A socialist, or a na case against the
Socialist Organiser1986 1986-10-02Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
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Now I have a somewhat different viewpoint from that of Sinn Fein. I do not start out with the idea that Irish nationalism is a fixed star. I have a different standpoint in judging this agreement and everything else about Northern Ireland: what best serves the interests of the Irish working class? What will help create the possibility of working class unity and therefore of a socialist solution in Ireland, North and South?
So I start with that different perspective and I also have a somewhat different analysis.
What I want to do today is deal with four different things: why the Anglo-Irish Agreement has come into being; what it is; what its prospects are and finally what is wrong with the Anglo-Irish Agreement from a socialist — as distinct from a nationalist — point of For like Sinn Fein I also conclude that we should reject the Anglo-Irish Agreement and oppose it, but for reasons different from those of Sinn Fein. = Why the Deal? Because the Six County State broke down in 1969. It had existed for 50 years as a Protestant-ruled state, a state dominated by a Protestant community making up about two-thirds of the Six County population. For fifty years they had one party rule.
The Protestant community lorded it tyrannically over the Catholic one-third of the Six County population, reducing them to second class citizenship, keeping them down because they felt threatened by them. That system broke down in 1969.
It broke down initially when the Catholics began to demand an end to the various forms of oppression and discrimination against them and that in turn created a big Protestant backlash. In turn the Protestant backlash quickly escalated to the point where, in mid-1969 there were serious attempts at pherom in Bel asgro De. Belwere pogroms fast where some 500 houses were burned down in August 1969.
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to end Unionist power.
All this talk of reconciling the two traditions - Unionist and Nationalist -within the Six Counties, is therefore a smokescreen. Unionism and nationalism are two diametrically opposed political viewpoints. And the people who hold this can only be reconciled within partition if one side, or both, abandons its ground.
It is obvious that both London and the Dublin government will be expecting Northern nationalists once again to knuckle under. Crumbs of reforms will be thrown at them. Republican 'trouble makers' will be interned, proscribed, censored or otherwise disposed of.
And British interests in keeping Ireland under control will have suffered not one bit.
This is why the present British govenment lis trying to stabilise the Six
That led to the British Army having That led to the British Army having to go into the streets — 'having to'
from the point of view of the ruling class, to stop the situation becoming uncontrollable.
Now that meant that the Six County state had broken down. But Britain did not admit that the state had broken down. The troops were put out to control the streets and they formed a sort of tight scaffolding to keep the state from collapsing.
Britain allowed the Protestant Home Rule government to continue in Belfast until March 1972. But in fact from the point where the troops took over control of the streets in 1969, Northern Ministers had senior British civil servants assigned to understudy them and act as commissars over them.
So to an important extent Britain took a very big share of direct rulership as early as the middle of 1969.
But that did not solve anything. True, Britain began to push through serious reforms. Again it is important to understand what happened.
If you look at how Northern Ireland was destabilised after 50 years it was in the beginning the result of the British government giving insistent signals to the Northern Protestant regime that it wanted reforms.
Britain wanted reforms because in the 1960s Britain had long ceased to look to partition for any benefits.
On the contrary, Britain was moving closer to the 26 Counties which had been growing in importance as an economic partner of Britain.
Backyard Britain and the 26 Counties signed a Free Trade agreement in 1965. Both Britain and the 26 Counties were preparing to enter the EEC, which they finally did in 1972. Britain wanted to get rid of the embarrassing backyard police state that Northern Ireland had been for most of the previous 50 years.
That led to the pressures on the Northern liberal Unionists - such as they were, and there were not too many of them and they were not very good as political leaders. And it encouraged the development of the Catholic Civil Rights movement. The unprecedentedly vigorous campaigning of that movement led to the sequence of events which I have already described, culminating in the British Army taking over in 1969, with the job of creating a scaffolding within which Britain could remodel the Six Counties.
But Britain taking control in 1969 did not stop anything. Lots of Catholics remained fundamentally unsatistied, especially the youth in Derry and Belfast.
The Catholics may have marched in Counties, and normalise North/South relations, while establishing closer links with Dublin.
Like its predecessors in 1971 and 1973 it would prefer a 32 county Statelet rather than the present powderkeg. For this it must seduce the Irish nationalist middle class, appease the Unionist monster, and eliminate Republican resistance.
The first objective has been reached. To achieve the second, it hopes to deliver the third: the defeat of the IRA and Sinn Fein.
But Unionist opposition is not just caused by IRA actions and Sinn Fein's presence in the councils. It is mostly about losing their supremacy. This could be Thatcher's first miscalculation.
