No room for any compromise
Socialist Organiser1986 1986-10-23Read it in the scan (PDF), scan page 7 →
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Polled the streets inism': the red star, the hammer d sickle, etc. All of these they cortly identified with their oppression workers and as Hungarians under domination of Russia.
But they did not reject the essence the Communist programme: litical and economic control by the rking class democratically expressthrough their own state organisaThe programme of the workers" ncils was never fully proclaimed. vas often confused or partial, and ressed undue confidence in men Nagy. But everywhere three igs came clearly through: hat the workers control nomically and politically. hat the corrupt Stalinist bureaucracy be overthrown.
That small nations like Hungary have the right to self-determination.
Nowhere do we find the workers demanding that the factories and large estates be returned to their former owners. It is true that there were demands for the return of land to the small-holding tenant farmers, and for the right of the Catholic Church to freely worship. But genuine communists have never argued for the forcible collectivisation of small peasants or the forcible suppression of religious belief, however reactionary we may consider it to be.
Stalinists to this day proclaim that had the Russian tanks not intervened, the result would have been the restoration of capitalism and landlordism. In reality the situation was fluid. Right wing elements may well have seized the chance for themselves. But are we really to believe that the workers having claimed their right to rule would quietly hand over control to their former oppressors of the Horthy regime?
Collapse
In any case, a struggle for sociailsm by a genuine mass workers' movement is preferable to any amount of bureaucratic manoeuvring. Thousands of Hungarian communists themselves chose the former, and aided the rebellion. As an organisation, the CP virtually collapsed during the revolution. Caught between the Russians and the workers' councils was the Nagy government. Nagy's acceptance of the post of Prime Minister was widely welcomed by workers and intellectuals alike. He was, at least at first, seen as an honest and cultured communist, a victim of the Rakosi clique, who would strive to implement their demands.
But except for its most hardened members, the bureaucracy saw Nagy as a last chance to save themselves, a "liberal' figurehead who might quel the rebellion by his reputation and sweet promises.
Nagy himself had a vision of Hungarian communism at bottom no different from that of the other bureaucrats. But he did want to cleanse the regime of its more obvious corruptions and injustices. Above all, he wanted the regime to take on a more 'Hungarian' flavour; less crude control from Moscow and more freedom for intellectuals.
From the beginning he tried to serve both the Russian bureaucracy and the workers. He ended up satisfying neither. He welcomed the workers' councils, but cautiously, as healthy new groups with which to sweep out corruption, rathern than as organs of working class power. At the same time he sincerely believed that he could 'win the confidence' of the Russians, and persuade them that he was capable of retaining Hungary inside the Russian bloc.
But a situation of dual power allows for no such compromises. The situation moved too quickly for subtle and diplomatic manoeuvres. As the workers drew revolutionary conclusions, he tailed behind them -but was visibly unwilling to draw those conclusions himself. Russian confidence ebbed, especially as his constant appeals for the rebels to lay down their arms met with no response. When Nagy, in response to mass pressure, reluctantly declared Hungarian neutrality and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact (the Russiandominated alliance set up in the early 1950s as a counter to NATO and the imperialist rearmament of West Germany) this was too much for his Russian masters.
Withdrawal
On 30 October Nagy announced that the Russians had agreed to withdraw. Within two days, it was crystal clear that he had been deceived, and on 4 November the second week an all-out battle raged, until in assault on Budapest began. For the end the insurgent workers were crushed by overwhelming military might. The Russians, who had had to withdrew the troops used in the first assault because they were infected" by the spirit of those they were fighting and had become 'unreliable' brought in fresh troops for the final showdown. They had been primed with the lie that those whose resistance they were to smash were fascists and counter-revolutionaries...
As the Russians approached, Nagy found that overnight the bulk of his 'government' (a government in name only) had reneged and capitulated. He and a handful of supporters took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. A government entirely subservient to Moscow was installed, led by Janor Kadar — who is still there to this day Nagy's fate was to be different. Leaving the Yugoslav Embassy with an