Socialist Organiser

Paper of the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory, the Socialist Organiser Alliance and the fused WSL, 1978 to 1986

Interview with an Iranian Iran

Socialist Organiser no. 293, 20 November 1986 · scan pp. 10–11 · about 1,688 words

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Socialist Organiser no 293 20 November 1986 page 10 Is the regime in a stable situation at present?

It is unstable and for two important reasons: the war and the worsening economic situation. both of which have enhanced internal contradictions.

Because of the war, oil exports have dropped considerably and as a result, the economy is in a very bad state. This has sharpened the arguments within the government. One faction favours state capitalism, the other strongly advocates a free market economy.

In the past Khomeini has intervened to reconcile the two factions, but in recent months his interventions have failed.

What is the regime's motivation in continuing the war?

The government continues the war because it sees no other solution. It blames the current economic problems on the war and can appeal to a sense of patriotism as long as the war continues. It wants to keep on the war to delay a final reckoning, but it cannot do that forever.

On a practical level, there are a lot of arguments between the army and the Pasdaran, Khomeini's revolufionary guards, with regard both to the length of the war and day to day tactics.

The Army is in favour of not risking too much, of making small advances and then holding peace talks. The Pasdaran are in favour of "conquering" Iraq and carrying on from there.

To what extent does it make sense to argue in terms of 'the revolution (of February 1979, which brought down the Shah's regime) being undefeated'? This suggests that February 1979 was a vaguely or potentially socialist revolution, rather than what was arguably a seizure of power by the mullahs who effectively functioned as a political party.

It is true to say that before 1979 there were a lot of genuinely revolutionary forces who were fighting against the Shah. The strikes, for example, were not planned by the clergy, but once they happened, then everyone tried to build their own base in them. And there were many demonstrations, especially the more violent ones towards the end of the Shah's regime, which the clergy had not hoped for and did not welcome.

Khomeini and Bazargan, his Prime Minister, hoped to be able to achieve a smooth transfer of power. But by February 1979 two different movements had emerged: a genuine revolutionary movement which did not have a clear strategy or programme; and the clergy and bourgeois elements, such as Bazargan, who looked towards a mited and peaceful transition.

These forces were in contradiction each other before February 1979, and the contradiction became more anute thereatter The mullahs had the opportunit develp their forces, due to their inks with the bazaar, their degree of gaminaton, and also becase they did not face repression as much as the eft. This was meant to set the scene for a peaceful transfer of power in anuary.

But what did not go according A supporter of the Organisation of Iranian People's Fedaii Guerillas spoke to Socialist Organiser about the situation in Iran.

plan were the events of January and February: the development of political strikes and the attacks on army and airforce barracks, which partially weakened the state without destroying it. The clergy, however, were able to stop such actions by calling on people to hand over their arms. and return home.

Hence the revolution is unaccomplished, it has not been carried. through to the end. The Left made a major mistake in going for a broad alliance. It was not clear about the programme for secialist change and dissolved itself in mass demonstrations. The idea of a united front against the Shah blinded people to more determined class politics, such as continuing the political strikes, which had no goal other than bringing down the Shah.

But the events of 1979 had a longterm effect - people remember that they have the power to change things, they remember the power of a mass movement. And this is still recent Insofar as information is available, what is the form and level of working class opposition to the regime at present?

There was a period when there were only sporadic strikes, rather than a continuous series of strikes. But in the last 18 months there have been a lot more strikes and go-slows.

Previously, the government could buy raw materials and thereby buy time for itself. But in the last year this has been almost impossible — a lot of European firms are not giving credit to the government, and European firms are not even sending spare parts because they know that they cannot be paid for The severe shortage of raw materials has led to closures with huge numbers of workers being made redundant, or forced to work a shorter working week - or factories operating only six months of the year in other workplaces.

Unemployment is the worst thing that can happen to anyone in Iran. Prices have risen because of the war, so if you are out of work there is no way that you can live. So there is no more widespread opposition to the regime than there was two years ago.

