Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

ANOTHER FRONT Sinn Féin Are neis 1986

Socialist Organiser no. 292, 16 November 1986 · scan pp. 5–6 · about 3,154 words

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perialism in all its forms, political, economic, military.

Such aims cannot possibly unite the working class, or define a democratic Ireland, because the Protestant Catholic workers of the South) identify with 'imperialist" workers of the North (and even a good many of the Presidential address by Gerry Adams - with Sean MrManic Martin Mresnr o e betor t tes eftPt DarSnr danyullless, and wanny British culture rather than Irish-Gaelic culture. (More on Sinn Fein's conference next week), Socialist Organiser no 292 13 November 1986 page 5.

social and cultural'.

Ireland or post-partition Ireland.

It is a question of whether a struggle such as ours can be advanced by opening up another front in a parliament of the establishment which oppresses us and the interests we seek to represent. As such, this question of electoralism as a means of revolutionary struggle has affected all struggles in areas where parliaments with universal suffrage exist. As with all such questions, the answer lies in the people's attitudes to those institutions.

Our experience has taught us that our struggle - and this affects every aspect of the struggle for national liberation - cannot be built merely on the republican perception of things. We have had to consistently pitch our struggle at the level of people's understanding and we have had to develop it from this commor denominator, taking into account, in an objective way, all the forces and factors involved.

It would be much easier, of course, if all the Irish people, or a large section of them, were born with our perception and our view of things, but this is not the case. It it was, there would be little need for a republican struggle. But there is such a need and if we want to win then there is a fundamental need to make it a people's struggle. Of course, if we have no concept of winning we can remain as we are — a party apart from the people, proud of our past but with little involvement in the present and only dreams for the future...

In the Six Counties, in regards to Stormont or Westminster, a sizeable section of nationalists and republicans feel no affinity with those institutions. In the 26 Counties it is different.

It is a massive mistake to presume that our republican attitude to Leinster House is shared by any more than a very small section of our people, especially the citizens of this state, who might otherwise be open to our policies on all other issues. It must also be clear that the reconquest of Ireland, much less a British withdrawal, cannot be completed without the support of more of these Of course we have a duty to point out to these people the shortcomings and the history of the present system, and we have a duty to win them to our view, but we can only do so at their level of understanding and we can only proceed from the objective reality their consciousness.

Rory O'Brady reading out a press statement at the West County Hotel in Dublin following his walk-out from the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis.

Photo: Derek Speirs/Report.

Those who first articulated T abstentionism could not foresee the political developments that were to take place, nor could they, or did they, lay down a course of action with a stipulation that it could never be changed.

As the political conditions change so must republican strategy change. Therefore present political conditions continue to be the dominant factor in producing a republican response to those conditions. Our experience teaches us that, as a group, we are often successful when we have a flexible approach. We are at our weakest when we are forced into a static political position where the most powerful forces of imperialism can be employed to isolate us.

We should not reject participation out of hand, but we should always be aware that such rejection may become essential. It also depends on the objective reality and conditions of the time.

The central issue is not abstencionism. It is merely a problematic, deeply-rooted and emotive symptom of the lack of republican politics and the failure of successive generations of republicans to grasp the centrality, the primacy and the fundamental need for republican politics. This truth must be grasped. It is a difficult one for many to accept given the conspiratorial and repressive nature of our past, our distrust for 'politics and politicians' and a belief that politics' Is inherently corrupt. But once it is grasped then everything else follows logically, especially the need to develop our struggle at the level of people's understanding.

noo often republicans have T appeared dogmatic on the question of abstentionism and yet successive leaderships and generations of republicans have at least passively, and in many cases actively, supported other political organisations in election campaigns.

This is certainly the case with Fianna Fail in the 26-County general election of 1932, later with Clann na Poblachta, and in our time with the late Frank Maguire, Frank McManus and Bernadette McAliskey and -although some of them will deny it now — it was also the case with Gerry Fitt, Paddy Devlin, and Paddy Kennedy. They wouldnot have been so successful on their entry into politics without republican support and in some of the above cases i was witness to, and in most cases opposed to, that support or at least to a 'standing aside' being agreed.

Some republicans believe that politics is the property of the establishment, that so-called 'constitutionalism' and politics are the same thing and thus that politics are inherently corrupt and corrupting. The logic of this is that de Valera was okay until he went into Leinster House, or that the opportunism of the Clann na Poblachta leadership only occurred after their entry into the 26-County parliament.

If we still believe that, then we don't know our own history and we have little concept of the class nature of this struggle.

For our part, this leadership has been actively involved in the longest phase ever of resistance to the British presence. Our record speaks for itself.

