Bolivia: the price of not winning socialism
Socialist Organiser1984 1984-11-08Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →
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BOLIVIA is one of the poorest countries in the world, best known to outsiders for a bewildering series of military coups, or as one of the world's largest producers of cocaine.
In this detailed study of the political history of Bolivia since the revolution of 1952, James Dunkerly shows that behind the apparent political chaos is a rich history of popular struggle. an extraordinarily class conscious, militant and well-organised working class, and something of a serious, mass Trotskyist tradition.
Prospects
Dunkerly argues that the prospects for socialist revolution are particularly good in Bolivia. He puts it like this:
...of all the post-World War Two political revolutions which failed to achieve the abolition of capitalism, that in Bolivia [in 1952] exhibited the highest degree of proletarian politicisation within a broad Leninist idiom and most consistent resurgence of mass mobilisaton... The potential for] a mass political movement for socialism...has acquired exceptionally strong roots and remains a vital possibility.
*Nowhere else in Latin America, perhaps the world, can one so readily perceive such an outcome flowing from the process of national liberation. " (p.348).
In 1946, at an extraordinary congress in Pulacayao mine, a resolution was passed by the Bolivian tin miners' union, the FSTMB, which, as Dunkerly notes, "was, in essence, an application of Trotsky's 1938 Transitional Programme to Bolivian conditions and with special reference to trade union objectives. " (p.17).
Lora
One of its authors was a miners' leader from Siglo XX mine named Guillermo Lora. Lora and his party, the POR (Workers' Revolutionary Party), along with its various schisms, have remained one of the few Trotskyist parties in the world with some mass influence.
The miners' union, the FSTMB, has not remained so clearly dominated, by the Trotskyists as it was in 1946. It has always been a battleground for various left-wing organisations, including Lora's POR and various parties that have split from it, as well as the Communist Party and the nationalist parties.
The most important single figure in it for over 30 years has been the wily trade union militant Juan Lechin, who has kept his distance from all of these
groups.
But the FSTMB has always been a powerful radical force in the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana), the Bolivian equivalent of the TUC. Both the COB
and the tin miners' union played a big role in the 'national revolution' of 1952, which overthrew the old landowning elite.
That revolution brought to power not the working class, but the MNR (Movimento Nactionalista Revolutionaria) of victor Paz Estenssoro, . representing the nationalist middle class. It could have been otherwise. The old state apparatus was disintegrating, and workers' militias had developed - including militias based on workplace organisation and relatively independent of the MR.
The COB produced a programme which was a 'slightly diluted version' of the 1946 FSTMB resolution and stated:
*The COB plans the occupaalisation without compensation under workers' control...
*The national congress of workers is a step towards obtaining a workers' parliament which will transcend the democratic bourgeois juridical framework and open the road to a government of workers and peasants. (quoted, p..47).
This, note, was produced by the Bolivian equivalent of the TUC. The MNR condemned the COB's statement and insisted that "it [the MNR] is in essence a national party and thus against international communism.
In the event, the MNR won out, and co-opted the workers' muvement into its strategefor a revolution within capitalist limits. The mines were nationalised, and held under workers' control for many years; the landowners' estates were handed over to the peasants; but Bolivia remained capitalist.
Syndicalism
Dunkerley explains the failure of the workers' movement in 1952 by the strength of its traditions of syndicalism (i.e. militant trade unionism rejecting party-political action). Unfortunately he does not say much about the mistakes and problems of the Trotskyist party.
After 1952 Bolivia entered into a long period of political instability. Every so often the ruling class shored up its position - usually by more or less severe repression - but each time the working class would soon open up a new period of intense conflict.
Throughout the fifties and 'sixties the efforts of Bolivia' capitalists to consolidate their rule became more ana more AMA тлис drastic. This culminated in the Banzerato - the rule of the military under Hugo Banzer Suarez, beginning in 1971.
After 1974 the Banzer regime modelled itself on Pinochet's molvian tin miners "A workers' and peasants' militia, 1952 Chile.
Along the road from 1952 to 1971 there were many coup' d'etat, and heroic working class struggles.
For example, the Barrientos dictatorship (November 1964April 1969) met with fierce resistance. Faced with an attempt to take their guns away, the tin miners responded:
"Let them come to the mines and ask the workers for their anne Wo will cop if they hand them over. When a miner takes mus. vre wu see a micy nanu up a weapon he doesn't give it away for anything in the world. —Eventually, the workers* militias were overrun and the troops established control. workers leaders were killed and wages were cut. The US military presence was increased.
