PCI to get back into governmental political life.
In 1973, following the Chilean coup d'etat, Berlinguer formulated the idea of the 'historic compromise. To avoid what had happened in Chile, he said, it was necessary to establish collaboration between the two big Italian parties: the PCI and the Christian Democracy.
Stripped of spurious justifications, this proposition came down to this: the PCI would not claim access to government power in alternation with the Christian Democracy, which had dominated Italian governments until then, for the Italian bourgeoisie would never accept such a thing, but it would seek access to government in collaboration with the Christian Democracy.
In other words, the PCI limited its ambitions to the possibility of participating in a Christian-Democrat government. In the name of the compromise necessary with the 'Catholic masses' whom the Christian Democracy (DC) was said to represent, the PCI declared itself willing to serve the DC as a buttress and a cover, even as a life-belt or safety-net, in return for a few ministerial seats.
The 'historic compromise' began being realised in the years 1976 to 1979. In the elections of June 1976 Berlinguer's party got its best score, with 34.4% of the vote. By compromises and bit by bit, the DC gained the collaboration of the PCI, but still without giving it what it wanted in return: ministerial portfolios.
In 1978 the PCI was even allowed to participate, explicitly, in the Parliamentary majority of.. an exclusively Christian-Democrat government!
All in all, the 'historic compromise' came down to the fact that the Christian Democrat leaders accepted... the PCI members of parliament voting for them!
Loyal
For the communist militants, for the working class, this was hard to swallow, and more so because the 'national unity' governments of this period had to pursue cuts or repression against student demonstrations and against the violent actions of the terrorist groups.
But, under the leadership of Berlinguer, the PCI insisted on showing itself a loyal supporter of these governments of crisis, conscious that this was the price it had to pay to show the Italian bourgeoisie its loyalty and that it was a governmental party.
Berlinguer's party paid for this policy with an erosion of its electoral position.
After the assassination of Aldo Moro — who had been the main artisan of the compromises with the PCI by the Red Brigades in spring 1978, the DC showed itself less and less prepared to make concessions to the PCI.
So in 1979 the PCI had to go back into opposition.
Berlinguer himself recognised that the formula of • 'historic compromise' was now finished. He substituted the formula, 'the democratic alternative' which proclaims that the PCI should have a leading role, but which in reality does not close the door to collaboration with the Christian Democracy, so deliberately vague are its outlines.
It is in fact an interim position, as Berlinguer clearly said when he declared: 'Italian political life is going through a transition phase. Before a replacement solution really emerges, we have to devise transition phases. Availability in continuity"
With 'the democratic alternative' ', the PCI is trying to maintain its forces as an opposition party, while still declaring itself available to take up government responsibilities if a possibility of that sort should emerge. Its principal concern 1504 is not to have its position as the main left party taken away from it by its rival, the Italian Socialist Party which, for its part, has been trying since 1980 to show that it can enable the Italian bourgeoisie to govern without the help of the PCI.
In his determination to occupy the place of a social-democratic party, and not to have the PSI take that away from 'him, Berlinguer made some demonstrative gestures in relation to the USSR, and notably the gesture which will go down in history as "lo strappo'. , 'the hreak' USSR In December 1981 thẹ PCI daily L'Unita, declared that "the phase in the development of socialism which began with the October Revolution has exhausted its dynamism": in other words, the PCI no longer had any reason to have special links with the USSR.
The PCI declared that it would "maintain normal relation with all the Communist Parties, in the same way as with any other socialist, revolutionary and progressive force, without any special or privileged link with any of them and on a basis of autonomy of political thought and action, without any ideological or organisational link"
This 'break' did of course lead to some difficulties inside the party. A pro-Soviet tendency was created around Armando Cossuta. But 's rule, 1943 Cossuta's motion at the following Congress of the party only got 5% of the votes. Basically, the 'break' was well accepted by the party.
But ' Berlinguer's political skill in those years lay also in maintaining the hold of the PCI and its control over the reactions of the working class, sometimes at the cost of radical words.
Thus Berlinguer could be seen threatening to call for the 'occupation' of the Fiat factories in September 1980, at the time when the management decided to sack thousands of workers.
He could also be seen, at the beginning of this year, at the head of workers' protests against the Craxi government's decree cutting back on the inflation-protection of wages... all the better to lead that action into a dead end and in the last analysis to have it play the role of a buttress to the parliamentary jousts of the PCI.
Berlinguer was, as all the press emphasised, an honest, moral, serious and hardworking • man, which isn't common among Italian politicians. But this honesty and seriousness was basically in the service of the bourgeoisie.
He worked, seriously and patiently, to make of the enormous force which a party like the PCI could have been for the working class, a force which was controllable, integrable and usable by the bourgeoisie in the framework of its political and social system.
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Socialist Organises no: 185 June 28 1984 Paga 9