The second is about defeating republican resistance.
Whatever its future holds, it remains that this Agreement is a step backwards for Irish nationalists - and BELFASI SAYS Rolfact Mav 1986. Photo: Martin Shakeshaft.
1968-9 for one man, one vote; one man, one house; one man, one job, and basic civil rights. But in reality the root civil right they lacked was self-determination. Their troubles grew out of the fact that they were an artificially carved-out minority in an artificial state.
It is important to keep in mind that the Six Counties and its majority and minority are artificial. But it is also important to be aware that even if the existing untenable Six County entity had not been carved out, there was still a powerful and compact ProtestantUnionist minority — it is a natural for all those that want to see the development of a free, independent, united and socialist Ireland.
Socialists and progessive people everywhere must oppose the Agreement as another attempt by Britain to consolidate its hold on Ireland under cover of peace and reconciliation.
They should not be confused by the support given by the Irish nationalist middle class to the Unionist veto.
In the final analysis Britain's coloniall stranglehold on Ireland can only be broken by a process of decolonisation. Peace and stability can only be established within a framework of Irish national self-determination.
The inherent weakness of the Hillsborough process is that it is not geared to these objectives. On the contrary it is geared towards thwarting the attainment of these objectives.
And for this reason, as for many of the other imponderables, it is doomed in the long-term to failure. minority - in an area of north-éast Ulster, in the north-east of the Six Counties. The point is that the Six County entity made the problem of how the Irish majority and minority relate to each other more intractable and in no sense was it a democratic resolution of the conflict.
From the Catholics' lack of self-determination came the Catholic revolt -and that revolt has to this day remained unquellable.
The IRA had been virtually non-existent in 1969, during the pogroms, and what did exist calling itself the IRA had disgraced itself. But with an astonishing speed a new IRA was created. Initially it was very right wing, an avowed right wing split off from the old IRA.
The Provisional movement was to be quickly radicalised in the early 1970s.
The new IRA initiated and developed a military campaign within a matter of 18 months after the British Army took to the streets in mid-1969. The Catholic revolt became unquellable -it took the form of a series of bombings in the centre of towns and killings of soldiers and personnel of the Six County state.
Intention
This in turn led to an intensification of the Protestant-Catholic polarisation. The result of the Provo campaign was that in March 1972 Britain abolished the Stormont regime.
Now it is important to keep in mind that Britain — through all the zigzags of policy since 1969 — has always had the intention of politically restructuring Northern Ireland. If you see it simply as brutal, old-fashioned, bone-headed immovable British imperialal West Belfast Apartheid-Free PRO:
Protestant workers dominate heavy ism or British colonialism, I think you: miss the point of what has been going on, you misunderstand the dynamics of what's been going on.
Since 1972 Britain has always hac the objective of reforming Northern Ireland from above, to stop things getting completely out of hand below. This. of course, is a central pattern in Irish history, things being done from above to stop the revolt from below. That has been Britain's goal.
When they abolished the Protestant Home Rule parliament in March 1972 there was an enormous Protestant backlash against that. The UDA, a -mass Protestant militia, was formed and at its peak in 1972 it had between30,000 and 40,000 members. There are about a million Protestants, so to get a British equivalent you would have to multiply that figure by about 60!
It was an immensely powerful Protestant-Unionist mobilisation.
Britain tried to replace the home rule of the Protestants by power-sharing, in. which the Catholic middle class, through the SDLP, was co-opted into the system.
And Britain succeeded for a period. in doing that. In 1973 and the beginn.
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fionalist, gree ment? Ils Road. Photo: Martin Shakeshatt.
AN ustry. Photo: John Lloyd. ing of 1974 they set up the power- utive. sharing executive. After that, Britain tried a number of The real strength of that executive experiments to get a new powerlay in the SDLP, the Catholic, constitu- sharing executive and then gave up. tional nationalist party. They were the The form their giving up took was -bedrock, the real power in that admin- that the British Labour government istration through which, in partnership thereafter swung round to a policy of with minority Protestant politicians led defeating the IRA, and this quickly by Brian Faulkner they ruled for the became an intense repression of the first five months of 1974. entire Catholic community.
