Nicaragua: the Sand capitalism, and soc
Socialist Organiser1986 1986-10-16Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 6 →
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Last week a US aircraft was shot down over Nicaragua. Piloted by Max Gomez, a Cuban-American whose involvement in US 'counterinsurgency' activities goes back to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, it was a supply plane for the President Bush to this illegal Why is the US so determined to destroy the Nicaraguan government? Why does it spend so much money on subverting the Sandinistas?
In this article (an abridgement of a pamphlet published by the Australian THE 'NEW Nicaragua' has been declared by many inside and outside the country to have opened up a new road to socialism.
After visiting the country in June and July of 1985, I concluded that these claims were erToneous, and in this study I will attempt to put them to the test.
The matter must be not posed as a moral question (the heroism and dedication of the Sandinistas is unquestionable), nor is it fair to measure contemporary social reality against the grander flights of FSLN rhetoric (Tomas Borge's talk of creating a 'new man' in the here and now appears extremely overoptimistic once you have experienced the physical struggle for seats on a Nicaraguan bus). It is a matter of determining whether there are significant elements in the country's economic life which are moving it beyond the limits of the capitalist mode of production, and above all whether the structures of political power place the working class and oppressed people in control of shaping the country's destiny.
My contention will be that neither is true...
As is well know, Nicaragua maintains a mixed economy, of which some 60 percent is privately owned. While part of this private sector is made up of small entrepreneurs, the bourgeoisie also remains as an entrenched force, represented by the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) and various political parties.
What is less well known is the exsector, preding a vatory of forms tent to which the FSLN actively proof assistance and incentives. A study by the Central American Historical Institute notes:
Profits *During 1980 and 1981, the state financial system.. helped with 100 per cent of the requirements of the private sector in terms of working capital and investment, in contrast with the policies of the (Somoza) dictatorship which never financed more than 70 percent of these requirements... The distribution of foreign exchange was also javourable to the private sector. Between January 1980 and August 1981, 52.9 per cent of the foreign exchange was distributed to the private sector".
Consequently, as another proSandinista source remarks: "objectively profits have recovered much more rapidly than wages".
Such encouragement for private enterprise will remain government policy for the foreseeable future. The economic plan for 1983-88 indicates that the rate of profit is to be arificially maintained jor industry through the course of the recessior currently afflicting Central America.
To stimulate production, cattle ranchers and cotton producers are being paid for some of their output in hard currency. The state sector does assume a considerable importance, despite representing a minority of the economy. It allows the regime to determine the pace of national development to a degree, both in the sphere of production and in that of finance (the entire banking system is state-owned). Yet an enterprise does not become socialist simply because it is placed in the hands of the state..
operation.
group Socialist Action), Tom O'Lincoln explains why.
The Nicaraguan state sector is situated within a market economy, and the Sandinistas themselves recognise the significance of this fact, though they often attempt to blur the issue. Consider for example Agriculture Minister Wheelock's comments in a speech to managers early this year:
"Private production has its laws, and capitalism knew and developed them perfectly. We are clear that our enterprises are not capitalist, nor are they socialist enterprises because they are inserted in a market economy, an open economy which makes the law of value operate. That is to say, they are neither capitalist nor socialist. Simply, they are new forms of property and production...
Wheelock remained studiedly vague on the precise nature of these 'new forms" , but at another point in his speech gave the game away:
The state enterprises have to be models of economic rationality. They have to be profitable. They are not... enterprises to provide social services for the community. They have costs and they have to make a profit, and the costs are rising and so the prices have to go up. They have to be profitable to be able to meet depreciation costs for future investment...
So Wheelock's 'new forms' of production look remarkably like the old capitalist forms. The state enterprises are subordinated to the demands of profitability: pricing policy is dictated by market forces rather than by human needs, and tomorrow's investment depends on today's rate of return. The Nicaraguan state sector is thus best described as state capitalist.
The rural sector merits some consideration on its own in view of the extensive land reform programmes which have been carried out. The landholdings of the Somoza family have either been taken over by the state or parcelled out to the peasants, as have some of the lands of other rich latifundistas (landlords), particularly where they were not being efficiently used.
Between 1981 and 1984 sc.ie 2.4 million acres (nearly a fiftn of the country's farmland) have been deeded to peasant families, and the process is continuing.
In 1985 Enrique Bolanos, head of COSEP, had his land south of Managua seized in a move which aroused considerable hostility among the bourgeoisie. Bolanos was offered other land, and the regime is clearly going to stop well short of liquidating the rich landowners as a class, but still the process of agrarian reform is fairly radical.