Simultaneously, a weaklybased guerrilla war led by Che Guevara was defeated, and Guevara, a hero of the Cuban revolution, was killed.
Barrientos
But before long the Barrientos dictatorship fell, and new struggles erupted, including general strikes.
In 1971 a 'Popular Assembly" was set up. This was intended as an "independent organ of popular power, grouping together al! the mass workers' and left-wing organisations in a form of united front.
'A few have dismissed it as a transient and thoroughly ineffectual body, a talking shop for self-seeking ideologues who net for only ten days, spent tive of them immersed in bureaucratic minutiae and the rest of provoking a coup against which they could provide no leadership.
"The left has, in general, defended the experience although it differs considerably as to whether lit| represented a school PCB, the Bolivian Communist Party). possessed the characteristics of a soviet (workers" councils such as those in Russia in 1917) and the organs of dual power (MIR, a Castroite left group), or was a body with much more pronounced soviet characteristics born out of a state of dual power (POR). " (p.192).
In any case the Popular Assembly did fail to lead resistance to the Banzer coup in August 1971. Mass resistance was, however. tremendous.
A general strike and armed opposition were organised -although Torres. the president overthrown by Banzer. refused to give out arms to the workers.
The workers movement was crushed, far more seriously than at any time since the forties. and Banzer remained in power until 1978. The savage military
regime was heavily backed by US imperialism. From August 1971 to December 1972, Bolivia received a total of $32 million from the US, as against only $6.7 million from 1942 to 1970.
Mass opposition nevertheless recovered in the late 1970s, and Banzer was replaced by civilian rulers. another bloody coup - in October 1979, led by Colonel Natusch Busch — was followed by another parliamentary regime.
By the end of 1980, demonstrations, strikes and occupations were widespread.
Mass resistance to attempting to reinstall military rule was organised by the COB, but on a: class-collaborationist political line which proved unable, in the event, to prevent the military seizing power once. again in July 1980.
Argentine
The new military regime fell in 1982, following mass opposition on a colossal scale including 48-hour general strikes and huge demonstrations. The Argentine military - the main sponsors of the 1980 coup — were in disarray following their defeat over the Falklands, and the international bankers thought that a civilian regime would be better able to implement IMF austerity in Bolivia.
The new government of Hernan Siles Zuazo, one of the original MR leaders in 1952, simply represented a new round in the cycle of political chaos.
Siles Zuazo Siles' government is still in power - but earlier this year (and outside the scope of Dunkerley's book) it was rocked by a massive. but inconclusive, series of general strikes. The Bolivian Communist Party, which is in Siles' government, was a serious brake on this movement.
A consistent weakness of Dunkerley's account is a reluctance to make political judgements on Bolivia's working class parties. Whilst clearly sympathetic to the POR tradition (and specifically the Lora group), he makes no overall assessinent of their political record, or their actions at crucial high-points in the struggle like 1952 or 19/1 -outside of a few footnotes.
In fact, Dunkerley has very little to say about the fractious Bolivian Trotskyist movement, apart from documenting its actions and general positions. He neither explains nor comments upon the splits and international alignments of the various POR groups.
Conclusions
Dunkerley's books is a tremendous source of information on the history of Bolivia and its remarkable working class: but it draws no sharp political conclusions.
It would have been useful, for example, to know more about the organisation of the unions and working class political parties at rank and file level and about the forms of working class organisation in strikes and general strikes. Dunkerley chronicles events - and he chronicles events brilliantly -but he leaves the reader desperate for more information.
That said, Dunkerley's book is of tremendous value. He has performed a great service in recounting Bolivia's tangled history and recording the history of the heroic workers movement.
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Socialist Organiser no. 204, November 8 1984 Page 9 Armed workers in Moscow auring the Revolution of the revoluti Reviving our occasional series on socialist classics id Tratckv (who arrived get the party to grasp the oppor'Socialist Bookshelf", Edward Ellis looks at Leon Subscribe!
A-HIAI Petrograd: May Day 1917IN February 1917 the Russian monarchy was overthrown by a massive popular uprising which put power into the hands of a government of liberal capitalist politicians.
In similar circumstances in other revolutions, such capitalist governments have been able to hold onto power - politically and physically to disarm the working class and the mass of the dispossessed, the poor of town and countryside - and to see to it that private property remains intact and society moves on along capitalist lines.
