Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

How Britain crushed revolution in Greece 1943-49 To the eve of liberation

Socialist Organiser no. 258, 30 January 1986 · scan p. 8 · about 1,496 words

Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 8 →

Read from the scan by machine and not corrected: expect misread words, and now and then a caption or a line from a neighbouring story. For anything you quote, read the scan.

Scan page 8

Within weeks of the liberation of Athens British soldiers were to take the p While the Greek Resistance Army - ELAS -was involved in liberati 80% of Greek territory from German occupation, Churchill and the British were planning how to impose their own political settlement on Greece when the war ended. In the second of five articles, lan Swindale describes developments up to the eve of liberation.

Unlike ELAS, which captured most of its weapons from the enemy, Napoleon Zervas and his much smaller partisan army EDES was completely depen-dent on the British for arms and supplies. Zervas decided the time was right to throw in his lot politically with the British. Inoring the views of EDES members, including its second-in-command, the republican Duramanlan ha cannatle cant a ryumagiou, ne seurcuy sell a telegram to London informing the British government that he would not oppose the return of the King, with or without the agreement of the Greek people.

The significance of this telegram lay in the fact that not only the whole of the Resistance but also most of the politicians who had fled to Egypt and were now vying for positions in the Greek government in exile were opposed to the return of the King before a referendum on the issue — a referendum which all sides knew would result in a massive vote against the King. The Royalists were now politically isolated because of their support for the Metaxas dictatorship.

Even the rival partisan armies being promoted by the British to counteract ELAS's influence were all republican — a problem the British decided would have to be confronted at a later stage, after they had dealt with ELAS. The secret declaration of support for the monarchy from Zervas might prove useful at that stage.

One of the rival partisan groups, the Liberation Struggle (AAA) was led by a group of former army officers and republicans of whom the most important was Sarafis, a long-standing republican who had been exiled by Metaxas.

Sarafis proposed that the resistance should be organised in National Bands rather than around political groupings. The British eagerly seized on the idea. They wanted to form the National Bands out of the nonELAS partisan groups — i.e. the bourgeois republicans - as a 'non-political' partisan force and then invite ELAS to join them in what they felt certain would be a subordinate position.

However, a conflict broke out between an AAA group and an ELAS detachment which led to a meeting between Saratis and the local ELAS leadership in an attempt resolve arriving in ELAS territory Sarafis was arrested and sent to ELAS HQ where he met Aris Velouchiotis, the chief guerilla leader and Andreas Tzimas of the KKE leadership and the only one prepared to give full backing to the partisan struggle. Sarafis so impressed i by whar on his journey S-animulied areas -: lies and rumours circulating Athens 5 - that he was invited to join ELAS as its commanding ficer. He accepted no. 238 30 Januaty 1986 Pade 8* con neslnspro nalbido?

AAA was finished and, to their dismay, the British plans to subordinate ELAS in "nonpolitical" National Bands was wrecked.

The Athens bourgeoisie refused to believe that the defection of Sarafis had been voluntary and even KKE leader Siantos sent repeated telegrams to ELAS HQ demanding the release of Sarafis who finally had to go to Athens in person to convince the KKE leadership that he was not a prisoner of Aris.

Unable

The Central Committee of KKE met on 2 May 1943 and appointed a High Command for ELAS consisting of Aris (Partisans and Supplies), Sarafis (Military commander of all ELAS forces) and Tzimas (political chief). But the Mountain, having gone to Athens, was unable to persuade the Athens leadership to come to the Mountain. Consequently they remained unable to assess the importance of the partisan struggle at first hand and continued to fall prey to the lies and rumours circulating in Athens about ELAS.

During the spring and summer of 1943 ELAS grew from 5,000 to 40,000-strong. From the beginning it had been willing to unite with EDES, even offering Zervas overall command. These approaches had been rejected and EDES even engaged in military provocations against ELAS.

