Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

[December fighting. Government policy at Varkiza was were…]

Socialist Organiser no. 260, 13 February 1986 · scan pp. 6–7 · about 1,605 words

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December fighting. Government policy at Varkiza was were not psychologically prepared to KKE press for "helping the forces of He publicly denounced Aris in the more than a hundred peop . Sometimes le would be formulated by Harold Macmillan and imposed on the Plastiras government which had preferred the miltary des- fight yesterday's allies — the British out of the plains and isolated them in - and that the creation of a national Greek army would have driven ELAS reaction to formulate anti-KKE argu- to claim that the Varkiza agreements ments, providing them with a pretext charged with the murder or been members of a People': "moral responsibility" for s Court with , if they had the murder tem of controlould again be used. allowed the extreme right to pene Churchill's rejection of this polic truction of ELAS, something the Brit- are being broken and to invoke the of a single collaborator. Gendarmes trate the state instead, thus making th ish army was not in a position to banding of all party and private achieve. be purged of the worst elements from the Metaxa period; repeal of Metaxist all hostages held by ELAS; dis- created; the police and gendarmerie to repressive legislation; freedom of armies; a new conscript army to be assembly and association after the end- ing of martial law; no prosecutions on the basis of political beliefs; partial trial of wartime collaborators; plebi- amnesty for December combattants; scite on the future of the monarchy and Macmillan's terms were: release of the mountains where they would have been defeated. forces of January 1945 were doomed to view is that he assumes that the ELAS 1949. But are the two situations com- parable? Left which had controlled most of Greece was not disarmed and for 18 months had suffered increasing. per- mass movement represented by EAM defeat like the Democratic Army in broke out, ELAS no longer existed. The secution at the hands of the Right. The by turning it into a KKE front organis- KKE had succeeded in destroying the The problem for me with Richter's By the time the Civil War eventually governments and the extraparliamen- crimes (!) Aris has committed against the democratic world... When Aris heard of this he committed suicide. fice their most respected and popular tary right systematically violated prac- tically every single article of the agree- which a White Terror was established Varkiza agreements. But successive ment. throughout Greece: ruerilla fighter in order to ensure tha EAM/ELAS adhered strictly to the So the KKE was prepared to sacri- Richter describes the process by "During the period when the Nation- had collected taxes for E collaborationist Gendarn charged with desertion ani who had gone over to ELI prisoners and 200,000 fc sional government were c tance fighters were forced robbery and looting. outcome of the Varkiza villages and go into hidin arrest Or assassination. more went into self-impose meantime, was well satist Now they resolved to ta The jails filled with th The British governme ed exile. harged with ke ahand in ormer resis- fied with the d those who ent, in the nousands of g for fear of AS from the nerie were AM's provi- to flee their conference. Thousands traditional policy a dead letter for ever this was nowhere more clear ground from the governments of th power to carry out their policies, ar middle ground. They did not have th which had destroyed the desire of t help from abroad" , an apathy creat apparent than in the crucial question prevailing apathy and the waiting f lem of Greek reconstruction was t wing state within a state undercut ti the economy. Greek people to make something The growth of the extreme ng Richter argues that "the basic pro British intervention in Greec elections to a Constituent Assembly. al Guard had sole responsibility for law solving the country's mili tary, admin- their country - a desire which h officers, police, gendarmerie and civil ing EAM, followed by a plebiscite and called for a thorough purge of army a government of all the parties includ- service to rid the state apparatus of the extreme right; a general amnesty; and KKE general secretary Siantos (from 2,000 to 200,000 in the course of ation and at the same time reversed the the war) by transferring all the peas- separate party in order to restore the "working class character" of the enormous growth of the KKE itself ants (60% of its membership) into a and order (until July 1945) it staged a counter-revolution...(In every town)... received by a more or less welcom- government-appointed mayor whilst ing EAM demonstration...The British commanding officer installed the the advanced British troops...were istrative and economic pr fore a clash of views on ho the day to day interfer return Greece to semi-col Greek government soon b British Embassy in the a All were agreed on th lonial depen- iffairs of the roblems. But le aim - to w to proceed. ence by the rought to the tored by force of arms the peopl flourished as they mobilised to res the German occupation. apathy and then into hatred." dynamic enthusiasm for reconstri tion withered, first into frustrat "Since the pre-war regime was r take a hard line it was Siantos who elections. gave all the ground. In the end he With the government determined to KKE. the Left. Richter's argument also begs demobilisation and demoralisation of All this had inevitably led to a and the Athens National Guard taken the British unit collected the arms handed in by ELAS. "Hardly had the British moved on dence on Britain. They how to do it and which Greece to rely on. The traditional Britist forces within attitude, still clashed over power within the country remained the hands of the old oligarchy. The was no economic policy. Econor For the first six months of 1945 the accepted the disbanding of ELAS; an amnesty for political offences between the question: was the defeat of the Democratic Army in 1949 itself inevit- left began. In Sparta, the new prefect over control than suppression of the by Richter thus: "Greec adhered to by Churchill is i summarised ze should be industrialists and financiers had ma huge profits under the Occupati 3 December 1944 and the signing of the anninonith ahle? Was that defeat not due in large