There have been many strikes, with cases of occupations and sit-ins. In some cases the government has not one in and created confrontation.

his shows that the government is scared. Some strikes have achieved their goal, such as the strike by workers in the Tehran bus company for better pay and conditions. The basis for working class opposition to the regime is very strong. The regime is not faced by a simple problem that will go away. The fall in the price of oil makes it even more difficult to provide raw materials and keep factories going. Rations are now being put on fuel, and this will affect production as well, especially in winter.

But there is not any form of coordination between workers in the different factories. This would require a more open organisation, which is not possible under present repressive conAs an alternative to the current regime, last year's Labour Party conference agreed to support the National Council of Resistance (NCR -set up by the ideologically Islamic Mojahedin organisation, and consisting largely of the Mojahedin alone) of which the programme proposes severe limitations on, among others, the rights of workers, women, and national minorities. This year's conference adopted a more ambiguous position. But how much support is there in Iran now for the Mojahedin and their NCR?

The Mojahedin lost a lot of support around 1984, mainly because they had encouraged people to believe that they would soon come to power, but then people realised that nothing was happening. So the Mojahedin turned to trying to gain support abroad.

Resentment grew because the MoJahedın sought support from anyone, irrespective of their politics, and the government used that to discredit them - anti-imperialist sentiments are still very strong in Iran. The Mojahedin were further discredited by claiming that organisations which had left the NCR were still in it.

The NCR never had much popularity in Tran, It was mainly known through the Mojahedin, and as they lost credibility, so too did the NCR. The programme of the NCR, which advocates a series of reforms to maintain the capitalist system, did not. aim to mobilise the people for revolution. On the other hand, the Iranian people are experiencing for the first time a religious state, an Islamic state, which interferes in everything, both private and public. A lot of people have lost interest in religion, and even those who maintain their beliefs realise that this religious interference is bad for religion. So not many people will support another Islamic Republic, as advocated by the Mojahedin and the NCR.

CODIR (formerly Committee for the Defence of the Iranian Revolution, now Committee for the Defence of the Iranian People's Rights) enjoys considerable support from sections of the trade union bureaucracy in this country, especially those sympathetic to the Communist Party, presumably because CODIR is merely the mouthpiece of the formerly proKhomeini Tudeh Party (Moscowloyal Iranian Communist Party). But how active is the Tudeh Party in Iran?

A few weeks ago Kianouri and Tabari (Tudeh Party leaders who repented after their arrest) spoke to all imprisoned party members who had refused to repent and Tudeh prisoners expressed their hatred of the party and its leaders.

The Tudeh Party does not have many people outside prison. Up to March 1983, when the regime turned against the Tudeh Party, they saw themselves as allies of| a "revolutionary government", so they did not leave anyone underground. But now many of them are abroad, either in Europe or in the Eastern European countries.

The name of the Tudeh Party is now synonymous with treachery. The Iranian Left cannot survive unless it isolates the Tudeh Party. It is not simply a difference of ideas, it goes well beyond that. The Tudeh Party and the majority Fedayeen helped actively the Islamic authorities in the most severe period of repression against revolutionary and socialist forces in 1980-1 and 1982 as well as the first month of 1983, prior to their own arrest. The only hope of the Tudeh Party is to get support outside Iran, because inside Iran people just don't want to know about the TudehParty:

What is the likely course of developments in Iran over the next few months?

It is very difficult to say. Everyone believes that the next stage of the war will be very important. The Iranian government has accumulated vast forces but has delayed the attack -the pressure from inside the government is increasing, to win the war or stop it.

If it is not victorious in the offensive, which is likely, given the conflicts in the government, and between the army and the Pasdaran, then dissatisfaction with the regime will gain a more open form.

The opposition will then hopefully no longer be passive but a revolutionary movement against the war, because that has become the crucial issue now, and the present government cannot obtain, and does not want, peace. So the only way out is the overthrow of the Islamic Republic.

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