[The fight against the closure of 'uneconomic' pits…]
Socialist Organiser1985 1985-02-13Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
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The fight against the closure of 'uneconomic' pits gets right to the heart challenges the law What is meant by an 'uneconomic' pit? How the bosses judge what is and what is not 'economic' Bob Fine looks at the issues An 'uneconomic pit'. Lewis Merthyr in the Rhondda Valley. Photo: John THE Government and the Coal Board claim that the striking miners are defending their own particular interests at the expense of the nation as a whole and the hard-press taxpayer.
Why should we subsidise miners to produce coal at a loss, they ask. We may perhaps sympathise with the miners, but their struggle is a vain attempt to thwart the iron laws of economic necessity.
A lot of people agree: the NUM has not been able to communicate an alternative perspective to them. The NUM's negotiating position, which rules the 'economic' state of the pits out of consideration, seems to be a quixotic stab at the realities of the modern world.
The real issue behind the dispute, however, is not whether "economic" considerations should be taken into account, but rather what kind of economics.
The actual conflict is between a monetarist conception of economic rationality, based on profit maximisation, and a conception based on the general needs not only of miners but of the majority of the people.
The goals of the strike in fact accord not only with the defensive needs of miners to keep their jobs and communities intact, but also with a rational plan for energy.
Economists of various political colourings have made this point in the long duration of the strike, but their explorations have been obscured by the barrage of counter-propaganda.
Take first the issue of the "profitability of the mining industry. The NCB claims that pits make a loss, and that state subsidy can only be avoided by means of closing the least "economic' pits. This claim is borne out by the figures which the NCB produces.
But 'profit" figures very misleading.
Andrew Glyn, for example, has shown that the NCB's version of 'costs' includes the costs of closing down pits — the very thing against which the NUM is fighting - and costs (of subsidence, pensions for retired miners, etc.) - which would continue even if every pit in the country were closed.
They also include £400 million interest payments from the NCB to... the government. A large chunk of the state subsidy to the NCB goes straight back to the state again as interest payments.
Thus the coste of the mining industry appear higher than they actually are and the profits appear lower. In fact Britain's pits produce coal of value greater than its costs of production: the NCB's figures make lit appear otherwise.
We should also remember that the price at which coal is sold is regulated by the state. It is not a product of market forces.
The huge leap in the price of oil around 1973 showed that energy prices are not set by free competition. Depending on political circumstances. the price of oil today could be anything between the cost of production in Saudi Arabia — a tiny fraction of the present price -and the cost in the most difficult oilfields, in the US for example. Supply can be balanced to demand at almost any price just by choosing how fast the more easily-worked oilfields are going to be exploited.
Coal prices could be cut dramatically, no doubt about it. if the NCB switched to a policy of exploiting only the richest. easiest seams, and leaving the rest. Would such a switch be "economic'? Yes and no. It would be a choice for short-term profit now, at the expense of the majority of the people in future.
Again, the huge profits made by the Electricity Board represent a transfer of surplus away from the coal industry through the low price at which coal is sold to it. The profits which appear in the Electricity Board's books were in considerable part produced by coal miners. A number of economists have concluded from such considerations that, as things now stand, the NCB makes a considerable surplus. Far from being subsidised by taxpayers, it makes a sizeable contribution to the state' 's finances.
But surely, whatever the state of the mining industry as a whole, a lot of particular pits are 'uneconomic'?
Andrew Glyn has examined this claim too, and shown that if you include the costs of redundancy payments, dole. lost tax revenue, etc., then there is not a single pit where closure would be 'economic' in terms of costing less to the state than keeping the pit open.
in addition, it is difficult to fragment the industry and treat each pit like an independent concern. A lot of the Coal Board's costs cannot be allocated precisely to this or that pit. From the figures given about Cortonwood, for instance. a Professor of Accountancy has reckoned(that it was making a surplus before the strike started. And yet its impending closure without consultation was the spark which lit the fuse in the first place.
In addition, the profitability of individual pits is not just a function of the material coal deposits lying within them, but of managerial policy decisions - how much investment is put in, what kinds of new technology are developed, what output figures are set, how machinery from already closed pits is redeployed.
In other words - rather than pits being singled out for closure because they are 'uneconomic' ', pits are 'uneconomic' because they have been singled out for closure and therefore have not received investment.
The NCB claims that it has good grounds for closing particular pits which are not revealed in the figures. As the professor declared, however, the NCB cannot expect to be taken on trust without revealing case either to the miners or to the general public.