Nevertheless, the growth of a small-holding peasantry, even where it is organised into collectives! , cannot promote a socialist dynamic in agriculture or a socialist consciousness among the peasants...
The land reform is aimed at modernising agriculture, by unleashing the initiative of the new private property owners, and by forcing the big landowners to become more efficient. This is undoubtedly a progressive step, and one of historic importance. But its capitalist character is undeniable.
Power
The structures of political powel rin Nicaragua are [also] essentia illy capitalist, and they quite clearly de eny to the workers and more generally / to the oppressed classes any real cont trol over decision-making..| The National Assembly was elec under universal suffrage. delegates serve for set terms and not subject to immediate recall.
In the electoral process bourgeoisie with its great resour had a considerably greater wei than the proletariat as a class (thoi of course the FLN claims to sp in the proletariat's name). Unlike Soviet regime established [in Rus at the end of 1917, there are workers' councils through which proletariat _ exercises class polit power.
This parliamentary system doubtedly represents a huge step ward for a people previously oppr ed by an autocratic regime. How it has no specifically socia character apart from sporadic fli of rhetoric from the leadership.
Most sympathetic observers I ted the ices ight ugh eak the sia[ the tical unforressever ghts nave Defending the revolution conceded as much. They point, however, to other features of Nicaraguan political life which allegedly add a dimension of mass democracy. George Black, for example, speaks of the "seeds of genuine democracy" being "sown in the factories and farms, in the schools and barrios"
There is no doubt that the mass organisations, such as the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS), the women's organisation AMNLAE, and the Sandinista Youth are an important arm of FSLN political power. So, in a somewhat different way, are the Sandinista-controlled trade unions.
The willingness of the leadership to regularly meet with the masses in Pueblo) sessions at which complaints can be aired is laudable... A closer examination of all the forms reveals, however, that the essential power relations are ones of control from above.
Decisions
The leadership genuinely wishes to ascertain the views and desires of its popular base, and to this end President Daniel Ortega holds a Face the People' session about once a week. Thus far these have been a real opportunity for people to express their views. However the decision as to whether to act on these views rests with the government, and with it alone.
In recent months, critical comments at these sessions have increased in number, prompting the FSLN to complain about the making of 'counter-revolutionary speeches' during the discussions and even to suggest that participants be got together to discuss the issues before the sessions get underway. This is a first hint that if dissent reaches unacceptable levels, the "Face the People' sessions will take on a more stage-managed character.
In separate interviews with the Sandinista Youth and with AMNLAE, I was told by representatives of both organisations that their main role was to support the decisions of the FSLN leadership. They spoke of a variety of ways in which people were mobilised to boost production and also to solve their own local problems, but it is clear that neither women nor youth as distinct groups have any decisive leverage in the political process.
In fact the AMNLAE representative expressed considerable frustration with her organisation's inability to make headway in securing equality in the armed forces (women are not conscripted 'even though we have proved we can fight' and are largely consigned to traditional female jobs in the army.
The CDS are a very extensive movement, comprising some 50,000 block committees. They organise distribution of basic necessities at controlled prices and engage in "revolutionary vigilance' (the latter is sometimes alleged to take on the dimensions of a 'spy network' directed against ordinary people, but I regard that contention as unproved).
But whatever their virtues, they do not make decisions about the main direction of their own work, let alone about the direction of government in general. This is quite clear from
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VOCEADOI BARRIC DA Tomas Borge's remarks to a mass meeting of CDS activists:
"What has the National Directorate determined to be the principal task of the Sandinista Defence Committees? You have said it: revolutionary vigilance!
Why did the National Directorate determine that the principal and fundamental task of the Sandinista Defence Committees would be revolutionary vigilance? To a great extent... because reality has shown that the main responsibility of Nicaraguans at this ominous hour is defence of the nation".
Workers
Let us assume for the sake of the argument that this decision is a wise one. It is still openly stated that the decision was made, not by the committees themselves, but by the Naof the FSLN. That, however, is now ancient history. All enterprises now have managers who are firmly in control.
Workers do continue to *participate' , but that participation is strictly limited and its aim is primarıly to incorporate the worktorce into the never-ending drive for increased production. The 'enterprise committees" which have recently received renewed attention by the FSLN consist of representatives of management, the workers, and the FSLN branch within the enterprise.
In such a 'troika' structure, the workers temselves have only a minority goice. And in some other structures they do not have even that.
