[ton unless the Northern Ireland majority wants it…]
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ton unless the Northern Ireland majority wants it. To try to conquer the Protestants would not bring Irish unity. Almost certainly it would lead to sectarian civil war and bloody repartition. In fact the alternative to the Anglo Irish agreement was the status quo - i.e. deepening integration with the UK under prolonged direct rule.
If the Anglo-Irish agreement works against a united Ireland, It Will be by way of the embitterment it has caused.
and the Anglo-Irish deal Anything that would bring about reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland, and thus create the preconditions for working class unity, should be welcomed by socialists. But the Anglo-Irish agreement does nothing of the sort.
While alienating the Protestants more profoundly than they have ever been alienated from Britain, it gives little to the Catholics other than the participation of the Dublin government as their champion. It is a profoundly undemocratic agreement, made over the heads of all the people in the Six Counties and resulting in structures that fall a great deal short of democracy.
The Anglo-Irish agreement does not solve the problem that has to be solved in Ireland; it exacerbates and inflames it.
The basic problem is that there is a natural Irish minority - the Protestants - which according to democratic norms would have every right to special treatment as a minority by way of having autonomy in its own heartland areas. But Ireland as a whole was ruled by Britain, and the minority - partly for reasons for protecting itself against the Irish majority - allied with a powerful section of the British ruling class against the Irish majority. As a result of that alliance Ireland was partitioned, with the Protestants having their own home-rule SATA Protestant bigots. Photo: Derek Speirs, IFL. state within which there was a Catholic minority bigger as a proportion of the Protestant state's population than the Protestants of all Ireland would have been in a united Ireland.
The Catholic minority in the North was some 35%, and they were in the majority in a sizeable part of the Six Counties - so they were felt to be a permanent threat to the Protestant majority. They were treated as second-class citizens, discriminated against and rigorously excluded from any say in ruling the Six Counties, even in local government where they were the local majority (e.g. Derry).
They suffered for decades and then revolted with a strength and determination that the British government has found impossible to quell.
The problem is to find a democrátic framework which:
a) takes account of the legitimate concerns of the two communities in Northern Ireland, of the wish of the Protestants not to be incorporated as an oppressed minority in a Catholic-majority Ireland as well as the wish of the Six County Catholics not to be an artificial minority in the Six County state;
and b) allows for reconciliation and development of normal class politics in Ireland.
That framework can only be a federa. united Ireland - in which the minority areas will have autonomy - combined with the closest link between Ireland and Britain acceptable to the Irish majority.
The fundamental criticism of the Anglo-Irish agreement from this point of view is that though it provokes the Orangeists about as much as a united Ireland would, it does not move any way towards providing a workable democratic framework.
The majority of the Orange population want a restoration of Orange majority rule. They will resist anything short of that and anything other than it. There would be resistance to any attempt to create a democratic federal structure. But resistance to structures that actually do take account of Orange interests could eventually dissipate. By contrast the Anglo-Irish agreement does not offer structures within which the Orangeists can be reconciled.
It puts them forever under the joint ultimate control of Britain and Britain's intergovernmental conference partner, the Fenian government which they believe schemes and plots endlessly to take out the Six Counties and incorporate its people as a helpless minority in the Catholic state. the British government and the Protestant community.
The chances that Britain, caught between the two communities, will just pull out, are probably very small. The consequences, including the likely spread of Catholic/Protestant conflict to British cities like Glasgow, are far too grave for any British withdrawal in response to the new situation. Britain will try to tough it out.
The Republicans If any benefit to the Catholics can be claimed from the Anglo-Irish agreement, then to the Republicans' military campaign belongs the credit.
The tragedy is that the cost of that campaign in terms of the deepening of the ancient gulf between the two communities is immense - and it has not yet been paid.
The revolt of the Catholics was a just revolt, its channelling into this sort of military campaign the product of the domination of a particular political tradition. Today the dilemma of the IRA lies in this, that it the military campaign were to stop then the pressure for change would stop; and if it goes on now then it is the pyromaniacal activity of pouring petrol on a fire that may anyway be uncontrollable.
The temptation to detonate the Protestants' and use them against Thatcher must be great. After all it was the Protestants who wrecked power-sharing in 1974. But no good can come of it.
Out of the sectarian civil war that is a clear possibility in this situation can come neither a united, nor a democratic, and still less a socialist Ireland.
T. Civil war The fundamental threat in Northern Ireland is of sectarian civil war - which would lead to a bloody repartition, complete and fix the division in the Irish people for perpetuity, and probably boost clericalist reaction on both sides of the new border. Compared with that, the carnival of reaction which accompanied the 1920 partition would seem mild and moderate.