Their power-sharing executive was. It was the Labour government which destroyed by a Protestant withdrew political status from constrike in May 1974. The general strike victed republican prisoners conceded -was got going to some by the Tories in 1972. That led to the coersion at the beginning but protests round the prisons which culbecame a genuine expression of the minated in the hunger strikes of 1981. Protestant dissatisfaction and By the end of this whole process in anger at the whole situation. the early 1980s you had the powerful That general strike was an immense- Catholic build-up behind the republily powerful demonstration of the latent can organisation, Sinn Fein.
power of the Protestant working class. In 1983 Sinn Fein got 12% of the Unfortunately it was the use of revo- whole vote, about 42% of the Northern lutionary methods for a Irish Catholic vote. That meant that -goal, because their fundamental Britain had failed — and failed dangerously. Britain's policy after 1976 of -control of the Catholics by way beating down the Catholics had "majority rule" in the artificial state. quietened the Protestants for a long Nevertheless it was one of the most time: since the British state was doing powerful and successful examples of a it, the Protestants felt that they didn't general strike in European historv. have to do much themselves, and they They smashed the power sharing exec were relatively quiet. U An attempt by lan Paisley and the UDA to get an Orange General Strike in 1977 failed resoundingly.
The political rise of Sinn Fein threatened to eliminate the constitutional nationalists who had been the mainstay of the power sharing attempt of the mid-1970s.
But of course Britain hadn't abandoned the idea of recreating a new set of political structures in the North of Ireland, it had merely believed in the mid-1970s that it had to let the thing sweat itself out for a period of time.
Now the political rise of Sinn Fein threatened to close the door on all sorts of deals for the forseeable period ahead.
As a result of that threat, various people began to act — not only were the British very alarmed, the Southern bourgeoisie were alarmed too and they organised a get together of all Irish constitutional nationalist parties North and South of the border.
For a year they deliberated in the so-called "New Ireland Forum" finally they produced a series of prod posals for a settlement with Britain. They presented their ideas as a series of options, listed in declining order of preterence. Their Ist preference was for an immediate move towards a unitary Irish 32 county state. Their second option was an Irish federation, or a confederation, which is even loser than a federation. Their third preference was some form of joint Irish-British rule in the Six Counties.
Out, out, out
The immediate response of Mrs Thatcher was made during a notorious press conference where she banged the table, ticked off the various proposals and dismissed them. "That's out, that's out, that's out"'.
But not long after Thatcher's "out, out, out" speech serious negotiations began between Britain and the Southern government which after a year produced the Anglo-Irish deal.
So the fundamental reason for the Anglo-Irish Agreement was that the breakdown of the Northern Irish state threatened the stability of the whole island and of parts of Britain too. From that stemmed the vigorous activities of the constitutional nationalists around the New Ireland Forum. The immediate goal was to save the SDLP from political oblivion or at least from being marginalised; fundamentally the goal was to find a basic solution that would allow the IRA to be quelled and to have its base of support gradually undermined and removed. Falls Road, Belfast. Photo: Martin Shakeshaft.
So that's the why. What is the agreement! I think it is rather more substantial than comrade Mules says. I think it is a sort of political power-sharing agreement between Dublin and London. And it is enshrined in an international treaty which is binding, solemnly binding.
International treaties of course have Limited force. If you have a dispute in Britain under the British law, you have recourse to the courts and ultimately to the power of the state to enforce your legal rights. In international treaties there is no such state power to appeal to and such international treaties as the Anglo-Irish Agreement break down.
But nevertheless, as it stands, what it is is an international treaty whereby Britain has agreed with Dublin that they will jointly set up an intergovernment conference to oversee the running of the Six Counties and Britain has bound itself, wherever there is disagreement with the Southern government on how to run Northern Ireland, to earnestly seek agreement before acting. In other words it amounts to an international power-sharing agreement with the 26 Counties sharing with Britain a serious degree of political control of the Six Counties. It seems to me that's a very important development.
Power-sharing
It's not exactly full power-sharing, it's not what the New Ireland Forum asked for, because the Executive is entirely in the hands of Britain. Nevertheless, in real terms it is a high degree of power-sharing.
There are a number of parallels to this sort of development. I think that what the British and Irish bourgeoisie are doing is trying to set up a frame. work that can evolve and allow the creation of new structures.
Both governments claim sovereignty in Northern Ireland. If you look at what they have done in the Anglo-Irish deal, they have agreed to leave the question of sovereignty alone. They haven't formally lett it alone, there are various forms of words floating about, but in practice they've decided to leave the whole business alone.
The procedure reminds me of two things and I am going to make two parallels. Firstly with the way the English natural scientists of the 17th century dealt with the religious dogma that was still formally very much part of the English state and to which they were nominally obliged to conform The way they dealt with the fact that England was still a state where you had to believe in the established church and all its doctrines, the way they freed themselves to really explore nature was by declaring that of everything in nature God is the first cause, but there were then many second causes. By paying lip service to God as "the" first cause, they managed to leave Goc alone on the sidelines and get on with the empirical exploration of reality.