The Coal Board's "profit" figures also leave out of all consideration the social costs of closing pits. The most obvious of these is the cost of unemp ployment. As well as the direct loss of pit jobs, there would also be a loss of other jobs and businesses in the mining communities.
If we see the strike itself as a result of the closure programme (rather than Scargill's "political" manipulation of gullible" miners!), then the huge costs of policing, substituting oil for
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ose economics? rai, dole, loss of coal produc-n. deliveries by road rather tan by rail, etc., should be addI to the social costs of the -hatcher/MacGregor position. If pits are closed, what about e costs of alternative sources energy? The government's eus has been on nuclear -wer. But it appears that clear power stations are more pensive than coal, even withi taking into account the Mential risks of leakage, waste sposal, and transportation. Alternatively. the government reatens that it will import coal om wherever it is cheapest. ais would probably ' mean America, South Africa and Poland.
The sum total of world energy resourceds will be reduced by the wilful 'sterilisation' (as the NCB call it) of maybe five-sixths of Britain's coal reserves. Meanwhile, the price of foreign coal will depend on the changing exchange rate between the pound and the dollar.
Andrew Glyn points out that though imported coals was cheaper (at Tilbury) than British coal at the start of the strike. the fall in the pound means that British coal is now cheaper than imported!
Such coat imports would lever to import into British mines the dire working conditions and environmental neglect that is characteristic of the production of cheap coal in countries where trade unions are weak.
Nigel Lawson, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has called the miners' strike "a worthwhile investment". What does he have in mind?
The government's aim is to maximise the rate of profit in the mines, whatever the economic and social cost - and, by crippling trade unionism, to increase the rate of profit generally.
It stands to reason that some pits are more profitable than others. If the less profitable ones are closed, and only the more easily-accessible coal is mined, then the rate of profit as a whole will rise. This is the nub of Lawson's economic insights.
In pursuing this plan, the government and the NCB declare their indifference to the damage caused to miners, mining communities, Britain's overall energy requirements, and world energy needs.
If you try to calculate the total costs to the nation, then keeping pits open is more 'economic than closing them. But who is 'the nation'?
For the ruling class, pit closures are economic, because they increase their profits and weaken their enemies (the trade unions). For the working class, pit closures are uneconomic, because they put people on the dole, destroy communities, and weaken trade unionism.
There is no umpire to average out the costs and benefits of different classes: struggle decides.
The govertment's noy will make spear as goxis ase from their rois of view if thermines are rola dEto pri ate ownerTLi John Harris ship, as the Economist magazine has advocated. From the point of view of private capital, the rate of profit is all that is important. The cost to the general public counts for nothing -or may even be a benefit! (High unemployment has its advantages for the bosses).
The scenario has been set by allowing private monopolies to take over the open-cast mines. Now, presumably, in deep mining, the huge costs of investment and closures, paid for by the taxpayer, could be discounted by the government - as was done in the case of British Telecom - and the mining industry: sold off to eager profiteers.
Maximising the rate of profit John Harris on the mines is a policy so fraught with damage to miners and most of the people that it must require the elimination of all democratic influences over how the industry is run.
Union-busting and privatisation are the two sides of this coin, backed up by a rhetoric of the 'managers' right to manage'. What does this right mean except that the public be barred from any say over the management of a vital public resource?
The hypocrisy of the government's commitment to democracy comes into sharp relief in its championing of a slogan which can only indicate a return to the days of | absolute management.
What would democracy in the mining and energy industry mean in practice? Formally. that the books of the NCB must be opened. that far greater parliamentary and trade union scrutiny over decisions about production and distribution be instituted, that the massive financial privileges of managers be curtailed, that top managers be subjected to some form of democratic selection procedure, and so forth. The ways in which mining could be democratised in its structure clearly need to be subjected to public debate.
In terms of economic content - the mining industry needs to be run not to maximise the profits of a few, but to gain the maximum economic and social benefit for the majority of people. This too requires debate over such matters as how much of the surplus should be distributed to miners, how much should be reinvested in the mining industry, and how much should go to other social uses.
Production geared to social need, rather than the private economic interest, will raise more rather than less public In my view this is what lies hidden under the seemingly simple categories of the 'economic and the 'uneconomic' What is at stake in this strike -though it has often been only partially articulated - is not whether economic considerations are important, but what kind.
Locked in uneven combat are two different conceptions of economic rationality: in one corner profit maximisation and managerial dictatorship, and in the other, social need and industrial democracy.
The Government referee' has firmly taken sides - and is indeed the captain of the side which fights for private profit.
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of the capitalist over people.
1/ NCB Fleenrikyber Collie South Wales Area