Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

The end of military rule

Socialist Organiser no. 292, 16 November 1986 · scan p. 7 · about 1,306 words

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968 there was a massive outburst, virtually an urban insurrection, in Cordoba — a rapidly industrialising rity where the car industry had established its plants. Cordoba was uso the centre of left-wing Peronist rade unions, and other left trade unionists including Maoists and Trotikyists.

Cordoba, and outbursts in other sities, destroyed the Ongania project: Guerrilla groups became increasingly laring in their attacks. Ongania totered on until replaced first by General Levingston and then by General Lanusse.

By now direct action - strikes, ¡actory take-overs, guerrilla attacks - was sweeping Argentina. Lanusse realised that to hold back the tide of revolution he had to make a deal and recall Peron from exile.

In September 1973 Peron won the Presidential elections with 62% of he vote. But it immediately became lear that the Peronist movement tself had become an impossible uliance ranging from gangster trade inion bosses, anti-semitic quasilascists, workers expecting a return o the mythical days of the past, young Peronists convinced that Peron would introduce some sort of ocialism, armed groups - a medley united by only one thing, their allegiance to Peron.

Peron hoped to repeat the alliances manageable, rocked by galloping inflation. The army watched, biding their time and waiting for the "rotten apple to fall into theif laps".

In 1976 the armed forces moved, and almost without protest Isabel was deposed. This time the military were determined to wipe out once and for all "the subversives" who became anyone they felt disagreed with them.

In what became known as the "dirty war" , the armed forces launched a campaign of terror against their own population. Their favourite tactic between 15,000 and 30,000 disappeared. The level of brutality was astounding. Torture was endemic.

Physical repression was accompanied by the disbanding of Congress, banning of political parties, state takeovers in the trade unions, censorship etc.

An old Etonian, Martinez de Hoz, was appointed overlord of the economy. He attempted a monetarist model which never even managed to achieve the short-run increases in growth that Chile managed for three Some people, mainly in the banking sector, grew rich particularly out of the foreign loans which bankers were only too happy to lend to Argentina. A high percentage of these loans never stayed in Argentina * the same time Galtieri offered full support to US foreign policy, even going so far as to send Argentine military advisers to Central America. In a visit to the USA Galtieri was publicly praised by Reagan officials as a loyal ally and a great soldier. The Argentine government became convinced that the USA would at least remain neutral in any conflict over the Falklands.

The final decision to invade the Falklands was probably prompted as much by internal as external factors. A mass anti-government demonstration at the end of March 1982 was brutally dispersed with one person killed. The trade unions called for a general strike. On April 2 Argentina occupied the Falklands to the hysterical acclaim of the mass of the Argentinian people.

The Montoneros in exile, many of whose comrades had been brutally tortured to death by the military, offered to return to fight for the islands. And in a bizarre capitulation to an absurd act of nationalistic posturing by a brutal military dictatorship, sectors of the international lett supported the take-over of the islands, interpreting it through some strange logic as an anti-imperialist act, The re-occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by the British armed forces marked the death-knell of the Argentine dictatorship. The military tried to hang on for some time in order to negotiate an amnesty for themselves.

Sectors of the Peronist movement flirted with the military. It was a flirtation which cost them dearly. Alfonsin campaigned hard on the issue of an honest government, and one which would investigate the crimes of the military. He won the election convincingly even picking up votes in what had traditionally been the solid Peronist areas of the industrial cities.

The return to democracy in Argenrina opened up a new era for the Argentine working class. Peronism had really died with Peron in 1974, but a decade of repression had kept it aliyt is a slow death: the old guard are not going to disperse without a fight. Peronism still remains in many ways a source of class identity for many workers.

M tually voted for Alfonsin, any workers may have acbut they have resolutely resisted any attempt to change the unions from above. The attempt by the Radicals to gain a serious foothold in the unions did not get very far. Some of the corrupt, Mafiastyle union bosses are still in power, but there has been a shift towards a weakening of the more traditional Peronist authoritarian populist labourism.

But the bitter internal fights in the Peronist movement have weakened the ability of the workng class to respond to Alfonsin's economic programme, and to offer any alternatives.

Alfonsin started off with a number of radical measures, above all that of arresting and putting on trial nine of the former military rulers for their part in the "dirty war" . This was an unprecedented move in Latin America, and one which won Alfonsin the recent European Prize for Human Rights. The trials have also helped make public the unbelievable brutality of the dirty war.

The military are deeply resentful of such acts, and sectors of them went so far as to plant a bomb when Alfonsin visited the Cordoba regiment. But in many ways the military as an institution has not been reformed as perhaps it could have been in the wake of their defeat in the Falklands. The military presence behind the scenes is still very strong, and their potential for intervention remains.

Trials are still continuing, but there is pressure on Alfonsin to call a halt and unless there is a public outcry it is likely that he will end them. The trade union movement has on the whole not taken up the demand to try those guilty of crimes during the dictatorship.

But in other areas Alfonsin has been very conservative. After initially threatening to take some radical measures on the debt which as Alfonsin said must be the only debt of almost $50 billion in the world for which there is nothing to show in Argentina, Alfonsin has adopted the line of not taking any unilateral initiative on its debt. And although the evidence of corruption surrounding Advertisement the debt is enormous, there has been no attempt to try anyone for financial corruption. -Instead the government is attempting a tax and financial amnesty to tempt back some of the billions a few Argentinians have abroad.

The economic problems facing Argentina are enormous: a fifty year cycle of economic decline and stagnation, and in the last few years an hyper-inflation. In the end the Radical government went for an orthodox economically conservative programme which put the burden of readjustment onto the wages of the workers.

The Plan Austral has already reduced the level of real wages by 27% - hence the constant call for general strikes. The attempt to woo the capitalist class to invest has not had much success.

Alfonsin's appeal — and he is still highly popular — is basically that he is honest and decent: rare virtues in the last decades of Argentinian If the combative Argentinian working class can rid itself of the authoritarian, gangsterish element in its trade unions, and if it can begin to offer an alternative to an austerity programme which is cutting living standards and not much else, then it could play a leading role in the reconstruction of Argentina. But to do that the working class would have to move in the direction of socialism.

Class consciousness and class combativity are not in themselves sufficient as the history of Argentina shows. A coherent_socialist programme is also needed.

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