Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

Ireland Aft the Accord

Socialist Organiser no. 266, 10 April 1986 · scan pp. 6–7 · about 1,953 words

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Clashes between the Northern Ireland Protestants and the British administration in the Six Counties are becoming more and more violent. What are the prospects? What is the socialist answer? Johr tions in a discussion article writter in preparation for Socialist Organ iser's AGM later this month. Irish agreement. Mrs Thatcher said the Orange election could not decide.

The Orange Northern Ireland majority are in a hopeless minority within the UK, like the Catholics are within the Six Counties. They either accept majority rule, on an issue they consider fundamental to their identity, or they revolt against that majority rule (as the Catholics did in the name of something they hold higher than that majority.

The Orange politicians started a series of local government protests all across the province in which Orange-controlled local councils refused to make rates, as the first step in a civil disobedience campaign. The Northern Ireland Office went ahead and made the rates.

Then the Orangeists organised the one-day general strike on March. Before it was over the RUC - which is over 90% Protestant and has long deservedly been denounced as a sectarian police force - had come under fire in the Orange heartland of the Shankill Road.

None of the legal weapons of the Orangeists have proved of any avail. The British and Dublin governments say that the Ango-Irish agreement holds. The result has been a greatly accelerated deterioration of relations between Britain and at least a sizeable section of the Orange population.

A mass campaign of intimidation and coercion of the RUC has been under way for over a month. The homes of over 100 RUC have been attacked, some firebombed. At Portadown on 31 March British troops were used for the first time since 1969 against Protestants and the RUC fired over 100 plastic bullets at Protestants - one of whom is expected to die from a blow to the head.

The parliamentary political leaders are being visibly by-passed. At the end of February lan Paisley and James Molyneaux agreed with Margaret Thatcher to start talks on restoring Belfast government, only to be forced by their supporters immediately to repudiate their agreement and to back the 3 March strikes.

The Orange paramilitary forces are recruiting and rebuilding their organisations rapidly. Andy Tyrie now talks openly about the UDA perhaps having to developed IRA-style operations in the Six Counties and also in raids into the 26 Counties, Thus in a brief period Northern Ireland has again been stirred up and the spectre of sectarian civil war - laid since the mid-'70sl - is again abroad in 1. What is the Anglo-Irish agreement?

The Anglo-Irish agreement sets up an intergovernmental conference - backed up by a permanent secretarial stationed in Belfast - between the Le ndon and Dublin governments which v ill jointly run Northern Ireland. The executive power stays exclusively in British hands; but the political control of the executive is normally to reside in the intergovernmental conference.

The Anglo-Irish agreement is an international treaty registered with the UN, according to which the British government obligates itself to run Northern Ireland in agreement with the 26 County government and when disagreements emerge earnestly to seek agreement and a common policy:

Britain declared itself to have no opposition to a united Ireland if the Six County majority wanted it, and promised to legislate for a united Ireland if a Six County majority decided for it: the 26 County government promised to respect the separateness of the 6 Counties so long as a majority there wanted to be separate.

This is power-sharing between Dublin and London. Because it proved impossible to establish power-sharing between Northern Ireland political forces in Belfast, the two governments have established a radically new framework over their heads.

It some form of mutually acceptable power-sharing in Belfast is agreed, then most of the powers of the intergovernmental conference will devolve to the Belfast government.

The agreement contrasts with the Sunningdale agreement of 1973 in not being dependent on any local agreement. Sunningdale started with agreement for power-sharing in Belfast, and proposed to build upwards on this towards a Council of Ireland. Hillsborough starts with a Council of Britain and Ireland and wants to build downwards. The Sunningdale agreement was vulnerable to the Orange general strike of 1974 because that strike could bring down the power-sharing executive. No local action in Northern Ireland can bring down Hillsborough, if the nerves of the London and Dublin governments hold.

The Orangeists are - from their own point of view - quite right that the Anglo-Irish agreement marks a big new involvement of the 26 Counties in the administration of Northern Ireland. 2. Why the Hillsborough agreement Northern Ireland broke down as a political entity in August 1969. Catholic revolt against their second-class citizenship and a Protestant backlash against the Catholics led to the British Army being put on the streets to stop sectarian fighting after over 500 Catholic families had been burned out in Belfast).

That Northern Ireland had indeed broken down was recognised by Britain in March 1972 when the IRA military campaign forced Britain to abolish the Protestant-controlled Belfast home-rule government. Britain attempted radically to restructure Northern Ireland politics by replacing majority - Protestantoctaran - rule with institutionalised power-sharing.

It won the majority of Catholics to support the power-sharing, but only a minority of Protestants. When an executive based on the Catholic majority and a Protestant minority was nevertheless set up, a powerful Orange general strike brought it down in May 1974.