One consequence of the vicarious Irish nationalism so widespread on what might be called the organisationally inchoate but ideologically Mandelite left is that the danger of sectarian civil war is not properly appreciated. It filters through the ideological spectacles as the socialist revolution, the permanent revolution' ", or as a little local difficulty which the good guys would win.
We must fight this irresponsible and light-minded attitude. In the period ahead it will otherwise isolate the left from serious and sober-minded labour movement militants who will rightly recoil from the prospect of sectarian civil war. Lebanon.
We do not say " we support troops out only after a federal Ireland has been agreed'; we say a serious movement for troops out among the Irish working class, let alone the British working class, can only be built as part of a programme for actually realising Irish self-determination' • In a sense this is conditional support for British withdrawal - but withdrawal is not a fetish. And it does not mean that we take any responsibility for the British troops. They buttress an untenable status quo and they serve British governments - Labour and Tory alike - which over the last 17 years (and now again with the Anglo-Irish agreement) could not have acted very differently if they had been deliberately trying to make sectarian civil war inevitable.
As the Orange mobilisation develops, sections of the soft left will probably start supporting British troops against the Orangeists or advocating their use. We do not back the Orange bigots, but we do not back the troops either. We remain the party of irreconcilable opposition. 10. The Catholics The Northern Ireland Catholics remain the chief victims of partition. They are likely now to be victims of reactivated Orange murder gangs. In the event of sectarian civil war they will be the most vulnerable, especially in Belfast.
While we advocate a democratic solution to the Protestant/Catholic conflict, and reconciliation and working-class unity as a basic immediate policy tor Northern Ireland, in face of sectarian conflict we must stand with and defend the Catholics. 11. Socialism The unspeakably bitter spectacle of the workers who live in the run-down Shankill area of Belfast in murderous conflict with their Catholic working-class. neighbours in the run-down Falls area sums up what capitalism, British rule, and the activities of the Irish bourgeois and petty-bourgeois politicians have done to Ireland.
The massive 25% unemployment rate among people who often lack the means of life above the bare necessities is a further indictment of that system.
The Irish working class, Protestant and Catholic alike, needs socialism that the workers should join together and take power from the capitalists.
We do not counterpose future socialism to the just struggle of the Catholics now, nor pretend that a divided Irish working class can miraculously make a sudden leap from the terrible reality of today to socialism.
But we need socialism, and a movement that fights for socialism as well as for a democratic solution to the Catholic/Protestant conflict.
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John O'Mahony
One way or putting the modern Trotskyist groups and their attitude to Israel into some, sort of historical perspective is to enquire what Trotsky's opinions were or most likely would have been.
Of course Leon Trotsky died 8 years before the state of Israel was declared and consolidated. But he had watched the development of the Zionist project and commented on it over four decades.
Trotsky was a Ukrainian Jew whose life (he was born in October 1879) happened almost exactly to span the period from the beginning of systematic pogroms in Russia - 1881 - to the very eve of the holocaust, whose preparations he witnessed and understood. He had seen the migration of millions of Jews, stirred up by the Russian pogroms after 1881 to Western Europe and to the USA. He had seen the growth of Jewish self-awareness in Europe in the later 19th and early 20th centuries.
Ghetto
He had taken part as an internationil socialist in the debates among leftving Jews in the Tsarist Empire between Zionists and assimilationists. He attended Zionist Congresses as a journalistic observer.He was always an opponent of the and the left part 3, one hand by the blows of antisemitism and on tne owner Dy ent striving of a minority Jews realise their nationhood like other nations on a national territory.
Trotsky's very loose use of the term nation describe the ot the world may perhaps be explained as an unconscious by-product his open acceptance of the need for a territorial solution to the problem of the people without a land' - the very idea he had scoffed at and fought for most of his life as a reactionary utopia.
He still says it is reactionary utopia and a mirage in its bourgeois. Zionist form. But now he counterposes to it not assimilation but a socialist version of the Zionist, territorial, statecreame solutIon.
What makes the Zionist project utopian and reactionary? The methods which flow inescapably from doing it capitalism and Palestine. The unpostponable international task is the overthrow of capitalISTe not the utopian project ingathering and nation-building.
Trotsky insists that only revolution SaVe the Jews from annihilation. The Zionist project cannot. But after the international socialist revolution? An international socialist federation "would have 10 make possible the creation of a Birobidjan or those Jews who wish to have their own autonomous republic as the arena their own culture. It may be assumed that a socialist democracy will not resort compulsory assimilation.. " Trotsky would not be an advo-