We have led from the front and from within the occupied area. We have learned that to be victorious a struggle for freedom must be a struggle of the people. We have said many times that even the most successful armed struggle in theSix Counties -and the struggle there is not merely an armed one - cannot achieve the Republic. W County-wide political e must develop a 32struggle. This is the most important task facing us at present. While consolidating our base in the Six Counties, we must develop a popular struggle here in the 26 Counties to complement the struggle in the Six County area.

Of necessity, this means, in order to advance at the level of people's consciousness, the removal of abstentionism in regard to Leinster House.

We all must share the daunting and massive task of interpreting and applying republicanism to changing and changed political conditions. Our failure to do this is one of the tragic failures of the past. The fundamental tenets of republicanism remain valid and are, of course, absolutely central to the resolution of our current national difficulties.

But no generation of republicans could or should ever merely absorb the teaching of previous generations.

Those who were successful in the past in advancing the republicated and even by one inch, updated and modernised the teaching and experiences of their predecessors. This is what Lalor did, what Pearse did, what Connolly did - and it is what we have to do also.

We have to develop a coherent social and political philosophy which provides a rationale for consistent political as well as armed action.

Such a process is one of continual interpretation and refinement in response to constantly changing social political reality:

Many republicans wandered in the political wilderness, isolated from the daily life and concerns of the people and unable to challenge or offer a viable alternative to the partitionist regimes in Ireland. This in turn has weakened the appeal and credibility of this struggle and limited our ability to think or act outside, and thus complementary to, the armed struggle, and it has prevented us from mobilising the broad masses of our people, not least in regards to the armed struggle.

We have at all times been more committed to rebellion than to revolution. The cement which held us together was physical force and, until recent times, physical force was applied in isolation, unsupported by organised political sentiment in the country.

The only feasible way to break our of our isolation, to make political gains, to win support for our policies, to develop our organisation and our struggle is by approaching people at the level they understand. This is the sad and unfortunate reality of the dilemma facing us. It cannot be dodged by highly moral rhetoric. It is an issue which we must face up to. This means Sinn Fein getting among people in the basic ways which the people accept.

It will mean the difference between another glorious defeat the development of strategies which can succeed.

T will not provide a 'magic he removal of absentionism wand' solution to all our problems. Indeed, in this state it merely clears the decks and it makes the burden of struggle heavier upon us all.

We have to cease being spectators of a struggle in the Six Counties and become pioneers of republicanism in the 26 Counties, putting our policies before the people, confident of the logic of the alternative which Irish republicanism offers.

I say this means risky political positions. This should not be underestimated.

The removal of abstentionism allied to implementation of the other necessities I have touched on here, and detailed in other addresses, will initiate an increase in our party membership and could change the political complexion of this party. It is important therefore that those who wish to change abstentionism now recommit themselves to this struggle and that those who are. opposed to change stay with us also.

We need to keep our republican gut. While developing the struggle in the 26 Counties we must never lose sight of our national objectives. We must change our strategies but must never let this change our objectives or aims.

We are a republican party committed to the struggle for national self-determination, committed to the overthrow of British rule in Ireland and to the end of partition and committed to bringing about the political and economic changes necessary for the well-being and security of this nation.

In other words, we are committed to the reconquest of Ireland by the Irish people. This means the expulsion of imperialism in all its forms, political, economic, military, social and cultural. It means the establishment of a real Irish republic and the organisation of the economy so that all its resources are under Irish control and organised to bring maximum benefit to the people in a 32-County state in which Irish culture and national identity is strong and confident.

In a sentence, what I am saying is that it's time for change, not just for republicans but for all the people of this state.

For too long the political pygmies of Leinster House have had things too easy, for too long they have been allowed a monopoly upon what passes for politics in this part of Ireland, and for too long a very sizeable section of Irish citizens have been denied the opportunity to shape and build as relevant, radical and principled alternative to partitionist rule.

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Phil O'Brien concludes his series on Latin America with a look at Argentina, the home of the subcontinent's largest and potentially most powerful organised working class.

general strike, the since Alfonsin President at the 1983, hit Argentina at the ing of last month.

Nobody expected the government to fall or even radically alter course as a result of the general strike. The strikes are essentially a protest against the consequences of the Plan Austral, the government's programme to try and stop Argentina's hyper-inflation - almost 700% in 1985 — and the government's commitment to service Argentina's foreign debt.

But the general strikes also highlight one of the paradoxes of Argentina: the existence of a combative, class-conscious, well-organised working class movement which is politically and ideologically anti-socialist.

The Argentine working class is, and has been for most of this century, the strongest working class in Latin America. But ever since the virtual "re-making" of the working class under Peronism from 1945 to 1955 the Argentinian trade union movement has been committed to a highly combative, often personally courageous struggle under the banner of Peronism which has led it nowhere.