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Despite a 51% state holding, the Bank of Greece was effectively controlled by members of this oligarchy, so they were able to manipulate the Greek economy to their advantage.

After the war entrepreneurs in many countries started reopening factories but the Greek capitalists kept theirs closed since there was a much more lucrative source of profits: they 'participated in the distribution' of UNRRA relief supplies. They were further discouraved from restartine production bv exchange rate problems. The drachma was so worthless that it ceased to be used and the British gold sovereign became a second currency. In this situation those with wealth hoarded gold or goods and refused to invest. Those workers who did have jobs saw their wage packets destroyed by massive inflation.

The capitalists themselves hoped that if they sat tight long enough the industrial reconstruction would be financed either by war reparations from Germany or aid and loans from Britain and America, something Britain was unable and America unwilling to offer.

Despite continuous pressure from the British government whose experts devised economic policies for successive Greek governments and even went so far as to demand the Greek government renounce its sovereignty over the economy, the liberal/centre-right politicians who made up the various governments prior to the 1946 elections lacked the political will to confront the Greek capitalist class and the economy continued to deteriorate at a dramatic rate.

Amid scenes reminiscent of Germany in the 1930s, inflation rocketed while the value of the drachma plummeted. By December 1945 the budget leading up to the elections of 31 March 1946, before finally falling apart a few days before polling day.

But what of the Left? What was it saying and doing?

Zachariadis, as we have seen, returned from Dachau and resumed the leadership of KKE. His analysis began at the international level with the two-pole theory: "Greece is situated at a sensitive and crucial spot in the British Empire's vital communication network Ac lano ac there ic a Rritich Empire this artery will exist and Britain will do everything in its power to preserve it. A consistent Greek policy should function between poles: that of the European Balkans with its centre in Soviet Russia, and that of the Mediterranean, with Great Britain as its centre.

In practice the KKE continued to vacillate between its futile attempts to pursue integration into a parliamentary system that was not prepared to allow the KKE to participate and looking in the direction of Moscow for a signal that it could embark on the struggle for power. The occasional sabre-rattling talk of a new civil war was intended to pressure the government to curb the excesses of the Right, and no more. This did not stop the Right from continually denouncing the KKE for wanting to start the "Third Round'.

While the KKE-inspired ERGAS won control of the trade unions in Athens and Piraeus (union elections in the rest of the country were halted by the right after these victories), it was unable to respond to the new situation it found itself in - a mass party of 200,000 with a heterogeneous membership acting as the fulcrum for a 1½ million strong organisation — EAM. AYTA BEM EINAL NORTA EIXAME WY DO THI KATOXMI H WI I

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