Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

[ted. By the end of the summer the…]

Socialist Organiser no. 261, 20 February 1986 · scan pp. 8–9 · about 789 words

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ted. By the end of the summer the Democratic Army was 35,000-strong. Further recruitment was now practically impossible.

Back in Athens the Americans were having as much difficulty in overcoming the economic crisis as the British had faced. Corruption was widespread, particularly in the distribution of American aid. The bourgeoisie remained unwilling to invest its own money and foreign capital investment, because it was usually tied to specific projects, often remained unused. The head of the first American economic missions wrote:

"...the government's only practical policy has been to make constant demands for foreign aid both to keep itself in power and to safeguard the privileges of the small clique of businessmen and bankers which constitutes the invisible power in Greece.

*This clique has decided to defend its own economic interests at all costs, without any concern for the possible effects on the economic health of the country...They have never considered investing their profits in their own country to help its economic recovery.

To establish a less corrupt regime in Greece the Americans were forced to It was to cease being a highly mobile guerilla army and become instead a standing army based in the areas of Northern Greece already under its control. From there the army would set out to liberate Greece. Zachariadis's policy was adopted b a meeting of the KKE Central Committee in September 1947, attended by only six of its 25 members.

On 8 October the KKE paper announced the decisions of this CC meeting and was immediately banned together with the EAM paper, by the government. It was only a matter of time before the KKE and EAM were themselves declared illegal organisations.

The last operations of the civil war under Markos' own leadership took place in November 194/ and the tollowing month Lacharadis, not content with leading the KKE from one political catastrophe to another, outlined to the Political Bureau his suicidal military strategy. By the spring of 1948 the Democratic Army would be expected to capture and hold a number of large towns.

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f defeat Markos was complete opposed to the plan. He pointed out that this was precisely what the government wanted the Democratic Army to do. Centralising Democratic Army forces in one area would free a large number of government troops in different parts Greece currently tied up in opposing the guerilla bands. These forces could then be concentrated on engaging the Democratic Army in decisive action. The Democratic Army needed to decentralise its forces. —But Zachariadis, who was already launching a Stalinist purge of the Democratic Army, was more interested in a politically controllable centralised army than small guerilla units. He was also preparing the establishment of a provisional government and he believed that if the Democratic Army was able to hold a number of large towns this would facilitate recognition of the provisional government by the Stalinist countries.

The composition and programme of the Provisional Government was announced on 24 December 1947. Zachariadis was not included in the list of Ministers but Markos, despite his opposition to the newly adopted military strategy. was made Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

The Provisional Government's programme included: mobilisation of all people's forces for the liberation of Greece; installation of people's justice; nationalisation of foreign owned property and heavy industry; agrarian reforms; reconciliation between Greeks; reorganisation of the country between Markos and Zachariadis on questions of military tactics and strategy. Long after Markos had ceased to have any influence on decisions, all the orders and statements still went out over his name.

To reinforce the break with the guerilla strategy the record of ELAS during the occupation now came under regular attack in the Democratic Army's newspaper: "The Democratic Army's basic weakness stems from the fact that, although it is a revolutionary army committed to achieving the democratic reconstruction of our country, in the tactical sphere it is still enslaved by the foreign concepts (!) and bourgeois traditions (!) inherited, for the most part from ELAS...This is a gross error, almost a 'mortal sin' to cling to the anti-popular traditions and foreign influences which have come to us from the negative side of the ELAS heritage."

By the spring of 1948 US spending on the Greek civil war had reached $8,600 for every guerilla. 250 US Army officers were acting as advisors to a Greek army of 136,000 men backed by a National Guard of 50,000. The Democratic Army numbered 35,000.

The government army's 1948 spring offensive proved more successful than the previous year's. This can be attributed almost completely to Zachariadis's policy of creating a standing army, and the adoption of a mobile "guerilla" strategy by units of the Greek army. 1368 partisans were disarmed and 641 killed.

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