There are signs that the Peronist movement is breaking up as the two major factions - the traditionalists and the renovators - fight for control, but there are no signs yet of the emergence of a socialist party based on the working class.

Argentina is a complex country. Until the latter half of the nineteenth century Argentina was a large, underpopulated territory.

Between 1890 and 1914 over four million European immigrants, three-quarters of these from Spain and Italy, came to Argentina, and over two million of these stayed. Argentina was classically an extension of EuroNightlife in Buenos Aires seventh became end of beginnpean space - comparable to Canada, Australia and New Zealand rather than Peru or Algeria. It was a country which saw itself as an outpost of European civilisation, At the turn of the century it also saw itself as the main rival to the USA to be the dominant power in Latin America. Through its exports of beef and wheat Argentina linked itself to the European market, especially Britain, Even as late as 1929 a British Ambassador could claim that "Argentina must be regarded as an essential part of the British Empire."

The European immigrants brought with them the traditions of the European anarchist movement, and from 1900 to 1930 the working class was dominated by anarchism, including the tradition of the general strike. In 1919 a general strike of a week left over 500 dead and thousands injured.

The Great Depression threw Argentina into turmoil, and the 1930s opened with a military coup which was to be a depressing harbinger for the next 50 years.

The Communist Party and others began to replace the influence of the anarchists. By 1941 the CP controlled the tour tastest growing trade unions the construction workers, textiles, metal workers, and the refrigeration workers. However the CP's policy of "no strikes during the war years cost it support, A coup by nationalist military men with sympathy for the Axis powers in 1943 led to a new strategy towards labour. Colonel Peron was put in charge of the Department of Labour, and from there he set about strengthening the trade unions to forge a nationalist and proindustrialist alliance.

Be made allies and removed ded labour legislation to give increased benefits to the workers. A whole generation of union leaders and activists began to look to the state for a resolution of their problems.

The workers were not just duped by a clever politician. Concrete benefits and power were given to them. The sinking of HMS Antelope The military hierarchy soon became alarmed at Peron's growing popularity, and dismissed him in 1945. The leadership of the Central Confederation of Labour decided to call a general strike on October 18, but already activists had organised the industrial areas of Buenos Aires and on October 17 hundreds of thousands marched into the centre. The military backed down, and in the 1946 elections Peron won with a massive popular mandate.

Thereafter the Argentine working class was drawn into a corporatist project that gave it real benefits and some real participation, but at the cost of any socialist project.

All working class movements are also processes of creation by the working class itself. The Peronist legacy was a deeply ambiguous one, but one which the working class movement itself helped create.

Peron's project of national economic development with social justice (hence the name of Peron's party - the Justicialist Party) won him the undying support of the working class. It was they who stood by him even when after his re-election in 1951 he moved rapidly to the right. It was only they who tried to defend him when the military ousted Peron by force in 1955.

Myths were created and re-created about the first Peron period. For the young Peronists in the 1970s, Peron's legendary first wife, Evita, became a sort of socialist saint.

As with all myths there was an element of truth. But at the same time Peron was corrupt, authoritarian, often brutal, and towards the end inefficient. But many of the workers felt that Peron gave them in the words of a union leader of the time "that most precious right of a human being - dignity"

Much of that dignity came from the workers' own struggles. For after 1944 a strong shop steward movement was created: through the cuerpo de delegados (a shop stewards plenary) which in turn elected a comision interna (a factory committee) the workers created powerful and democratic bodies within the factory nitself.

Peron had initially encouraged the creation of these bodies (hence their support for Peron in his exile), but he found that his corporatist project for labour frequently ran into problems of control with these organisations. He and subsequent governments would then try and use the trade union bureaucracy to control the comisiones internas.

The coup against Peron was to divide Argentina into two warring camps: the Peronists and the antiPeronists. For the next two decades the issue of Peronism dominated Argentina.

As the landowners, industrialists and the military tried to break the working class movement, that movement became more inextricably bound to Peronism. And Peronism without access to state power became more firmly based on the working class.

Trade unions became not only representatives of workers' economic interests but also in effect the political party of Peronism. The power of the workers was such that effectively all projects for restructuring Argentine society and economy foundered on confrontation with them.

In 1966 *General Ongania seized power through a military coup. He was determined to eradicate once and for all the power of Peronism and the trade unions. His efforts to follow the Brazilian model led to a movement of mass, and increasingly radicalised, resistance.

What was new about the resistance was the shift of radicalised middle class youth into an alliance with the still largely Peronist working class. This was also to be the era of Trotskyist-inspired guerrilla groups (notably the ERP) and the rapid growth of the armed peronist youth movement the Montoneros, who advocated a quasi-socialist programme.

Radicalisation grew rapidly, and in

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he question is wider than T one of principle or tactic and it is not unique to

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