The book 'Participatory Democracy in Nicaragua' lists among the 'instances of participation' a National Council of Agrarian Reform whose participants include the The fall of Somoza, July 1979 where the director of the enterprise, Denis Lopez, made known the production plans of the firm for this year as well as individual and collective production goals. For its part the union made known the commitments of the workers to ending labour indiscipline, augmenting production, strengthening defence, and taking forward the innovators' movement with the standardisation of work".
The boss does not ask but tells the workers what is to be done; the union pledges to keep the workers' noses to the grindstone. Similarly the book Participatory Democracy in Nicaragua' lists various uses of these assemblies, which all boil down to keeping the workers informed. There is no mention of decision-making by the workforce.
One final institution which deserves a mention is the 'red-andblack' labour days (rojinegros), which constitute a programme of unpaid, voluntary labour. One hesitates to estimate just how much of workers' participation in the rojinegros is genuinely voluntary and based on enthusiasm for defending the revolution, and how much of it is a product of various kinds of pressure.
But even if we assume it is largely the former, it is still very clear how the decisions are taken. Consider the following government memorandum, announcing the initiation of a round of rojinegros for the Managua region.
"As a form of practical support for the pronouncement of the FLN represents the power of the working class to demand sacrifices from the workers. It is another entirely for such demands to be made by a regime beyond their control, a regime moreover which uses a significant portion of the surplus thus accumulated to boost the profits of the bourgeoisie and make payments to foreign banks.
Real wages have clearly fallen since 1979, as the Sandinistas themselves concede. The FSLN's own press estimates that real individual income fell by 50. per cent between 1982 and 1984. This was a result of the destruction caused by the process of insurrection, natural disasters, blockade and contra war, rather than being the fault (at least in any immediate sense) of the FSLN's policies, Nevertheless, it is a hard fact, and must be the starting point for considering the regime's most recent austerity measures.
In August 1984 the government partially removed subsidies on the prices of basic necessities, and in February 1985 they were abolished entirely. The consequence has been a wave of inflation.
Wages are being indexed to keep up, but whilst a Sandinista official assured me in June that workers' buying power was thus being maintained, the regime was admitting by November that this was not so:
"During the first six months of the year, prices for basic goods rose 300 per cent while the minimum wage increased only 165 per cent"
This is because the indexing of wages is based on official, controlled prices while in practice workers are often forced by shortages to resort to the free market. where inflation is worse. (The reader will note that the figures quoted above are taken together, a rather horrific picture of falling living standards emerges. suspect that the real picture is somewhat better. What matters, however, is that real wages have fallen significantly and are likely to keep falling).
Speed-up
At the same time, the government has begun to whittle away at fringe benefits...
At Fanatex, industrial action forced management to review the matter, though in the end the abolition of la traditional fringe benefit] went ahead. In the aftermath of the strike an indeterminate number of militants were victimised', and Daniel Ortega visited the factory along with an array of other top officials.
When the workers challenged him on the issue, Ortega responded by attacking 'ultra-left parties' calling themselves "Marxists or Trotskyists' who he said were allied to the right and were strengthening the forces of imperialism'.
In the aftermath of the dispute so many workers left their jobs at the plant that management attempted a speed-up drive to maintain production levels.
At the E. Chamorro factory in Granada, workers occupied the plant at the start of June, only to be attacked by police backed by the local CDS, and physically ejected While fringe benefits are under attack in the urban industrial sector, agricultural labourers are tacing a speed-up drive. The problem arises from the fact that in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, the labourers and their unions demanded and got substantial reductions in their workload....
Agriculture Minister Jaime Wheelock [said] in a speech to factory managers in early 1985:
"The (sugar workers) can't sow 600 shoots of cane as they are doing today, they have to sow the 1200 they sowed previously, and if possible they have to sow 1400 for the revolution. Because the Somoza regime got 1200 out of the workers".
All the criticisms one can make of the Nicaraguan leadership do not of course diminish in the slightest our responsibility to display principled solidarity with the Sandinistas against imperialist aggression. They do however impose an additional responsibility.
Serious socialists will display the same principled solidarity with the Nicaraguan workers when and where they come into conflict with a regime bent on imposing the logic of capitalist development on them. Not to do so would be to abandon the only force that is capable, potentially at least, introducing genuine socialist dynamic into the greatest revolution of recent times. 1 In the course of 1986 the Sandinista regime has shifted its emphasis from cooperatives backed towards individual peasant farming. (SO note). 21 confirmed this personally in a discussion at the factory gate. (TO'L note). Phil O'Brien's series on Latin America conținues next week.
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anti-Sandinista 'contras' A scandal has linked Vice-