In June, EDES, ELAS and the British met for a conference. Zervas promptly offered to put EDES under British command. Tzimas, on behalf of ELAS, proposed a joint partisan command of ELAS 3; EDES 1; EKKA (another small resistance group) 1; and the British Mission 1. This was very favourable to the other groups since at the time of the conference ELAS numbered 12,500; EDES 1,300 and EKKA only 300. But Zerves knew he could take a hard line without losing British support and refused the offer.

Meanwhile the KKE leadership, pursuing their goal of respectability in the eyes of the bourgecisie, wanted Tzimas to secure official recognition from the British at any price. Tzimas continued to stall as this would inevitably mean putting ELAS under Allied command.

Fortunately for him, at that moment Tito's envoy Vukmanovic (General Tempo) arrived on the scene to propose the establishment of a joint Balkan Resistance HQ. Although the KKE leadership in Athens were to reject the proposal, Myers and Woodhouse were so worried by Tempo's arrival on the scene that they agreed to attach British Mission officers to EAM/ELAS in a liaison capacity only.

The Allied landings in Sicily took place on 11 July 1943 Churchill's plan to solve the "Greek problem" by a landing in the Balkans had been rejected. He now put his mind to alternative preparations. "The arrangements to prevent anarchy had to be considered," he wrote. His problems were considerable. ELAS was by far the largest of the partisan armies in Greece. The Greek politicians in Cairo represented nobody but themselves, and the 20,000 strong Greek army in North Africa was strongly republican. Churchill needed a political leadership, no matter how isolated, and a military force, no matter how small, loyal to the King in whose support the British troops could intervene in Greece when the Germans finaldecided to abandon its attempts to unite the Resistance and Aris went all-out to capture Italian weapons. The Italians were surrendering to the first-comer, so Woodhouse had to look on helplessly as ELAS picked up huge quantities of arms. The result was a fresh rift with the British.

Siantos, together with the guardian of party orthodoxy loannidis, now decided to move to the Mountain to take charge of ELAS and bring it under their direct control. The kapetanios (guerilla leaders) found themselves subject to the control of political commissars and Aris and Tzimas were gradually stripped of more and more power to act on their own initiative. Yet, the party leadership which was extending its control in this way did not include among its number a single guerilla leader and it continued to regard the partisan struggle as a sideshow which would have to be subordinated to the KKE's poltical objective of ministerial posts in the postwar bourgeois government. The consequences were to be disastrous. field. The benefits of civilization and culture trickled into the mountains for the first time. Schools, local government, law courts and public utilities which the war had ended worked again. Theatres, factories, parliamentary assemblies began for the first time...Followed at a distance by the minor organisations, EAM-ELAS set the pace in the creation of something that Governments of Greece had neglected: an organised state in the Greek mountains.

It should be added that the level of democratic participaPan-Slavic expansion in the Balkans and the natural sentinels of the gateway to the Mediterranean."

The sweeping advances made by the Red Army in Europe and the setbacks to British policy in Yugoslavia led the British to try a new angle in Greece. A conference was convened for the establishment of a Government of National Union and EAM was invited to participate.

The EAM/PEEA/KKE delegation to the Lebanon Conference — of whom only one, Sarafis, was from the Mountain -had been instructed by the KKE to secure agreement at any price.

The conference was rigged by the British from the start. The 12 representatives of the guerilla groups included two generals who represented imaginary resistance forces. On the other side of the table sat 12 pre-war politicians who also represented nobody but themselves. This did not stop them abusing the EAM delegation in the most insulting way. Papandreou even went so far as to call them "the enemy within".

The agreement offered EAM five minor government posts in exchange for a commitment to the dissolution of ELAS 'unified under the orders and discipline of a coalition government' The EAM/KKE/PEEA delegation signed. The underground repudiated its negotiators and a furious row broke out in ELAS and the KKE. Several attempts were made to revise the agreement in EAM's favour, but Churchill, as always, took a hard line and the agreement was ratified by EAM as it stood.

← Contents of Socialist Organiser no. 258

Something wrong on this page? Tell us →