Lessons of Belfast 1919
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This is the third and concluding part of Michael Farrell's article on the 1919 Engineers' and Shipbuilders' strike in Belfast. It points out that despite this being the greatest labour upheaval in Belfast's history, lasting solidarity amongst workers was not established owing to the lack of a socialist party prepared and ready to challenge Labour Association, which had been set up Police truncheon striker, 'Black Friday' 1919.
The 1919 strike failed in two ways. It failed to achieve its immediate object of a 44 hour week and it failed to establish a tradition of working class consciousness and solidarity which would have transcended sectarian incitement in 1920 and prevented the outbreak of the pogrom.
On the day the strike ended the Chairman of the strike committee, Charles McKay, gave his explanation for the first failure to the Newsletter: "If the Clyde and other centres had displayed the same solidarity, made the same stand, as we in Belfast made, we should now have been working 44 hours." But this is not enough. Belfast was the strongest centre in the strike. There the strike was most widespread, it had the sanction of a democratic ballot of the workers, and the authorities were slow to act against the strikers. Belfast should have been able to stand alone. And if the "44" had been won in Belfast it would have spread to other centres.
Two decisions of the Strike Committee ensured their defeat: the failure to call out the transport workers and the failure to challenge the military occupation of the power station and the gas works. From the first week-end the rank and file were calling for the involvement of the transport workers and at the end many were convinced that this was the reason for their defeat. The strike committee all the time maintained that they had the support of the transport workers and having declared limited industrial war in Belfast they would have been better to broaden the struggle.
When the military occupied the gas and electricity works no attempt was made to picket them. The committee feared a clash like that in Glasgow. The authorities were expecting it and had brought in three extra magistrates to try the resulting court cases. The workers were not afraid as they showed when they attacked the trams on the last Sunday. But the committee shirked the risk and failed to call the authorities' bluff; thereby they conceded defeat.
For the strike committee to be willing to call a virtual general strike or to take the risk of serious rioting between strikers and troops they would have had to believe in the doctrine of the class war and that the government was the tool of the employers not the servant of the people. Members of the committee believed no such thing. At the Custom House meeting on Sunday February 10, Clarke of the Strike Committee boasted that "they had never once said a hard or harsh or unkind word about the employers." Even James Baird who was something of a militant, wrote to the Northern Whig "I most emphatically deny having at any time said or written anything calculated to create class prejudice."
The dilemma of the strike committee was that they were trying to fight their battle according to the rules. The employers had no such scruples and anyway they made the rules so they could change them if they wished.
The second failure of the strike was related to the first. To build up a solidarity which would transcend and overcome sectarian prejudice required political as well as industrial awareness. The strikers received an industrial education from the strike itself though the final lessons went unlearnt when the committee failed to extend the strike. The political lessons of the strike were not drawn by the committee and they prevented anyone else from drawing them.
The strike committee was made up of delegates and officials of all the unions affiliated to the federation. It was a heterogenous body. Two prominent members, James Freeland and Robert Waugh had been Labour candidates in the recent election. So had Sam Kyle, a textile workers' official, who played an active part in the strike. But also on the strike committee were Robert Weir and William Grant, prominent members of the Ulster Unionist the existing sectarian ideology.
to counteract the spread of Labourism in the working class and keep them loyal to the Unionist Party. Grant later became a Union-. ist MP and Stormont Cabinet Minister.
The motley composition of the strike committee produced the resolve to keep the strike 'non-political' John McKaig of the Workers' Union, speaking at the City Hall on January 29 said 'he was not there to discuss politics or religion. They were there to get a 44 hour week for the people of this country, North, South, East or West" (Belfast Newsletter). James Baird, who was a member of the Belfast ILP wrote to the Whig "like Mr Allen (a director of Workman and Clark) I refrain from introducing any political references, except to assure him that politics have nothing to do with the hours of labour"
The desire to keep politics out prevented more than the briefest reference to the conduct of the Unionist MPs for Belfast who had pledged themselves to support the 44 hour demand before the election and who now completely ignored the issue. Indeed one, RJ Lynn MP, who had spoken strongly in favour of the "44" at the Ulster Hall meeting on December 5, was editor of the Whig which daily attacked the strikers. The three "Labour Unionists" elected - all trade unionists — were particularly silent, yet one of them, Sam McGuffin, MP for Shankill, was cheered at a union meeting a few days after the strike began. No attempt was made to expose the hypocrisy of these charlatans' claim to represent the interests of the working class.
