Apartheid Terror Continues
Socialist Organiser1985 1985-08-14Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 5 →
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The terror continues. Below: demonstration in Soweto before the armoured cars move in.
Clive The combination of partial reform with further repression is characteristic of every tyranny at bay. But now this policy is losing its coherence for the Botha regime.
A year ago, Botha seemed to be in a strong position. The regime had managed to find a good deal of international favour as a result of its policy of 'gradual reform' Botha visited Thatcher in Britain; and the newspapers were full of the encouraging progress taking place in South Africa. A lull in internal opposition gave Botha's reformist' image credibility.
That credibility has been shattered by events since last summer. The mass revolt in South Africa has been met with severe repression. Sanctions have been threatened by Western governments. Even the US government, while stressing its friendly relations with Botha, has criticised the repression.
Botha therefore walks on a narrowing tight-rope. Sanctions, and the withdrawal of foreign investment as a result of public pressure (or capitalists' concern about instabiliity in South Africa) would severely hit the economy. It is suffering already from a major recession, and a fall in the price of its major rawmaterial exports on the world market.
Ford and Coca Cola have already made steps towards pulling out.
Concessions
Repression is one answer. But concessions - at least to divide the opposition and buy off a section of it - are the other side of the apartheid state's attempt to rescue itself.
Every concession made to the blacks causes severe problems among wide layers of whites, especially Afrikaaners, who see all such moves as betrayals of white rule. Eotha faces fierce, vocal opposition from the ultra-nationalist HNP of Andries Treuernicht. Although Botha himself clear"stick', he continually needs to watch his back in his own Afrikaaner constituency.
Gambit So far the concessions have whetted black appetites, more than stemming the tide. His gambit - limited legality for non-racial trade unions; abolishing some "petty apartheid" rules; establishing representative Chambers for Coloureds and Asians (but not blacks) - always threaten to spill over and force the government's hand to make more concessions.
Organised opposition to the attempts to co-opt sections of non-white South Africa is very widespread. The elections to the Asian and Coloured Parliaments last year, were very effectively boycotted. Collaborationist local councils for blacks have merely provided a focus for opposition.
Botha's main proposed reforms now *To relax the pass law system.
*To give South African citizenship (but not voting rights) to all blacks born in the country.
*Some improvement in the position of blacks without jobs living outside of the 'homelands', which is currently illegal.
*Incorporating blacks into the President's advisory coun cil.
External These proposals seem to be mainly for external consumption. Even the US -through Reagan's National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane - has expressed doubt about the reforms ever being implemented. Similar doubts are expressed about the likelihood of ANC leader Nelson Mandela's release.
Sincere or not, these proposals go near the point beyond which apartheid begins to crack up: That Botha is prepared even to suggest such reforms shows how scared he and his state have become.
The State of Emergency shake the regime to its founbegun on July 20 - the first dations. Strike action in since the aftermath of South Africa is never easy -Sharpeville in 1960 - further even legal strikes face the highlights some of the prospect of violent represregime's difficulties. sion.
The repressive measures ing wave of working class led have failed to suppress the opposition prepared to take violence in the urban town- on the repression. The indeships. Communal violence in pendent - union federations, Natal, although politically and other non-racial unions, quite different to the upris- have spearheaded much of ings directed against the state, the resistance over the past does further underline the tew years. extent to which the situation Our priority is out of control for the aparParity with the theid regime.
At the moment, the state is not capable of reasserting its control. It has, of course, vast reservoirs of repressive strength, and it is by no means on the verge of collapse; but whole areas of the country have become ungovernable.
The State of Emergency has in fact provided a focus for opposition. The impending strike by the National Union of Mineworkers from August 25 will be a test of strength between the working class at the forefront of the movement against apartheid, and the state. The NUM cannot legally call a political workers, and in particular the NUM. Trade unions, Labour Parties, Anti-Apartheid branches, must be mobilised to win support and money for the South African miners.
Nevertheless there is a ris- Money Send money either to:
NUM of South Africa, PO Box 10928, Johannesburg 2000 (tel 011 294561), or to "Emergency South African Miners' Strike Fund". , AAM, 13 Mandela Street, London must be solidSouth African NW1.
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ly favours a policy of gradual reform and 'carrot' as well as
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