After that British direct rule became semi-permanent and the chief task Britain set itself was to defeat the insurgent Catholic IRA. But the IRA remained in the field and after ten Republicans died on hunger strike in 1981 the Republican movement achieved a degree of Catholic political support that convinced the rulers of London and Dublin that things were getting out of their control.

The Southern Irish nationalist parties and the Six County constitutional nat ionalist party, the SDLP - which ha been the mainstay of the power-sharin experiment in 1974 - spent a year in th 'New Ireland Forum' discussing constitu tional rearrangements in Ireland tha would end the IRA's revolt and brin about reconciliation between Catholi and Protestant.

They prepared a number of possib options, all of which were immediatel rejected by Mrs Thatcher. One of thes options was joint rule in the Six Cour ties by Dublin and London, Londo representing the Protestants and Dubli the Catholics. That was rejected in 198 by Mrs Thatcher.

But after over a year of negotíations what the London and Dublin govern ments came up with was a variant a power-sharing - political power-sharin while the executive power remained i British hands. As well as that, it proposed to create a strong Dublin Westminster joint parliamentary commit tee, thus drawing Britain and the 24 Counties closer together than they hav been since Southern Ireland secede from the UK in 1922. The Anglo-Iris agreement is thus a framework withi which British/Irish collaboration ca evolve and develop on a closer level thai for 65 years - if it holds. 3. The Anglo-Irish and a united Ireland Most of the left, following the Rep ublicans, denounces the Anglo-Irish dea for 'copper-fastening' partition. But thi is false. Every 26 County governmen since 1922 has in fact recognised parti tion, and some have declared that ther can be no united Ireland without th consent of a sizeable section of the Si County Protestants.

The Anglo-Irish deal would onl copper-fasten partition if there was som way of removing partition that the dea hinders. There is no way to remove part

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5. Prospects The Orangeists: eemed almost unanimous in their opp sition to the Anglo-Irish agreement. T leir unity has begun to shatter in face of the intransigence of Thatcher.

As a section of the Orangeists go all the way to outright illegality, the process of differentiation within the Orange ranks will accelerate. Already the Official Unionist Party leader James Molyneaux has said "Never again' after the violence of the 3 March strike, and the OUP officially kept away from the illegal demonstration at Portadown on 31 March.

A two-way separation will occur. A section of the Orange politicians will probably try to reach accommodation with Britain, as Paisley and Molyneaux did in late February. Others will go into militarist opposition. The creation of a Protestant IRA' is most likely - an org anisation striking at the South.

The majority of Catholics have been shown in opinion polls to favour the Hillsborough agreement, and the SDLP has been boosted at the expense of Sinn Fein. But the Catholics have in practical terms gained little, and the Orange backlash now threatens them with the sort of campaign of sectarian assassinations that swept across Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1976. The consequence of the Orange backlash in the Catholic community is that the IRA will be boosted as a defensive force.

In the months ahead the prospect is for a series of fierce clashes between the police and the Army and the Orange militants. The RUC will probably be eroded by the campaign against them in the Orange community (though this may provoke a revulsion which will be part of the process of polarisation in the Protestant community). In any case the RUC could hardly cope with the level of conflict that looms in the marching season ahead.

Therefore the British Army will be drawn more and more into 'police' work against the Protestants. The experience in 1969 and after when the Army did police work in the Catholic areas where the RUC had ceased to be acceptable suggests that this will further poison the already very bitter relations between The left Most of the so-called Marst lett politically subservient to Sinn Fean They relate to Ireland through romantic populist spectacles which allow them to avoid seeing the horrifying spectre of communal civil war that looms behind events there.

In their reaction to the Anglo-Irish agreement most of the left have surpassed themselves, focusing on the alleged surrender of Irish sovereignty and failing almost entirely to see anything new. The writers and readers of publications like Socialist Action and Labour and Ireland must be mightily surprised by the recent events in Northern Ireland.

On Ireland the left needs urgently rearm itself with working-class MarxThe single isolated slogan Troops Out has come to be the mark of a sizeable part of the left in the last decade. It has become something of a fetish, isolated from the rest of a socialist or democratic programme on Ireland.

We are for Irish self-determination, therefore for troops out. But SO has repeatedly criticised the slogan-mongering use of troops out as if it were a self-sufficient programme. Right now troops out without a political settlement means - for a certainty - sectarian civil war and repartition. It means not self-determination of the Irish people as a whole, but the dog-eat-dog destruction of any chance of unity of the Irish people as a whole.

Troops out is not a political programme, but only part of one - and it can be part of more than one programme. Plain troops out tomorrow means sectarian civil war - troops out with a political settlement means something radically different.

We are in favour of British withdrawal but as part of a political solution which actually allows Irish self-determination; and that can only mean a solution which leads to some form of federal Ireland within which Protestants and Catholics will not, immediately Britain goes, have to set about determining how they relate to each other by sectarian civil war, perhaps even on the pattern of

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