The rise of
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Since the late seventies Brazil has been gripped by a series of spectacular strikes and working class actions. Out of these has developed a new party, the Workers' Party - and the promise of a substantial challenge to capitalism. Phil O'Brien reports.
million, and the ninth largest view it makes sense: Brazil has the gross national product in the largest home market in Latin world. With a diversified and America. Brazil and Mexico have substantial industrial base and now begun to concentrate Latin immense natural resources within their borders: and again, the (though not oil), it is a country of sufferers have been smaller industrial importance — if not now, then in countries, such as Argentina, Chile the future, as Brazilians say. and Peru. 1964 to 1985, Brazil was the first and in engineering the 1964 coup which longest-lasting of the bureaucratic overthrew the populist and ineptly authoritarian regimes which swept reforming government of Joao Latin American in the 1960s and Goulart, and they have been the most 70s. On the face of it, it has also loyal supporters of the regime ever one of the dictatorships with any the coup, since the military continued possible claim to having achieved an Brazil's traditional policies of preserBut the claims look less convincing ing local industrialists orders through The Brazilian economy has con- ing with multinationals to secure distantlu natchad in arowth ratac of joint ventures and local supplies.
sign of emerging protest by changing lead to the results the military intendthe ground rules. From 1968 until ed. The introduction of a multiparty 1974 they ran a thorough-going dic- system did lead to the break-up of the tatorship, brutally repressing armed tame and loyal 'opposition' party, actions, strikes, and even left-wing the MDB. But the emerging new opIn 1974 the new President, General genuinely oppositionist, and reduced Geisel, began the process of open- the majority for the new proing' which vas to culminate in the in- government party, the PDS, in the direct election of a civilian as Presi- 1982 elections. dent in 1985. Under pressure - the In addition the military were BRAZIL has a population of 135 tina.
Governed by the military from been the most successful: the only economic miracle.
when we examine them more closely.
sistently notched up growth rates of over 6 percent a year since the Second World War, with the exception of the recession years of 1952-3, 1962-7, and 1981-3 — and production shrank only during the last of these.
The military justified their takeover of power and their determination to hold on to it by casting themselves as the deliverers of the economic miracle. But there is no historical justification for their claims. Brazil's industrialisation dates back to the 1930s and earlier: it did not begin with the 1964 coup.
Behind the present spate of growth, however, lies another story: the increasing tendency for multinationals to decide to locate major Latin American plants and export production sites in Brazil as part of a process of concentration which has seen them run down or even withdraw from plants in other Latin American countries, such as ArgenFrom the multinationals point of America's industrial production Multinationals played a vital role since. Local capital also gained from ving large State firms and guaranteethese and through aggressive bargainBut local capital began to lose out in the 1980-3 recession, and has since been one of the principal sources of pressure for "democratisation' Rapid industrialisation in Brazil has helped to alter the class structure, as millions of poor peasants flooded into Sao Paulo. The growing new working class in its satellite cities, particularly in the car industry, began to display its potential power in 1978, in the first of a series of illegal mass strikes which shook the dictatorship to its roots.
Concessions From these strikes emerged a new phenomenon in Brazilian politics, a working-class party genuinely responsive to its base, the Workers' Party (PT). Although fragile, this party offers the best hope of socialist change.
Official the 1943 Labour laws, which consolidated the previous decades' legislation on labour, gave a number of material concessions to the workers such as a minimum wage, pensions, paid holidays, etc — legal rights often ignored by the bosses. But it did this at the cost of a tight corporatist system of controls.
Vargas created his own 'workers' party', the PTB, to stand side-by-side with his own party for landowners, the PSD ('Social-Democratic Party'). Through demagogy and a very real nationalism he so dominated working-class politics throughout his life that even the persecuted Communists gave him political support, working through the official unions rather than setting up independent unions, and working with PTB leaders.
In the late '50s and early 60s some these controls began to break down - a contributing 1964 coup.
After the coup the military reimposed even tighter controls — a total ban on strikes - with none of the material benefits which Vargas had initially offered.
Only in the late 1970s did unions again begin to break free of these controls. But one of the principal struggles of the new Workers' Party even now is for free and autonomous unions; and it has not been easy for them to shake off the harness of legal controls.
The transition to some form of democratically elected government in Brazil has been very much a stage-managed affair from above. Not all of the stage-managing has been completely successful. Time after time the military-favoured party or candidate failed to win. But in general the essentials of the military's own project for a return to civilian rule have Compared to what later happened in Argentina and Chile, the 1964 coup was relatively bloodless.
Torture and political assassinations were used, but not on the scale which Brazil was later to help introduce elsewhere. The favoured method of control was much more the disbandment of organisations like the peaant leagues, and the purging of unions and me umversiues, togeuici with the suspension of opposition figures' civil and political rights.
Also unlike, say, Chile, after the 1973 coup, the military, though governing through arbitrary decrees, did not abolish all the trappings of elected government. The military created two parties: a pro-government party, ARENA, and a loyal opposition party, the MDB.
However, the military were always in control, and quick to react to any Church activists. Brazilian workers on strike official opposition party, the MDB, were making too many gains - the military attempted to take advantage of the bitter divisions within the MDB by allowing the emergence of a multi-party system from 1979.
But again parties were only allowed to operate if they could secure elite support. Recognition was limited to those who could find support from a bloc in Congress.
Transition
The attempts at control did not position party, the PMDB, was more unable to prevent the victory of Brizola, President Goulart's Minister of Labour at the time of the 1964 coup and seen by the military as a dangerous radical, as Governor of Rio.
The election results encouraged the opposition to push for more genuine democratic reforms, above all for direct elections for the Presidency. This demand, together with a protest against the deteriorating economic situation, brought millions onto the streets of Rio and Sao Paulo in 1983 Protests Faced with both an economic crisis and demands for political change, the PDS and the military President, Figueiredo, seemed to disintegrate. The PDS compounded the disarray by its in-fighting on the choice of a successor to President Figueiredo and then by choosing Maluf, a corrput maverick politician.
Faced with mass protests in the streets, and an open crisis in the regime, the Brazilian elite quickly rearranged its options. The impassioned demands for direct elections were ended in April of 1984 when Congress failed to give the necessary two-thirds majority to an amendment to allow direct elections.
Mysteriously the mass protests evaporated, showing perhaps that although the feelings were genuine the political organisation of the protest was, here also, top-down.
Crucially the PMDB sensed that it could win the indirect elections through negotiations and compromise. In a complex and secret series of manoeuvres, involving key military and civilian personnel, Tancredo Neves was chosen to represent a Democratic Alliance for the in-
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been achieved. 1964 coup