Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

'For your liberty and ours!'

Socialist Organiser no. 256, 16 January 1986 · scan p. 8 · about 1,480 words

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In 1968 the Polish army joined the Warsaw Pact forces crushing the workers' movement in Czechoslovakia. Now Czechoslovak forces are part of the Kremlin-commanded threat to Polish workers.

Against this counter-revolutionary 'internationalism Solidarnosc left-wingers call for workers' unity acro the borders, in all Eastern Europe and in the USSR.

genee chance ol oxerbrovigs the ressegemataas It is not national antagonisms that frighten the Nomenklatura people in the Kremlin and Warsaw contrary to what might be thought. They exploit these antagonisms, setting workers of different nationalities against each other, and thereby keeping them from organising joint workers' action on an international scale. This has made it possible, for example in the USSR, to build up an ideological underpinning of Great Russian chauvinism for the rule of the Nomenklatura, in addition to the regime's base in the administrative and police apparatus.

Moreover, this has a reciprocal effect. Anti-Russian phobias serve as a "national" compensation for the oppression and exploitation suffered at the hands of the native Polish totalitarian bureaucracy. The Russians are fed on descriptions of the hatred that the Poles have for them. In this respect, unfortunately, the Soviet Communist Party propaganda does not have to make up a lot. By way of reaction. this fosters a still greater aversion to Poles among Russians and so on. While all this is going on, Chernenko and Jaruzelski are having a good time. They would rather not think about what would happen if the workers on both sides of the River Bug (the river running along the Polish-Russian border) got together one day and stopped hating each other.

Hatred

The Nomenklatura people are not worried about the lack of friendship and still less by hatred among nations, in particular in those countries under the domination of 'fraternal parties" • Because this is an essential precondition for the functioning of reciprocal interventions* within the framework of the "camp". What they are afraid of is that people will take the official friendship seriously, because from that it is only one step to internationalism, that is international solidarity among, the workers and revolutionary struggle against the Nomenklatura and capital.

If we do not want to see bureaucratic movements and uprisings continually end in an impasse, it is necessary to combine social and national objectives with a clear definition of an international strategy. In the present geopolitical situation, we should regard every sort of non-internationalism as - to call things by their proper name - the concentrated expression of political cretinism. And this is both from the standpoint of the struggle for the liberation of the working class, as well as from the standpoint of the national struggle for the right of peoples to self-determination.

The national gulf deliberately widened by the totalitarian bureaucracy. that separates Polish workers from Ukrainiar. Cred o Russiar workers repreit bat is TIE EL THE MALES IT independence, both internally and externally.

There is an objective need for internationalising the dynamic of the processes of the August revolution that have arisen in Poland, which, as history has shown, is the weak link in the chain of the rule of the totalitarian bureaucracy. The only alternative to this is suicide in isolation. We do not have the means to afford the luxury of a philosophy of struggle confined to a national ghetto in the conditions of a determined political geography in the international arena.

Despite the bureaucratic counterrevolution initiated by the December 1981 putsch and which is continuing today, the revolutionary forces set motion in August 1980 are continuing to operate. But whether they will be the spark that lights a future flame or the slowly dying embers of the past depends on solving the principle dilemma. Despite the metaphorical way this was put, the dramatic choice before us is quite clear: Either these forces will continue to develop along a revolutionary axis of internationalism, or they will continue to decline in the downward spiral of isolationism.

If we do not want to see Soviet tanks sent against a workers' revolution in Poland or in some other countries, we have to begin eliminating the anti-working class repressive forces and their social base in the Soviet Union itself. Exactly forty years after the export of the bureaucratic anti-imperialist revolution from the USSR to Poland, we find ourselves obliged to begin to export the anti-bureaucratic workers' revolution from Poland to the The Prague Spring, 1968 USSR. This is not only possible and feasible, in particular considering the means at the disposal of the leading bodies of Solidarnosc and if there is a strategic reorientation and an attempt to find the concrete way of relating to the working class as the fundamental protagonist in the struggle. It is also necessary. much besmirched by fools and The present phase can, and rightists, first of all a must, be characterised as a historical social question of *revolution halted at the crossroads". The revolutionary situation has to be defined, as one labour. But it is also, in the strict that demands a choice between two alternatives — internationalisation or continuing self- to fight so as not to lose again. It limitation. Internationalism, so fact whether defeat is the result of foreign intervention as was slovakia, or of a domestic counterrevolution. The latter result of the revolution being ness of the external threat posed by the Soviet totalitarian bureaucracy.

Sisyphus internatiónal dimension. achieving the essential precondition for the workers' moveto emancipate sense, a practical question, how does not matter very much in the case in Hungary or Czechowas possible in Poland as a paralysed by a general awareIf our fight for freedom and independence is not to resemble a labour of Sisyphus, we have to reject the substance of nationalism that leads invitably to isolating the struggle that we are waging and to defeat. Historical and ethnic antagonisms cannot replace the struggle for social and national liberation in its To be sure, we do not want to Front revive the errors of (Rosa) Front), Luxemburgism, that is, a mech- August anical notion of internationalism that leads to underestimating the question of national independence. But it will not do either to fall into the opposite extreme, underestimating the importance of international workers' solidarity. Without the latter, and we cannot havé any illusions about this, we have no system of rule of totalitarian bureaucracy. And we are not exaggerating!

As an appendix we present some concrete proposals for exporting the revolution.

•To wage an informational and agitational campaign directed at the Soviet military units stationed in Poland (for example, distribution of leaflets and press statements in Russian on the bases of these units, either by dumping them there or passing them from hand to hand).

•Organising radio broadcasts from Poland for Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, East Germany and the Ukraine, in the languages of these countries (for example, regular broadcasts from constantly moving transmitters, a means that is already used in Poland).

•Use of clandestine print shops and print shops outside the country for the needs of dissident and opposition groups in our neighbouring countries, but also organisation of Solidarnosc's own information service for these countries. Priority should be given to East Germany and Czechoslovakia, whose frontiers are particularly penetrable, and wehre we will get our first foreign readers.

•The establishment of durable international contacts and coordination of common anti-bureaucratic actions with opposition groups and independent groups in the nearest countries of the bureaucratic camp and the setting up for them of ar. independent information service in order to counteract the antiPolish and anti-revolutionary propaganda conducted in these countries, for example, by disseminating the major documents of the August (Gdansk) accords.

Besides this "outward work" it seems important to undertake 'inward work" also that will facilitate the former.

•Condemnation of Great Russian chauvinism which was combatted by Lenin in his time, and clear suport for the fight for national independence by the Soviet nations dominated by Russia. This should go hand in hand with stopping and condemning anti-Russian propaganda in the underground press. Just as earlier not every German was a fascist, today not every Russian is a chauvinist.

•Combatting the national phobias, as well as having a critical attitude to tendentious nationalist literature and national history...

Bringing pressure to bear from below on the Solidarnosc leadership for developing international collaboration in particular with the Fastern European countries, which should be accompanied by an extensive testing by Solidarnose of a political strategy and of public and active positions for relating to the national and social problems in the USSR on a fraternal revolutionary basis.

Proletarians of the world, unite for your liberty and ours!

Robotniczy (Workers' No. 1, Warsaw, 12 1984.

*In 1968, the Polish army intervened in Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring, along with the armies of East Germany and the Soviet Union. Now, if the Warsaw Pact undertook an intervention against Poland, Czechoslovak forces would probably be included.

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