But the strike committee did more than just discourage politics. During the first few days of the strike a member of the Workers' Union, Jack O'Hagan, spoke at several meetings and made the only serious attempt to talk of socialism, capitalism and the class war. O'Hagan, who was not a Northerner and had been involved in many strikes, then organised daily meetings at the City Hall at which he and a few colleagues put the socialist case.
On Thursday January 30, they were interrupted by Clarke, a member of the strike committee who announced that the committee wanted no unauthorised meetings. "Mr O'Hagan might think he was doing a great deal of good in connection with the strike, but he could tell him that he was doing an enormous amount of harm." This led to shouts that "There was neither Bolshevism or Sinn Feinism in the strike movement" (Belfast Newsletter), and O'Hagan was rushed by a section of the crowd. When O'Hagan went to the strike committee's offices to clarify the matter Robert Waugh told the large crowd outside that O'Hagan had no authority from the committee to hold meetings and the committee alone should run the strike. Bob Weir of the Unionist Labour Association added that "If these men attempt to speak again you can deal with them" (Belfast Newsletter).
Dublin
Clarke figured again at the meeting on Sunday February 2, when he referred to labour unrest in Dublin. "On behalf of the strike committee he disclaimed any responsibility-for anything that might occur in Dublin (a voice 'Unity is strength'). The speaker concurred but said the Dublin workers had not been in with the Belfast workers from the start. In fact the Dublin movement was entirely unconnected with the Belfast movement which was purely a local one" (Belfast Newsletter). For this performance Clarke won the nickname of "the repudiator"
At the end of the strike Charles McKay repeated the point in his interview with the Newsletter. "There was none of the frothy talk of the usual agitator type, who take advantage of strikes to push their own Tanks on the streets of Glasgow ideas. The men held to the idea of the 44 hour week as a simple plain demand, without working out any theories such as were associated with the shorter hours movement on the Clyde and elsewhere" and he outlined his own philosophy, "I have every hope that if we can stick to the purely industrial aspect we shall remedy many injustices which the worker still suffers from in Belfast."
In fact they did not always stick rigidly to "the purely industrial aspect" . Some forms of politics were less rigidly excluded than others. At the big meeting on December 5 to persuade the election candidates to support the 44 hours, the proceedings began with "God Save the King". And when the shipyard workers downed tools on January 14 to march to the ballot on the strike issue, the Union Jack was prominently displayed, together with trade union banners.
It was impossible to keep "politics" out of the strike when every development forced it upon the strikers. The practical effect of the strike committee's efforts was to reduce the politics of the strike to the lowest common denominator. The vast majority of the strikers were Unionist by upbringing and tradition. The strike brought them into conflict with the Unionist establishment. That conflict could only be resolved and their sectarian prejudices left unchallenged if the ideology of Labour Unionism remained dominant, an ideology which claimed that class conflicts were not irreconcilable, that the interests of workers and employers were basically the same and merely needed periodic readjustment.
By bending over backwards to deny any connection with Sinn Fein, Bolshevism or the workers of Dublin, by tolerating Unionist flag-waving, by eschewing any effort at politica: propaganda themselves, and by prohibiting it from socialists the strike committee reduced its politics to those of Rober Weir and William Grant, to the level of th Unionist Labour Association.
The "Labour" members of the committe occasionally referred to the need for greate *Labour" representation, and their word may well have borne fruit in the corporatio election of 1920, but this still didn't chal enge any prejudices or indeed raise th question of socialism since Freeland ha declared in the 1918 election that he woul oppose Home Rule and Waugh had boaste that he was an Orangeman and had " connection whatsoever with any politi body." (Northern Whig).
Solidarity
The reason the 1919 strike failed to estat lish lasting solidarity among the workers ( Belfast, a solidarity that would have ove come any further incitement to sectaria hate, was because no-one tried, or wa given the chance to try, to use the lessons the strike to uproot the sectarian ideology the workers and replace it with socialisn All that was left behind was a veneer economic militancy which cracked as soo as sectarian tension grew. In trying exclude "politics" from the strike; strike committee sowed the wind. In i 1920 they reaped the whirlwind, many them personally.
There can be few clearer examples in hi fory of the ephemeral effect of purely ecor omic militancy. The greatest labour heaval in Belfast's history left scarcely ripple on the political consciousness of th city's workers. There could be no bette proof of the need for a socialist party whic can not only take the lead in such struggle but constantly draw the lessons of them ar take advantage of the heightened politic interest and involvement of the workers such a time to hammer these lessons hom