I think that the British and Irish bourgeoisies have done something like this in the Anglo-Irish Agreement. They have pushed the question of sovereignty aside and they are trying to get on with groping their way towards new structures.
The second parallel is with the EEC. Twice this century Europe has been convulsed by wars, world wars which were fundamentally rooted in the fact that the nation states of the advanced European countries were a fetter on the needs of production, the need to unity the European economy. On two occasions Germany tried to unify the European economy by simply conquering Europe, but that failed. Germany was defeated and at the end of World War 2 Russia was able to threaten to dominate Europe.
How did the bourgeoisie proceed? After the War they very urgently needed to unify the European economy but they were stopped by all the various nationalisms. So what they did was to begin in 1951 by creating something called the Iron and Steel Community which allowed the steel and coal industry, both German and French, to be unified and to escape from the normal fetters of the nation state. This led to the creation of the EEC in 1958. The EEC has largely eliminated the economic boundaries separating the European states, which are now more thoroughly integrated economically than the 50 states of the USA.
I think that what is being done in the Anglo-Irish deal is to attempt to develop in the same way, to grope towards new structures, leaving insoluble questions of sovereignty alone.
One final thing about this that we should note is they have made provision for a joint Southern Irish and British, and probably eventually Northern lico, parliamentary committee, actually develop into a powerful intra-parliamentary link between Britain and Ireland, by far the closest political links since the 26 Counties seceded from the old UK in 1922.
The prospects of the Anglo-Irish Agreement so far seem to be quite bright from the ruling class's point of view. Thatcher and company show themselves to be pretty firmly committed to the deal. So far they've stood up for it with impressive determination. From the point of view of the two ruling classes the real weakness of the deal if you examine the two pillars on which the deal must stand or fall - the British bourgeoisie and the Southern Irish bourgeoisie — is in the south of Ireland. Fianna Fail will most likely be the new government there in a year or so and it is not at all clear what Fianna Fail will do about the Anglo-Irish Agreement. It may try to renegotiate it, it may even scrap it.
Fianna Fail Flanna Fail is not an honest bourgeois nationalist party. It will not act on principle, it will act opportunistically and it may act in a way that will destroy the new Anglo-Irish Treaty.
What's wrong with the deal? From a socialist as distinct from an Irish nationalist point of view?
Even if you hope (as the ruling class, I think, do) that it can eventually lead to the evolution of new structures which will supersede the old structure and the old relationships, even if you can hope for that it's still a very long term prospect.
Meanwhile the grinding poverty. and the built-in sectarianism in the North continues. Meanwhile the various repressions continue. Meanwhile mass unemployment is starting to bleed the South once again, after a 15 year interruption.
Apart from that, it is an undemocratic way of dealing with the problem, particularly with the Catholic-Protes tant relations in Northern Ireland. It seems to me therefore, that it is not a solution that socialists can support.
However I think it is very important that we should understand it for what it is - a series of quite subtle moves by the ruling classes which, if it sticks, can perhaps evolve and create new relations between Ireland as a whole and Britain.
Now that, if it survived in the long, long, long term, can bring some benefits but I don't think we can support it in the hope of benefits in the distant or medium distant future
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Dialogue 3L RUC attack nationalist protest with plastic bullets. Photo: Derek Spiers, Report. John Bloxam: Kecenily an editorial in Republican News warned of the danger of sectarian civil war The result of such a war, the editorial concluded, would not be a united Ireland, but bloody repartiecially in places like East Belfast. These attacks are very similar to the pogroms of the early seventies.
In new buildings near Derry, Catholic families have had to move out because of Loyalist attacks on their homes.
So that possibility of civil war is. always there. But in our analysis it certainly isn't going to happen at the moment. And Britain won't with Sinn Fein the last vestiges of colonialism? *imperialism', etc. To me that just doesn't make sense, Britain derives very little benefit from the maintenance of its rule in northern Ireland. I don't know the exact figures, but I suspect that more money goes into Ireland than comes out of it. Most industries are heavily subsidised. In a Marxist sense, it's a strange imperI'd like to ask why Sinn Fein dropped their commitment to federalism, which goes some way towards creating a framework in which the working class of both communities can have their identity satisfied. If would create the possibility of the unity of the working class to create la socialist We're not saying, like Militant, that if you talk about working class unity enough the Protestant. workers will flock round and everything will be lovely. We understand that it is difficult almost to the point of impossibility even to geta hearing, let alone to get them toagree with you.
Nevertheless, if you analyse the situation realistically, you come to
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