Bolivia 1952 (see page 8 of this week's Socialist Organiser) is an example of this kind of outcome to a revolutionary struggle which could have gone much further:
Russia was different. In October 1917 an insurrection led by the Bolshevik Party overthrew the capitalist government and for the first time in history, power passed into the hands of the working class itself.
The new workers' government began to put an end to capitalism.
One major factor in the Russian Revolution made the difference - the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky's book "Lessons of October" is a study of the strategy and tactics of the Bolshevik Party — and the arguments and divisions within it -during the course of the revolution from February to October.
It shows the indispensable role that the party played in making the October revolution happen.
Trotsky was one of the major Trotsky's "Lessons of October" leaders of the Bolsheviks in 1917, and the main organiser of the October insurrection. His account of events is from firsthand experience.
He focuses on two aspects of the work of the party that made the seizure of power possible. First was its political role: the way in which it was able to use slogans and arguments that keyed into the mood of the masses and pointed the way forward.
Second, and no less important, was its ability to recognise and seize possibilities, to act when the moment arose, to develop "the art of insurrection".
It was not easy. In fact, the policy pursued by the party immediately atter the February revolution would not have led them to the victory in October. They only moved onto a course set for working class power as a result of an internal political battle that set Lenin, and later Trotsky (who did not join the party until the summer of 1917), against many other Bolshevik leaders.
After the fall of the Tsar, the Bolshevik leaders adopted a policy of critical support for the liberal-capitalist Provisional Government. They argued that because of the backwardness of Russian society, the time was not ripe for working class, socialist revolution. Lenin (who arrived in Russia from exile in April) and Trotsky (who arrived in May), argued for opposition to the capitalist government and for "all power to the Soviets".
The Soviets were huge councils of workers', peasants and rank and file soldiers' delegates that represented alternative institutions of state power to the Provisional government - or to any limited Parliamentary semi-democracy that might be set up.
At a conference in April, Lenin won the Bolshevik Party to his strategy. But the right wing continued to resist it, right up to the insurrection.
Major Bolshevik leaders like Zinoviev and Kamenev - and Stalin too, although Stalin was far less important at the time -opposed the insurrection in October, for fear of provoking counter-revolution. Lenin and Trotsky had to fight them to morality.
That is why she ! relieves lu get the party to grasp tunity in October.
The fact that many Bolshevik leaders made serious mistakes in 1917, however, and that Lenin was in a minority to begin with on the vital question of strategy for the revolution, does not mean that the decisive factor in the revolution was a few clearheaded individuals. The individuals would have been helpless without the party.
The Bolsheviks' success was the result of both clear-headed policies and an organisation rooted in the working class, with the respect and contidence of the working class, and the authority to lead. The clearheaded line put forward by Lenin enabled the party to increase its size and influence, so that by October it was in a position to lead the working class the whole •way, to the taking of state power itself.
As Trotsky puts it, The fundamental instrument of proletarian revolution is the party"
Before 1917 Trotsky had had a clearer idea of the real possibilities in Russia than Lenin and the Bolsheviks, who thought that the best possibility was a worker-peasant coalition government which would carry through radical reforms but which - because of the numerical weight of the peasantry, for whom their own private patch of land would be the main aim of the revolution - could not go beyond capitalist limits. Trotsky realised that the working class, if it could lead the peasants to bring down the Tsar would have to go on to take power and overJon throw capitalism it it was not to -In 1917 Lenin came over to betray itself Trotsky's view on this. But Trotsky's ideas would have been no more than an historical curiosity if Lenin had not been building the party that could actually carry out the seizure of power:
The party was vital in convincing the mass of the workers of the need to take power. And it was vital in preparing and organising the insurrection.
Disorganised militants, without a clear idea of what needed to be done, and without the organised discipline to do it, would have failed to seize the moment in October 1917.
In writing "Lessons of October" , Trotsky had another purpose besides historical research. The hesitant, timid, right wing in the party in 1917 were the very people who in 1923, when the book was written, were leading the party and beginning a purge against Trotsky.
They and their co-thinkers had repeated their timid approach in October 1923 in Germany. As a result, an opportunity was lost. The lessons of the German October - of failure - were as important as the lessons of success.
In 1984, as in 1923, the lessons of the Russian Revolution are important ones for socialists. We have seen too many revolutions go down to defeat because those lessons have not been learned. We, too, need to build a revolutionary party like the Bolsheviks that will make sure that in future the working class can win.
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