Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

[on a democratic basis; establishment of friendly relations…]

Socialist Organiser no. 261, 20 February 1986 · scan p. 9 · about 991 words

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on a democratic basis; establishment of friendly relations with the Stalinist resist external aggression; organisation of new elections.

The first attempt by the Democratic Army to capture a city to serve as its capital was launched against Konitsa on Christmas Day 1947. The assault failed. But instead of withdrawing, as a guerilla strategy would imply, the attackers held on to the positions they had captured. Government reinforcements arrived and the Democratic Army forces were driven off.

The government played up their victory for all it was worth. Queen Frederika visited the town to be photographed among her "loyal subjects' Markos tried to use this defeat to reverse the disastrous policy of Zachariadis but at a meeting of the KKE Central Committee he, along with the other members of the committee, was browbeaten by Zachariadis into confirming the correctness of the new policy.

Stalin was by now getting anxious about the situation in the Balkans. Tito was pursuing an independent line and trying to establish a Balkan federation. The KKE had participated in a conference organised by Tito on the subject. As far as Stalin was concerned the Greek revolution should be stopped.

Zachariadis was unaware of Stalin's view although even he must have realised that Stalin was reluctant to back the KKE. He felt that if the Democratic Army could notch up some successes and in particular establish a capital for the Provisional Government, then Stalin's hand could be forced in the matter.

In the winter of 1947-8, Democratic Army forces were concentrated on Mt. Grammos, and two large recruitment operations were launched. In the appalling cold these units combed the denuded countryside looking for recruits. When they were located by government forces the US-equipped air force dropped napalm on them (the first use of napalm in war).

One expedition had set out with 1,500 men and recruited a further 1,000. But of this total, 1,300 had died - 80% of them from cold and hunger - so that only 1,200 men returned. A 200-strong unit was sent south to open up belatedly a route from Athens to the mountains for those wishing to flee.

The whole unit was wiped out.

The rank and file of the Democratic Army were kept in the dark about the fundamental differences that existed The final break between Tito and Stalin came on 28 June 1948 and placed the KKE in a difficult position, since it was not possible to push Stalin into recognising the struggle of the Democratic Army without Yugoslav aid. At the Fourth Plenum of the KKE CC, shortly after the rift, it was decided to give secret support to the Moscow line and at the same time not openly criticise Yugoslavia. It was only after the final defeat of the Democratic Army, when Zachariadis was looking for scapegoats that the KKE turned on Tito publicly, blaming him for their defeat even though they had received more practical aid from Yugoslavia than from any other source.

The Fourth Plenum was also used by Zachariadis to establish even tighter control over the guerilla leaders (kapetanios) of the Democratic Army. A short distance away on Mt Grammos 12,000 partisans were locked in a desperate battle against 70,000 government troops. The report to the Plenum and the resolution it passed were both written by Zachariadis but it was Markos who was compelled to present them.

After eight weeks of fighting, 9,000 partisans found themselves encircled by 90,000 government troops. Markos argued that they should break through government lines, disperse, and harass government units. Zachariadis would have none of it.

He now accepted the need to withdraw, but insisted that the partisans should regroup on Mt Vitsi, up against the Yugoslav border. For good meas ure, he also named a leading guerilla, kapetanios Yannoulis, as culpable for the defeat on Grammos and had him executed.

On the night of 20 August the Democratic Army broke through the encirclement, even managing to take their wounded with them. As they headed for Mt Vitsi, Markos set off for Albania where he had been ordered to go following a final irrevocable split with Zachariadis. A five-man squad was despatched shortly afterwards with the task of eliminating him by simulating a "border incident"

Markos suspected an attempt might be made on his life. He travelled so fast that he was already in Albania when his pursuers caught up with him. Fortunately for Markos an Albanian army patrol was in the area and they drove off the attackers. Markos was given the Greek generals survey the carnage in 1949. protection of the Soviet Mission in Albania.

With Markos out of the way, Zachariadis was able to replace all the kapetanios who opposed trench warfare in the mountains with his own men.

In the autumn of 1948 government troops launched a massive attack on Vitsi and suffered enormous losses. The Democratic Army counter-attacked but its advance was also halted. The war was destined to drag on into 1949.

During the winter of 1948-9 the their final assault on 10 August. The fighting was so bitter that some Albanian soldiers crossed the border quite spontaneously to fight alongside the partisans But by the end of August it was all over. 8,000 partisans managed to escape into Albania. On Sunday 16 October Radio Free Greece announced that the Provisional Government was ceasing hostilities "to prevent the total destruction of Greece" had died of a heart attack in 1947) Saintos were expelled from the KKE 1,500 partisans were named as being responsible for the defeat of the Democratic Army and purged. The refugees were settled in the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR, sometimes in towns which were specially built for them. Although they did not know when they would be able to return, most thought that their exile would be of short duration. It lasted over 30

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States; equal rights for ethnic minori- ties; organisation of armed forces to

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